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Peace journalism or war journalism? A comparative analysis of the coverage 
of Israeli and Turkish newspapers during the Gaza flotilla crisis 
Haluk Dag  
This thesis examines the peace journalism model, created by Johan Galtung in the 
1970s, and argues that the model could be an alternative approach for the mainstream 
news media’s reporting practices, especially in times of conflict. In his model, Galtung 
presents peace journalism and war journalism as two competing frames in the news 
coverage of conflict. For the present study, I applied both textual analysis and 
quantitative content analysis to the coverage of the Gaza flotilla crisis of 2010 between 
Israel and Turkey in two English-language daily newspapers from Israel (The Jerusalem 
Post and Ha’aretz) and two from Turkey (Today’s Zaman and Hürriyet Daily News) 
between May 31
st
 and June 30
th
 2010. The analysis showed that more than two-thirds of 
the articles could be classified as dominant war journalism framing, compared to slightly 
more than one-quarter as peace journalism. The analysis focused on the newspapers’ 
provocative role in the crisis, as well as the story types (news report, editorial, op-eds, 
etc.), the production source of stories, the indicators of peace and war journalism, and the 
relationships between these factors. Moreover, I examined the viability of the peace 
journalism model and tested its ways of telling stories through rewriting the articles used 
in the present case study. The thesis concludes that some principles of the model could be 
more easily adopted by journalists than others. However, without reforming the structural 
problems at the root of modern journalism, it is unlikely that the peace journalism model 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The news media are an important source of information about current events and 
play a key role in influencing public opinion, especially during in times of war. As Ross 
(2006) remarks, media play a crucial role in international affairs and conflicts because 
citizens are dependent on media to provide timely, credible information of distant events. 
This dependence arises because citizens often do not have the means or the expertise to 
obtain first-hand information about distant events and conflicts, leading them to rely on 
the news media to provide coverage. The news media’s role is vital because, as Ross 
argues, in times of conflict misleading information is a primary contributor to the rising 
fear that can increase the potential for violent conflict. Receiving accurate information 
from the news media may help reduce the risk of conflict. 
However, the news media’s role in reporting conflicts faces many challenges, 
including over-dependence on government and military sources. It is not surprising that 
nowadays, military strategists consider journalists to be important elements in their pre-
war planning. Governments and militaries are careful about how they control the news 
flow and influence public opinion through the news media. After nearly every major 
conflict in recent decades, academic studies have focused on several themes, including, 
but not limited the following: the news media’s over-reliance on violence as a news 
value; the strong influence of governments and militaries on news coverage; triumphalist 
military language; the oversimplification of facts and disregard for background 
information; the exclusion of vulnerable groups; and the conflict between professional 
journalism norms and patriotism (Bennett, 2003; Reese, 2004; Patrick and Thrall, 2007; 
Lee, 2010).  These tendencies emphasize a binary situation that creates polarization 
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between groups in conflict, potentially escalating tensions. Such coverage may also reduce 
the ability to fully understand the political choices governments face when conflicts arise.  
Additionally, these practices inhibit citizens from participating in public debates on 
policies and attempting to influence or pressure government decision makers. 
In this thesis I argue that even though, the peace journalism model faces 
theoretical and practical challenges, it offers an alternative approach for the mainstream 
news media’s reporting practices. I examine the viability of the peace journalism model 
and test its ways of telling stories through rewriting the articles used in the present case 
study. I also provide a literature review to contribute to the still-emerging field of peace 
journalism.  
Peace journalism stems from the work of Norwegian peace researcher Johan 
Galtung who, working with Mari Ruge, published the pioneering work The Structure of 
Foreign News in 1965. This study examined a number of core principles that form the 
basis for peace journalism, including the rejection of violence as a news value in 
international reporting (Lee, 2010). The peace journalism model emerged in the 1990s as 
an alternative, trans-disciplinary field by using conflict analysis. The model can be seen 
as a remedy to the shortcomings of the news media’s reporting practices, and more 
specifically their conflict reporting practices. Advocates of peace journalism claim that 
journalists participate, and represent, the events they are reporting on, thus undermining 
journalism’s avowed objectivity and independence. According to the model, a peace 
journalist should expose truths from all sides and expose all cover-ups, focus on those 
who suffer, give voice to vulnerable groups and name the evil on all sides. Additionally, 
the model highlights journalists’ emphasis on non-violent options for conflict resolution. 
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Another distinct feature of peace journalism, according to Lynch and McGoldrick (2005), 
is its use of conflict analysis in order to promote balance, fairness and accuracy in 
reporting. Also, it provides a new way to trace the connections among journalists, their 
sources, the stories they cover, and the consequences of their journalism. Finally, it builds 
an awareness of non-violence and creativity into the practical job of everyday editing and 
reporting. 
Galtung (1998) argues that today’s dominant conflict reporting practices, which 
he calls war journalism, depict adversaries as belonging to one of two sides, and portrays 
combatants as struggling to impose their goals on the public. This type of journalism is 
war/violence-oriented, it focuses on a conflict area, and on the visible effects of violence 
without providing background information. War journalism effectively demonizes the 
‘other’ side and speaks on behalf of ‘us’. War journalism is propaganda-oriented in that 
it relies on official sources and promotes propaganda while revealing ‘their’ crimes. It is 
elite-oriented because it focuses only on ‘our’ suffering, and serves as a mouthpiece of 
official sources and elite males. Finally, it is victory-oriented; it sees peace as a result of 
victory and tends to report only once the conflict starts. War journalism repeatedly 
reflects the warrior logic of elites and calls for hatred and more violence to avenge and 
stop the ‘other’ side. In this two-sided form of journalism, one side inevitably wins and the 
other must lose. Moreover, Galtung (2002) points out the similarities between war 
journalism and the neo-fascist theory of war termination: “let them fight and kill each other 
until they are ready to negotiate” (p.262).  
In contrast, the application of peace journalism focuses on conflict transformation 
and seeks prevention before any violence or war occurs. It is peace-oriented in that it 
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tries to analyse/transform conflicts, it represents all parties and gives voice to empathy, 
explains conflicts in a broader context, focuses on less visible impacts of conflict such as 
trauma or cultural damage, and sees conflict as a problem without blaming and 
demonizing others. It is truth-oriented 
1
 because it tries to expose propaganda messages -- 
disguised as information -- and reveals untruths on all sides. It is people-oriented; by 
giving voice to vulnerable groups, it focuses on suffering all over. Instead of heavily 
relying on official sources or elites, and represents the suffering of ordinary people.  
Finally, it is solution-oriented; it sees peace as a result of non-violence and creativity, 
focuses on a peaceful society and conflict resolution. It is worth noting that all these 
aspects are consistent with standards of good journalism ideals. Galtung (2002, 2008) 
repeatedly argues that journalists should be in favour of peace journalism, despite the fact 
that war journalism is the dominant paradigm in the news media. The author maintains 
that journalists should prefer the peace journalism model because it is the moral answer; 
peace journalism’s focus on solving conflicts may reduce human suffering while 
providing a more accurate portrayal of what is going on in the world.  
This highly critical and provocative model suggests that while most journalism 
presents itself as neutral or objective, it is actually focuses on war and favors conflict 
(Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). Peace journalism has been enriched by contributions from 
various war reporters and scholars, and it continues to gain an increasing amount of 
support. War reporters, especially in the 1990s (when they witnessed the Bosnian and 
Rwandan genocides, the wars in Iraq and Kosovo), have been deeply affected by 
journalism’s passive stance towards these types of atrocities. Many war reporters began 
to support the active involvement of journalism in favour of vulnerable groups. At the 
                                               
1 As Lynch (2008) explains, the model doesn’t offer the ‘truth’ but uses it to reveal propaganda messages.  
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same time, as Kempf (2003) remarks, scholars also started to think about how the 
influence of the media can be used for the prevention and constructive transformation of 
conflicts. The majority of news media have failed to adopt the peace journalism model 
and it has remained a subject of disagreement among scholars. 
To explain the peace journalism model, I will discuss the various debates over 
conflict reporting practices and examine the emergence of peace journalism its 
contributions to reporting practices. Moreover, scholarly criticisms directed towards the 
peace journalism model will be investigated and the new theoretical approaches proposed 
to solve these challenges will be reviewed. Additionally, I will discuss conflict analysis to 
better understand the goals of peace journalism. Since its emergence, peace journalism’s 
ethical stance, its theoretical shortcomings and its reinterpretation of journalism’s 
objectivity norm have been the main targets of criticism by various academics and 
journalists. However, as peace journalism advocates argue, journalists are implicated in 
the events that they cover and so the standard approach to objectivity doesn’t produce 
independent or objective accounts of conflict.  
This thesis project examines the Gaza flotilla crisis of 2010 between Israel and 
Turkey as a case study to explore how peace journalism could be helpful in real-world 
conflict situations. The Gaza flotilla was organized by the Turkish Humanitarian Relief 
Foundation (IHH) to bring humanitarian aid and break Israel’s blockade over the Gaza 
Strip. However, on May 31, 2010, Israeli commandos overtook the ships while in 
international waters. During the confrontation between Israeli commandos and pro-
Palestinian activists, nine activists died and many others wounded, including a number of 
commandos. After the operation, the surviving activists and journalists were detained and 
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interrogated. From the early hours of the operation, I followed the crisis closely. I also 
had the opportunity to visit the flotilla’s main ship, the Mavi Marmara, when it visited 
Istanbul months later and to listen to the stories of the activists. The Gaza flotilla incident 
was a major topic for Israeli and Turkish news media. Hundreds of articles were 
published on the issue, and demonstrations were organized worldwide to protest the 
killing of activists. The United Nations (UN) also created a commission to investigate the 
Gaza flotilla incident.   
For this research project, after briefly examining the historically close relationship 
between Israel and Turkey before the crisis, I will address the following research 
questions:  
RQ1 – How did the coverage of the Gaza flotilla crisis by The Jerusalem Post, 
Ha’aretz, Today's Zaman and Hürriyet Daily News reflect war journalism? 
RQ2 - How could the techniques of peace journalism help journalists avoid these 
pitfalls and become independent of government and military sources during times of 
conflict? 
RQ3 - Can war journalism articles be reconstructed using the principles of peace 
journalism and still meet recognized standards of good journalism? What differences 
would emerge from such an exercise? 
Using textual analysis and quantitative content analysis, I will examine the 
coverage of two Israeli newspapers, The Jerusalem Post and Ha’aretz, and two Turkish 
newspapers, Today’s Zaman and Hürriyet Daily News between May 31st and June 30th 
2010, at the first month of the crisis. I hope to reveal their provocative role in the conflict. 
Moreover, I will explore indicators of peace and war journalism and their relationships 
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with story types. To address the last research question, I will identify three main 
exemplary themes. For each theme, I will select one representative article from each 
newspaper (four in total) and rewrite one peace journalism article, guided by Galtung’s 
principles of peace journalism: to transform conflict into peaceful discussions, to use 
softer language in order to reduce tension, to avoid ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ journalism, to give 
voice to vulnerable groups, and to use conflict analysis to understand the roots of the 
conflict and give historical background information to tell stories from a wider 
perspective. I hope to shed light on the shortcomings of the coverage from the Israeli and 
Turkish media. These reconstructed articles will be compared to the original sources in 
order to observe differences in tone, content and vocabulary. It is also my hope that they 















Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The role of media in conflicts  
To understand the peace journalism model, the shortcomings and structural 
problems of conflict reporting must be considered. Conflict and war reporting are 
probably the most sensitive and challenging fields for professional journalists. As noted 
by Moorcraft and Taylor (2008), while domestic reporting may sometimes topple 
governments, war reporting could lead to actual deaths. Similarly, drawing on MacMillan 
(2003), Gasher (2004) argues that war reporting is a particularly significant branch of 
journalism because individual lives, political regimes, and even the future of nation-states 
depend on whether, and how, the war is fought. The news media’s role of informing 
citizens is especially crucial in times of conflict because, as Ross (2006) states, 
information failures are a primary contributor to the rising fear that can increase the 
potential for violent conflicts. It can be said that providing accurate information to 
citizens may help reduce the risk of conflict. As peace journalism proponents argue, 
reporting practices, even peacetime reporting, generally emphasize two-sided conflict. 
This is particularly problematic in the context of military conflict because it has a 
polarizing effect that widens the division between groups or nations; it may also create 
hatred, xenophobia and even trigger violence. After nearly every major conflict in the last 
decade, research has been conducted on the structural problems faced by journalists 
reporting on conflict. 
A common structural problem of conflict reporting is journalists’ over-
dependence on official sources that promote their own ‘truths’ and tend to use 
disinformation and propaganda techniques in order to influence news flow. That is why 
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peace journalism recommends journalists avoid heavy reliance on official sources, 
instead broadening their range of sources in order to give vulnerable groups such as 
women, the elderly, children and minorities who tend to be the real victims of conflict. 
Many war journalists are encouraged to cover conflicts and wars from isolated places 
such as military command centres or conference rooms. Not surprisingly their main 
sources of information become military spokespeople or government officials; through 
press conferences, they could influence the flow and interpretation of information.  
A good example of this tendency can be seen in the documentary Control Room 
(Naujaim, director, 2004), which focuses on how journalists all around the world covered 
the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 while based in an American military command 
centre in Qatar. The documentary proposes that adopting a perspective contrary to that of 
the military forces can be detrimental, or even fatal, for journalists who try to report 
independently on the ground or work without being embedded. To support this argument, 
Control Room explores the U.S. army’s ‘friendly fire’ attacks on journalists in Baghdad, 
especially the attack on Al Jazeera’s headquarters and the killing of its correspondent, 
Tareq Ayyoub. The Nation magazine’s correspondent Jeremy Scahill similarly talks 
about the killing of Tareq Ayyoub and notes that despite the U.S. Central Command’s 
statement that “coalition forces came under significant enemy fire from the building 
where the Al-Jazeera journalists were working”, no evidence was ever produced to 
bolster this claim (Scahill, 2005). The author also discusses the killing of other journalists 
in Iraq and gives a voice to Reuters's global managing editor David Schlesinger: “we 
have had three deaths, and they were all non-embedded, non-coalition nationals and they 
were all at the hands of the U.S. military, and the reaction of the U.S. authorities in each 
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case was that they were somehow justified”. According to Scahill, in many of these cases 
“the journalists, mostly Arabs, were reporting on places or incidents that the military may 
not have wanted the world to see -- military vehicles in flames, helicopters shot down, 
fierce resistance against the ‘liberation’ forces, civilian deaths” (Scahill, 2005).  
Shoemaker and Reese (1996) discuss other reasons for this dependence by 
touching on the political economy of journalism. According to the authors, official 
sources and militaries provide a convenient and regular flow of information, which is 
efficient for journalists who work under the pressure of deadlines. Also, for media outlets 
it reduces the need for expensive specialists and extensive research. In other words, 
official sources provide irrefutable, ready-to-serve information to the news media. 
However, this dependence may lead to uncritical acceptance of how official sources 
choose to frame events. Moreover, as advocates of peace journalism argue, it may 
increase the use of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ journalism that aligns journalists with governmental 
and military interests: 
The routines involved in the media-military relationship have their own logic that 
shapes news content beyond the simple suppression or censorship of news. They 
impose an interpretive framework that works against alternative perspectives. As 
with other media-source relationships, the strong dependence of journalists on the 
military information can produce co-optation, leading to uncritical acceptance of 
military frames of reference (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996, p.136) 
 
Another important structural issue, also a major obstacle for peace journalism 
practices, is pressure from the governments and militaries on news flow. In their research, 
Reese and Buckalew (1995) examine the coverage of the first Iraq War by an American 
TV station and reveal how television news adopts patriotic language and supports 
administration policy, as well as creates an “illusion of triumph”. Bennett (2003) analyses 
the intertwined relationship between media and the U.S. government during the invasion 
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of Iraq. He describes it as a near perfect journalistic participation in government 
propaganda operations. Bennett concludes that campaigns from the Bush administration 
intimidated and suppressed those who tried to oppose and question government policies 
in the media. Likewise, Reese (2004) indicates that in front-line coverage, journalistic 
routines are clearly specified: “military officials desire positive accounts of their 
activities, to “get their story out,” and to simply accommodate the demands of the many 
news organizations seeking access to the story” (p.3). Similarly, in their paper focused on 
the communication strategies of the Bush presidency after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
Patrick and Thrall (2007) discuss how American presidents, when at their most 
influential, dominate the news and make it difficult for critics to gain a foothold. 
Wolfsfeld (1997) focuses on similar problems. The author explains that when authorities 
succeed in dominating the political environment, they have no trouble at all taking 
control of the news media and imposing their messages. Also, he observes that a lack of 
alternative sources leads to a united front against the enemy and the news media are 
reluctant to be cast as traitors and therefore tend to support dominant official 
perspectives.  
Journalists who cover conflicts are not servants to official sources or so naive that 
they report whatever they are told. As trained professionals, they are well aware of 
challenges, manipulations and pressures that they face. However, journalists are not 
working in an isolated world; they are surrounded by conflicting economic and national 
interests. Additionally, in times of conflict, the expectation of the audience dramatically 
changes towards more patriotic coverage and puts additional pressure on journalists. In 
summary, pressure from outside interest groups and their audiences, journalism’s 
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political-economic realities, sometimes reporters' lack of experience and other challenges 
compel journalists to cooperate with government and military sources, to cover conflicts 
in particular ways that is identified as war journalism. 
Herman and Chomsky’s (1998) propaganda model is illuminating to understand 
certain structural problems and shortcomings of the mass media. The model suggests 
American mainstream media as operating in a propaganda system that emphasizes 
corporate and government influence on the news flow. As Hackett (2006) remarks, 
Herman and Chomsky’s findings correspond to certain war journalism characteristics 
such as double standards that reflect an elite-orientation, emphasize ‘our’ side and see 
other side as moral and righteous, and perceives the other side as evil and the cause of the 
conflict. The propaganda model consists of five filters in which propaganda messages are 
created. The first filter is through corporate ownership of the media. In our globalized 
word, media outlets are increasingly taken over by corporations and multi-national 
companies; therefore editorial policies tend to be uncritical and supportive of corporate 
interests. The second filter is advertising. To cover production costs and compete with 
other media outlets, the news media need to attract corporate advertising revenue. This 
dependence on advertising revenue creates “a greater integration of editorial and business 
operations, more product placements, cutbacks in investigative reporting and analysis, 
more controversy-avoidance, and greater manageability by governments and other power 
centres” (Mullen,2009, p. 14). The third filter is news media dependence on official and 
corporate sources. The propaganda model suggests that by relying on ‘trusted’ official 
sources, the news media give these sources additional power to promote their own agenda 
and influence news flow. The peace journalism model empathizes people-oriented 
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journalism instead. The fourth filter is flak, which can be defined as negative reaction to 
media coverage by power groups, hired PR companies, institutions, governments or 
audience members. Flak creates pressure on journalists and may discourage them from 
covering certain sensitive issues, or affect the way those issues are covered. The final 
filter was originally identified with anti-communism, but after the collapse of 
communism, “the ‘war on terror’ has provided a useful substitute for the Soviet menace. 
Also, the antithesis of communism, the ‘free market’ has been elevated to more 
prominent ideological status, and has proven to be a strong co-replacement for anti-
communism and the basis for the new world order of neoliberalism” (Mullen,2009, p.15). 
This filter also matches war journalism’s distinct feature of demonizing or dehumanizing 
the ‘other’ side. Especially during times of conflict, demonization of the ‘other’ is an 
important tool to neutralize criticisms at home, and helps to justify aggressive and violent 
government policies. However, as Hackett’s (2006) research indicates, the propaganda 
model has certain limitations; it tends towards reductionism and it oversimplifies the 
complexity of the news system. In particular, it does not focus on the way journalists 
exercise agency within the newsroom and it disregards how audiences interpret the news. 
Drawing on Allan (2004), Hackett states that the propaganda model also risks:  
Reducing the news media to tired ideological machines confined to performing 
endlessly, and unfailingly, the overarching function of reproducing the 
prerogatives of an economic and political elite through processes of mystification. 
Journalists would then become little more than well-intentioned puppets whose 
strings are being pulled by forces they cannot fully understand (p.4).  
 
As a result of their dependence on official sources and close relationships between 
the news media and governments, news media can’t easily remain neutral and tend to 
promote their government perspectives in terms of conflict (Bennett, 2003; Reese & 
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Buckalew, 1995). Additionally, Liebes (1992) notes that during wars and conflicts, 
journalists face conflicting pressures of commitment to their own society and its fate, and 
loyalty to the demands and norms of journalism. Therefore, war coverage puts 
journalism to the test of choosing between patriotic enthusiasm and morale-building, or a 
distant and analytical stance. In other words, journalists face a dilemma between ‘our 
war’ and ‘their war’, a choice that mirrors Galtung’s war journalism description.  
The predominance of government and military sources in the media also 
undermines the news media’s role as a monitor of governments and power groups, the 
supposed mission of watchdog journalism. Waisbord (2000) emphasizes that freedom of 
the press must be a main condition for watchdog journalism and considers economic 
independence the only way to arrive at press freedom and solidify the ideals of the 
watchdog press.  
One of the main critiques put forward by peace journalism is the over-reliance on 
violence as a news value. Lee (2010) argues that because of this over-reliance, conflict 
reporting suffers from many weaknesses. These include sensationalism, identification with 
the home side, overemphasis on tangible losses such as human casualties and material 
damage, military triumphantist language, and a superficial narrative with little context, 
background, or historical perspective (Lee, 2010, p.362). As the peace journalism model 
points out, due to oversimplification, conflict coverage tends not to give background 
information about the complexities of conflicts and only focuses on the visible effects such as 
the human casualties or physical damages. An example can be seen in Gasher (2004), in 
which the study reveals how Time and Newsweek adopted President George W. Bush’s 
oversimplified ‘good versus evil’ framing in their coverage of the Iraq War in 2003. 
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Finally, Vincent (2000) and Avraham (2003) criticize ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ journalism 
and the demonization of the other side in times of conflict. Vincent (2000) reveals that 
during NATO’s military operation in Kosovo in 1999, the U.S. mainstream media 
enthusiastically used official Western viewpoints in their coverage that discredited and 
demonized Serbs. Also, the quest for balanced and fair journalism was ignored. Avraham 
(2003) also shows how politics enters every level of coverage and how the social-
political environment affects the way in which news media organizations cover 
minorities in a conflict-riddled country like Israel. Due to these social-political 
conditions, the Israeli news media tend to ignore Arab minorities and their suffering 
(Avraham, 2003).  
Emergence of the peace journalism model  
 As discussed in this chapter, several academic studies have highlight 
shortcomings of the news media’s approach to conflicts. Aslam (2011) remarks that in 
the debate about what should be the news media’s role in conflicts, peace journalism 
emerged along with other concepts, such as civic journalism, caring journalism, citizen 
journalism, reliable journalism, and innovative journalism. Each focused on the social 
responsibility of the media and advocated a proactive role for the media in resolving 
conflicts. 
Peace journalism stems from Galtung and Ruge’s (1965) pioneering work The 
Structure of Foreign News. The authors examined a number of core principles that they 
used to form the basis for the peace journalism model, including the rejection of violence 
as a news value in international news reporting (Lee, 2010). After completing this 
research, Galtung wrote dozens of books and follow-up studies (Galtung 1995, 1998, 
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2000, 2002, 2004, 2004a, 2007, 2008, 2008a; 2009, 2012). He also co-founded 
TRANSCEND International, which works toward conflict transformation through 
education, training, dissemination and research (transcend.org, 2012). The model “has 
emerged, since the mid-1990s, as a new, trans-disciplinary field, of interest to 
professional journalists, in both developed and developing countries, and to civil society 
activists, university researchers and others interested in the conflict-media nexus” 
(Lynch, n.d). Based on peace research’s principle of the participant observer -- as soon a 
person starts to observe something, she/he enters into a relationship which inevitably 
impacts upon it -- the peace journalism model claims that journalists covering conflict are 
inevitably implicated in, and take sides in, the event they are reporting on. For instance, 
Galtung (2000) expresses his desire to see objective journalists who can cover all sides of 
the conflict. However, this doesn't mean that journalists should favour all sides, report on 
them equally or through their own words or interpretations. Peace journalists should take 
the side of vulnerable groups, represent them in news coverage and advocate for peaceful 
or non-violent conflict resolution. This perspective can be seen as a different 
interpretation of the objectivity norm. 
In his article “High road, low road”, Galtung (1998) presents peace journalism 
and war journalism as two competing frames in the news coverage of conflict. In this 
description of journalism, war/violence journalism is today’s dominant reporting practice 
and has certain distinct features; it is war/violence-oriented and focuses on the visible 
effects of violence and demonizes the ‘other’ side. The hostile parties are reduced to just 
two and become combatants in a struggle to impose their goals on each other. War 
journalism is propaganda-oriented; it focuses on the other side’s untruths and helps ‘our’ 
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cover ups. Therefore, propagandist tendencies help to mask crucial issues to the benefit 
of governments. War journalism is also elite-oriented; by relying on official sources, 
army officers, and elite sources it promotes ‘our’ points of view and suffering. Therefore, 
it ignores vulnerable groups that can be the ignored victims of conflicts. Finally, war 
journalism is victory-oriented; it sees peace as a result of victory, conceals peace 
initiatives. Once the conflict is over, war journalists leave the area for another conflict and 
only return if the old one flares up. War journalism adds new problems to existing ones 
because, first of all, in times of conflict it emphasizes two-sided journalism that may 
widen the gap between conflicted groups and nations. This kind of journalism may also 
create hatred, violence and the desire to avenge or even destroy the ‘other’ side. Finally, 
war journalism’s presentation of events may prevent citizens from publicly debating or 
attempting to influence government policies, or even from being accurately informed. 
Peace journalism, as Lee and Maslog (2005) state, is grounded in communitarian 
philosophy - namely, the commitment to the idea of civic participation, the understanding 
of social justice as a moral imperative, and the sacredness of the individual. Galtung 
(1998) points out that peace journalism tries to depolarize issues by pursuing truths on all 
sides, and to de-escalate conflicts by highlighting peace and conflict resolution in equal 
proportion to violence. It is peace-oriented; it explores conflicts by using conflict 
analysis and provides a wider perspective and background information. It focuses on 
alternative peaceful ways rather than conflict and humanizes all sides through empathy 
and understanding, and focuses on less visible effects of violence, such as trauma and 
damage to structures or cultures. It is truth-oriented; peace journalism exposes not only 
‘their’ untruths and crimes, but the shortcomings on all sides, including ours. Therefore, 
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it requires not relying on official sources, but having a critical perspective that provides 
background to analyze the conflict and to reveal hidden propaganda messages. The 
model’s suggestion of truth-oriented journalism could raise questions about the long-
debated concept of the truth, such as what is truth? Or whose truth is best?  Lynch (2008) 
explains that peace journalism doesn’t offer the truth but rather is about deconstructing 
propaganda messages:  
Reporters should report, as accurately and fully as they can, the facts they 
encounter. Where peace journalism goes further is to call on them to consider how 
these particular facts, as distinct from a practically infinite number of others ‘out 
there’, come to meet them; and how they, the reporters, come to meet this 
particular facts (Lynch, 2008).  
Peace journalism is also people-oriented; it has an emphasis on the vulnerable and 
minority groups. Additionally, it requires the naming of all evil-doers and the search for 
alternative sources other than official sources -- such as peace groups, peaceful political 
parties and such.  Finally, it is solution-oriented; it highlights peace initiatives, tries to 
promote a culture of peace in society and contributes to the discussion of post-conflict 
peace-building. Galtung (2002) discusses why journalists should prefer peace journalism. 
He touches on the moral ground, indicating that a focus on solving conflicts rather than 
winning them, given the horrors of modern warfare, may reduce human suffering. 
Moreover, Galtung also discusses a non-moral reason: peace journalism paints a realistic 
image of what goes on in the world. In other words, war journalism reflects the warrior 
logic of a world of states pitted against each other, with conflicts as the domain of states, 
statesmen and the elite in an isolated world.  
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Table 1: Peace/Conflict Journalism vs. War/Violence Journalism (Galtung, 1998).  
PEACE/CONFLICT JOURNALISM WAR/VIOLENCE JOURNALISM 
I.   PEACE/CONFLICT-ORIENTED 
--explore conflict formation,  x parties, y goals, z 
issues, general "win, win" orientation 
--open space, open time;  causes and outcomes 
anywhere, also in history/culture 
--making conflicts transparent 
--giving voice to all parties; empathy,  
understanding 
--see conflict/war as problem, focus on conflict 
creativity 
--humanization of all sides; more so the worse  
the weapons 
--proactive: prevention before any violence/ 
war occurs 
--focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma  
and glory, damage to structure/culture) 
I.   WAR/VIOLENCE-ORIENTED 
--focus on conflict arena, 2 parties, 1 
 goal (win),  
war general zero-sum orientation 
--closed space, closed time; causes and exits in  
arena, who threw the first stone 
--making wars opaque/secret 
--"us-them" journalism, propaganda, voice, for  
us"  
--see "them" as the problem, focus on who  
prevails in war 
--dehumanization of "them"; more so the  
worse  
the weapon 
--reactive: waiting for violence before  
reporting 
--focus only on visible effect of violence 
 (killed, wounded  and material damage) 
II.  TRUTH-ORIENTED 
--expose untruths on all sides 
--uncover all cover-ups 
II.  PROPAGANDA-ORIENTED 
--expose "their" untruths 
--help "our" cover-ups/lies 
III. PEOPLE-ORIENTED 
--focus on suffering all over; 
on women, aged, children, 
giving voice to the voiceless 
--give name to all evil-doers 
--focus on people peace-makers 
III. ELITE-ORIENTED 
--focus on "our" suffering; 
on able-bodied elite males, 
being their mouth-piece 
--give name of their evil-doer 
--focus on elite peace-makers 
IV.  SOLUTION-ORIENTED 
--peace = nonviolence + creativity 
--highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent 
more war   
--focus on structure, culture the peaceful society 
--aftermath: resolution, reconstruction, 
reconciliation 
IV.  VICTORY-ORIENTED 
--peace = victory + cease-fire 
--conceal peace-initiative, before victory is at 
hand 
--focus on treaty, institution the controlled 
society 







However, peace journalism adopts a responsibility for exposing the problems and 
realities of commonly ignored people who don’t have power to promote their interests. 
This is also a basic responsibility of journalism.    
Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) are two scholars who contributed to the model, not 
only through their research and publications, but also by providing training in peace 
journalism, conflict analysis and promoting the model among journalists. The authors 
define peace journalism as a set of tools, both conceptual and practical, that journalists 
can use to better serve the public. The authors find peace journalism provocative due to 
the fact that, while most journalism occurring during times of conflict is presented as 
neutral or objective, it is actually war journalism, typically one-sided and biased in favour 
of conflict. Also, peace journalism requires journalists to see that the practical methods 
they use need to be understood as a set of conventions. These assertive claims are aimed 
at the majority of journalists who, Lynch and McGoldrick say, promote violence in the 
name of the objectivity norm. This indirect promotion of violence may emerge especially 
in times of conflict through over-reliance official sources, not questioning propaganda 
messages or promoting these messages or ignoring peaceful ways to end the conflict.     
According to Galtung (2002), any journalist can practise peace journalism, just as 
anyone can practise war journalism. One of the main obstacles to peace journalism is the 
mindset of editors and their conventional approach: that is the way we do it. Most 
importantly, journalists and their editors need to be trained to do peace journalism. It 
would be naive to criticize journalists and expect them to use conflict analysis without 
intensive training. That is why Galtung suggests providing summer courses within 
motivated media organizations, as well as increasing the number of peace prizes to 
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encourage and reward good peace journalism reporting. Lynch and Galtung (2010) also 
explain that peace journalism can be done essentially in the same way that journalists 
currently produce journalism; journalists just need to keep in mind peace journalism 
techniques. In their brief peace journalism manual, the authors indicate that to make the 
links between conflict and violence more transparent, the peace journalist should adopt a 
critical or constructive attitude to facts provided. Moreover, while reporting violence, 
peace journalists should focus on the victims and their suffering and give a voice to 
vulnerable groups. 
Contributions to Peace Journalism / Criticism towards Peace Journalism  
Since its emergence, the peace journalism model has been enriched by 
contributions from various scholars and professional journalists, especially in the last 
decade, to explore the possibilities beyond war journalism. For instance, BBC reporter 
Martin Bell (1998) confessed that he is no longer sure about the notion of objectivity and 
describes it as an illusion. Instead, he proposed the long-debated journalism of 
attachment as an alternative. According to this approach, in the face of atrocities, 
journalism shouldn’t be neutral between victim and oppressor. At first glance, Bell’s 
approach seems to resemble peace journalism; however, peace researcher Kempf (2003) 
remarks that journalism of attachment ignores conflict analysis (an essential aspect of 
peace journalism) and sees conflict as moral antagonism between good and evil. Also, 
Bell’s formulation allows journalists to abandon their professional rules in the name of a 
higher moral duty. Kempf’s research contributes to the study of peace journalism. In 
2003, he suggests using a two-step procedure for deconstructing war discourse and for 
transforming the violence-oriented war journalism into conflict-oriented peace 
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journalism. The first step is called “de-escalation oriented conflict reporting” and 
overlaps with what is usually called quality journalism. It requires neutrality and critical 
distance between all parties and the conflict. The second step is solution-oriented conflict 
reporting. Very similar to Galtung’s argument, it requires a focus on common rights and 
peace initiatives, a sign of readiness for peace and mediation attempts, as well as voices 
anti-war opposition. For putting his approach into practice, Kempf highlights the 
importance of the training of journalists and recommends a number of ground rules such 
as “Neither of the parties to the conflict have absolute standards of truth, Conflicts are 
always open to being dealt with either as competitive (win-lose) or a cooperative (win-
win process), peace processes are based on creativity - give voice to the voiceless” (p.11).   
An important piece of research is conducted by Lee and Maslog (2005), who 
analyzed the coverage of four conflicts in Asia by using the frame of peace journalism. 
The authors remark that existing studies are normative and anecdotal, and mainly focus 
on identifying procedures for how to do peace journalism. Their study attempted to 
bridge the gap between theory and practice by operationalizing war and peace journalism 
in a quantitative content analysis. Their findings  reveal strong war journalism framing 
and the authors conclude “the pattern of salient indicators supporting the peace 
journalism frame falls short of Galtung’s characterization of peace journalism as an 
advocacy and interpretive approach oriented in peace-conflict, people, truth, and 
solution” (p.324).  
Another key contributor to the study of peace journalism is Robert Hackett.  
Hackett’s theoretical framework connects peace journalism with other theories and 
frameworks by creating broader strategies for peace journalism. Hackett (2006) argues 
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that to succeed, peace journalism “must translate its normative concerns, rooted in the 
discipline of peace research, into a strategy based on a theoretically-informed analysis of 
the governing logics of news production” (p.2). To point out the challenges that peace 
journalism faces, Hackett asks these questions: “Do media organizations have sufficient 
autonomy vis-a-vis other institutions, or journalists vis-a-vis media organizations, to put 
peace journalism into practice? Or is structural reform a prerequisite for the successful 
implementation of peace journalism?” (p.2). Hackett focuses on three models and 
theories to examine the relationship between journalism and other relations and 
institution of power. The first is Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model; as 
mentioned above, the model describes structural influences on news production. 
However, it is criticised by Hackett as reductionist and functionalist (p.4). The second is 
Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchy of influences model. Hackett explains that this model 
identifies five levels which have influence on news content, as well as helps to assess 
pressures for and against peace journalism. The first level consists of journalists whose 
professionally-related roles and ethics have a direct influence on their stories. However, 
especially when media workers have a position which could override institutional 
pressures, their socio-demographic background and political tendencies have also an 
indirect influence. The second level consists of daily work routines in the newsrooms. In 
other words, getting information from different sources and providing this information to 
audiences and advertisers results in standardized patterns of content. The third level 
pertains to the broader organizational imperatives of media institutions. The profit 
orientation, shared by private media companies, influences the content in accordance 
with corporate interests. This level corresponds with the propaganda model’s first filter 
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(corporate ownership of the media). The fourth level consists of extra-media influences 
such as sources, advertisers and the political power. The fifth level is the influence of 
ideology which is seen by journalists, audience and other players in the media system as 
natural and it helps to support existing relations of power.  
Overall, Hackett points out that, like the propaganda model, Shoemaker and 
Reese’s model tends to be reductionist and obscures the coherence of journalism as 
cultural practice and form of knowledge production (p.6). Finally Hackett cites Pierre 
Bourdieu’s notion of journalism as a field. Compared to the two previous Anglo-
American models, Bourdieu’s field model provides an alternative approach. Hackett 
explains that Bourdieu's journalistic field is influenced by commercial or economic 
constraints (such as audience rating systems); however, journalism also imposes 
structural constraints on other fields on politics or cultural production. It is true that peace 
and war weren’t Bourdieu’s main interests, but his criticisms of TV journalism (e.g., its 
emphasis on entertainment, scandals, oversimplification, crime as well as 
decontextualized events) are consistent with the peace journalism critique (p.7-8). 
Finally, Hackett (2006) proposes three strategies for change in journalism. The 
first is to reform the journalism field from within. The hierarchy and field models suggest 
some degree of agency for journalists. According to Hackett, dedicated journalists should 
take the lead as teachers, writers and advocates of peace journalism. He also points out 
that journalists who work in the Western corporate media don’t have sufficient incentives 
and autonomy to adopt peace journalism techniques, which is an obstacle to realizing this 
reform. Alternatively, the author suggests that peace journalism can be adopted by the 
societies -- e.g., in Rwanda or the former Yugoslavia – where the news media provoked 
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enmities in times of conflict (Hackett, 2006, p.11). The second strategy suggests building 
a new field; in other words, to create an alternative media infrastructure supported by 
civil society, and insulated from corporate or state power. The third strategy’s aim is to 
change the environment of journalism, such as developing social justice movements 
which also demand a better media system in number of countries. Additionally, Hackett 
and Schroeder (2009) state that during conflicts, journalists are participants, not detached 
observers. The authors suggest that peace journalism can be advanced by reforming of 
other aspects of news production, such as broadening of the range of sources required and 
the cultural and geographical diversification of coverage. 
Similar to the research of Lee and Maslog (2005), Shinar (2009) examined the 
coverage of the 2006 Lebanese War in the Canada's Toronto Star and Israel's Yediot 
Aharonot newspapers. Even though his findings demonstrate a tendency towards war 
journalism in the coverage, Shinar argues that there are opportunities for the 
advancement of peace journalism and that some professional practices could be adopted 
to achieve this objective. Shinar concludes that the analysis of the three frameworks 
(Hackett, 2006) can increase understanding of the environments in which war journalism 
thrives. Canadian journalist Howard (2003) also focuses on peace journalism and 
promotes Galtung’s ideals among journalists. He considers media as instruments of 
conflict resolution; when the news media respond to journalistic values such as accuracy, 
impartiality and independence, they can then have an influence on peace building. 
Howard remarks that the news media have the potential to educate, correct 
misperceptions, identify underlying interests, and humanize all the parties in the dispute. 
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It also can provide an emotional outlet, enable consensus building, offer solutions and 
build confidence. 
Almost 50 years after its emergence, Galtung’s peace journalism model has not 
been adopted by the majority of news media and remains controversial among scholars 
and professional journalists. The model’s ethical stance, structural problems, theoretical 
shortcomings and reinterpretation of the objectivity norm have been the main targets of 
criticism. In her study, which examines three major Asian conflicts, Lee (2010) 
recommends that to evolve into a mainstream model, peace journalism must expand 
beyond its basic normative theory by recognizing its structural limitations. The news 
media’s tendency to reflect their government’s position is a limitation for peace 
journalism. Governmental influence on the work of journalists in conflicts is another 
issue which raises the question of how peace journalism can operate without journalistic 
autonomy. Lee notes that traditional news-writing norms are actually a challenge for 
peace journalism. Her findings reveal that feature stories and opinion pieces -- rather than 
hard news -- are more likely to be framed as peace journalism. Therefore, Lee suggests 
that journalists need to rethink the notion of hard news values and the inverted pyramid 
formula for reporting conflicts.  
The shortcomings of the model are also examined by Keeble (2010), who 
suggests that peace journalism can provide a useful critique of the corporate media’s 
promotion of militarism. However, he finds it elitist in its definition of journalism:  
Peace journalism theory focuses too closely on the notion of journalism as 
privileged, professional activity and fails to take into account the critical 
intellectual tradition which locates professions historically and politically, seeing 
them as essentially occupational groupings with a legal monopoly of social and 




Unlike peace journalism’s position, Keeble claims that improvements in 
professional routines and reforms in journalism training can’t bring a major change. 
Drawing on Hackett and Caroll (2006), Keeble maintains that change will only come if it 
is based on a radical political analysis of the media and society. This will include an 
awareness of the possibilities of journalistic activities both within and outside the 
corporate media and as part of a broader political project to democratize the media -- and 
society in general. It requires a new definition of journalism, one which includes 
intellectuals, campaigners and citizens, all of them articulating their ideas within the 
dominant and alternative global public spheres. As a solution, Keeble mentions Hackett’s 
(2006) alternative perspective which includes the Propaganda Model, Shoemaker and 
Reese’s “hierarchy of influence” and Bourdieu’s notion of journalism as a field. 
Peace journalism’s advocacy approach -- as opposed to the objectivity norm -- is 
also criticized. Hammond (2002) brings to light peace journalism’s rejection of neutrality 
and says that despite their claim to be critical and independent, advocacy journalists have 
tended to follow the agenda of powerful Western governments. This approach includes 
suppressing inconvenient information, distorting public understanding of conflicts, 
applauding the deaths of designated Western hate-figures, and ignoring evidence of the 
destructive effects of Western involvement in centuries such as Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia. The ‘peacemaker’ role that peace journalism assigns to journalists has also 
attracted criticism. Former BBC reporter Loyn (2007) finds peace journalism as a 
meaningless exercise as well as a misleading prescription for journalism. The author 
criticizes McGoldrick and Lynch (2005) who condemn all other ways of reporting as war 
journalism and biased in favour of war. Loyn points out that peace-making isn’t the 
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business of a reporter; rather, politicians should lead this mission. Instead of the peace 
journalism approach, the author focuses on traditional journalistic methods of using 
objectivity to get at a version of truth. Similarly, Hanitzsch (2004) admits that journalism 
has the potential to contribute to the peaceful settlement of conflicts; however, this 
potential influence is limited. Moreover, he indicates that freeing the world from crises, 
conflicts and other evils cannot be the primary task of journalism; it is the task of other 
social systems such as government and the military. Hanitzsch argues that “peace 
journalism draws epistemologically from a naive realism and is, according to mass 
communication theory, largely based on the assumption of powerful, causal and linear 
media effects”(p.1). According to him the model can only evolve within a culture of 
peace there is need to focus on society and culture as source of problems. 
Finally, Aslam (2011) specifies that peace journalism alone can’t be the ultimate 
solution to the problems of contemporary journalism. To put peace journalism’s ideals 
into practice, Aslam proposes in-the-field training and journalism education. The first 
suggestion -- the training of professional journalists – “may be conducted by non-profit 
organisations, media organisations or by a self-motivated group of media workers and 
aims for skills enhancement and capacity-building of journalists in the form of training 
workshops and seminars” (p. 127). For the second suggestion -- improving journalism 
education -- conflict analysis and conflict resolution should be a part of the curricula of 
journalism schools to develop students’ sense of social responsibility. Also it could help 
prepare them to face challenges in the field. Additionally, universities can encourage 
more research on the impact of peace initiatives on people’s lives. Today, he argues, 
universities focus more on theoretical subjects such as media and society, social change, 
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communication theories, and development support communication, but little on the area 
of conflict resolution (p.130). 
Conflict Analysis and Peace Journalism 
To understand peace journalism and the role of journalists in conflict situations, it 
is important to examine the existing scholarship on conflict analysis, also known as peace 
studies or peace research. In addition to creating the field of peace journalism, Galtung is 
one of the founders of peace and conflict studies and has been making significant 
contributions to journalism studies. As Perez (2008) remarks, Galtung asks journalists to 
know how to analyze a conflict properly and to use conflict analysis skills while covering 
conflicts. According to Lynch (2002a), conflict analysis skills help journalists focus on 
the core of the conflict, and its impacts on society. Additionally, Lynch and McGoldrick 
(2005) explain that conflict analysis and conflict transformation -- to have balance, 
fairness and accuracy in reporting -- are distinct features of peace journalism. Further, 
conflict analysis provides an alternative way to trace the connections between journalists, 
their sources, the stories they cover, and the consequences of their journalism. The 
authors note that conflict analysis skills make journalists capable of reporting conflict 
more accurately, identifying and restoring parts of stories about conflict generally ignored 
or marginalized, and taking responsibility for their inescapable involvement in the events 
and processes on which they report. Lynch and McGoldrick mention that the terms 
conflict analysis and peace research cover various theories such as communication 
theory, intercultural miscommunication theory, human needs theory and negotiation 
theory. These theories inform journalists with different explanations and different 
practical tools to use in responding to conflict, and different ways of overcoming conflict 
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situations.   
Diagnosing the roots of violence is important for journalists and helps them know 
how to react and focus on non-violent responses. During a conflict, there is an elevated 
risk of violence; however, the peace journalism model considers conflict situations 
creative, as opportunities for human progress and as forces for change (Lynch & 
McGoldrick, 2005). Understanding the difference between conflict and violence is crucial 
for peace journalists. As Lynch (2002a) remarks, in the media the word conflict is usually 
used to mean violence. The author, instead, defines conflict as a process through which 
two or more parties pursue incompatible goals while trying to undermine the goal-
seeking potential of the other. Conflict can also be defined as a situation in which actors 
use conflict behaviour against each other to impose their goals or to demonstrate their 
hostility (Bartos and Wehr, 2002). Jeong (2000) argues that serious conflicts have their 
roots in structural injustice and are embedded in an inequitable social and economic 
system.  
Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) insist that conflict is not a synonym for violence; 
violence is only one possible response to conflict and the emergence of conflict depends 
on the interaction between the underlying issues, the incompatible needs, interests and 
goals. Galtung formulized conflict as conflict = attitudes + behaviour + contradiction, 
known as the conflict triangle or ABC triangle, which is an important tool with which 
peace journalists can understand both conflict and the causes of conflict while reporting. 
According to Brand-Jacobsen (2002), attitude refers to how parties to a conflict feel and 
think, and how they perceive the ‘other’ and the conflict itself. Behaviour refers to how 
parties act in the conflict: seeking common interest and constructive, creative action or 
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seeking to inflict loss and pain on the ‘other’. Finally, contradiction refers to the actual 
issues and what the conflict is about.  
Unlike the dominant approach in the news media -- where the focus is on the 
visible effects of violence -- the peace journalism model divides violence into three 
categories. The first is direct violence, which is visible, destructive and intended to harm 
through violent actions such as shooting, bombing and killing. The second type is 
structural violence, which is less visible and has no intention to kill but can be more 
destructive than direct violence. Segregation, colonialism, institutionalized racism, 
corruption-collusion-nepotism or exploitation can be mentioned as examples for 
structural violence. Finally, cultural violence also legitimizes direct and structural 
violence symbolically, through words and images. Hate speech, xenophobia, Orientalism, 
civilisational arrogance, religious justifications for war or patriarchy can all be seen as 
cultural violence (Galtung, 2004a). To avoid war journalism’s binary approach and to 
map conflicts, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) propose some tools (used by conflict 
analysts) to reveal what a situation is really about and who has a stake. For journalists, 
these tools provide new ways of deciding who to interview and what questions to ask 
during conflict coverage. The first tool is “mapping the stakeholders.” During conflicts, 
journalists should not limit themselves to the conflict arena or a limited time frame. 
Instead, they should reveal other stakeholders in conflicts. The second tool is “needs-and-
fears-mapping.” Journalists should list all parties in the conflict. After that step, they 
should write down the current positions of all parties: the demands they are making or 
their stated goals. The next step is to define problems which can be difficult for 
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journalists because it is about the disclosing and fully understanding the causes of 
conflict.   
Israeli-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of the Gaza Flotilla 
In this thesis, the Gaza flotilla crisis will be used as a case study to explore the use 
of war journalism practices and how peace journalism could be helpful in real-world 
conflict. Therefore, to better understand the incident, it is important to review the 
relationship between Israel and Turkey. Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize 
Israel as a state in 1949. Unlike other Muslim countries, Turkey never cut its relations 
with Israel. Indeed, following the Persian Gulf War in 1991, Israel emerged as a potential 
ally in the eyes of Turkey due to the increased Kurdish insurgency in northern Iraq, an 
insurgency supported by Iran and Syria (Kosebalaban, 2010). Therefore, various strategic 
military agreements between the two countries were signed and relations flourished in 
military, diplomatic and economic areas.  
In April 2002, Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to 
power with a parliamentary majority, and the new government maintained its relations 
with Israel. However, the American intervention in Iraq in 2003 created a hostile 
atmosphere between the Turkish people and the U.S. and its ally Israel. Many Turks 
began to see Israel as an ally to the Iraqi Kurdish and also to the Kurdish separatists 
fighting against Turkey (Kosebalaban, 2010). Turkey’s recognition of Hamas as a 
political party further cooled mutual relations.  Israel’s blockade over the Gaza Strip and 
the Gaza offensive in 2008 angered Turkey because Turkey had previously been 
mediating peace talks between Israel and Syria, and Turkey was not informed of this 
operation (Inbar, 2011). Moreover, Erdoğan attended a conference at the Davos 
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Economic Summit with Israeli President Shimon Peres, where accusations were traded 
between the two leaders. As a response, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Ayalon insulted 
the Turkish ambassador by seating him deliberately in a lower sofa in a meeting, further 
damaging their relationship (Kosebalaban, 2010).  
The Gaza flotilla -- organized by the Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation 
(IHH) and the Free Gaza Movement -- aimed to bring humanitarian aid and break Israel’s 
blockade over Gaza. The flotilla refused Israel’s offer of delivering the aid to Israel’s 
Ashdod port. On May 31, 2010, Israeli forces boarded the ship and took control; 
however, some activists on the Mavi Marmara ship resisted the Israeli soldiers. By the 
end of the conflict, nine Turkish activists had been killed, while more than twenty 
passengers and 10 commandos had been injured (Migdalovitz, 2010). The Turkish 
government could have stopped the flotilla after Israel repeatedly warned of a possible 
military maneuver. However, Turkey viewed the flotilla as a political opportunity to put 
pressure on Israel to remove the blockade on Gaza. Even though the Turkish government 
wasn’t officially involved in the organization of the flotilla, it did nothing to prevent the 
flotilla from sailing to Gaza. After Turkish officials ensured that there were no arms on 









Chapter 3:  Methodology 
This project will use a textual analysis. This approach was selected because, as 
Priest (2009) explains, qualitative methods are designed to explore and assess things that 
cannot easily be summarized quantitatively. Textual analysis is relevant to this research 
since, as Gasher (2010) articulates, it “provides close critical readings of selected news 
texts, revealing: how stories define or frame events; why particular events are deemed 
newsworthy; which social and cultural values are privileged; the ideal audience to whom 
the stories are addressed; journalists’ assumptions about readers’ knowledge and 
interests; and how readers are situated with respect to the subject(s) of the news texts” 
(p.4). Fursich (2009) defines textual analysis as a type of qualitative analysis that, beyond 
the manifest content of media, focuses on the underlying ideological and cultural 
assumptions of the text. Text is understood as a complex set of discursive strategies that 
are situated in a special cultural context (Barthes 1972, cited in Fursich). “Textual 
analysis examines how language is deployed to portray newsmakers and news events and 
to construct the stories through which we come to know the world around us. If news 
stories are always partial depictions and share cognitive space with other sources of 
knowledge and information, they nonetheless help to define, or give meaning to, people, 
places, institutions and events” (Gasher, 2010, p.4.)  
 I will compare the coverage of The Jerusalem Post, Ha’aretz, Today’s Zaman and 
Hürriyet Daily News from May 31 to June 30, 2010. I hope to reveal the provocative role 
these newspapers played in the conflict. I will also examine the newspapers’ overreliance 
on official and elite sources over alternative sources; the use of demonizing, victimizing 
or threatening words; the use of nationalistic and military discourse; the lack of 
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background information provided; and the similarities and differences between the 
newspapers. To  apply textual analysis to the coverage -- a total of 405 articles -- and to 
better represent the coverage in a balanced way, I will choose representative articles from 
each newspaper and categorize them based on Galtung’s (1998) peace / war journalism 
table (see Table 1). This table contains four main categories: (1) War/Violence-Oriented 
vs. Peace/Conflict-Oriented; (2) Propaganda-Oriented vs. Truth-Oriented; (3) Elite-
Oriented vs. People-Oriented; (4) Victory-Oriented vs. Solution-Oriented. 
 A quantitative content analysis will also explore the domination of war 
journalism in the coverage. I also plan to analyze a number of other factors: the frequency 
of each story type (hard news, editorial, op-eds, etc.) the source of the stories (wire 
services, foreign or local), and the indicators of peace and war journalism. I will also look 
at the relationships between these factors. While I will use Galtung’s (1998) peace/war 
journalism table for the textual analysis, I will rely on Lee and Maslog (2005) for the 
quantitative analysis. Their 13 indicators of war journalism and 13 indicators of peace 
journalism will be my coding criteria. To identify peace and war journalism frames in the 
coverage, I selected 9 peace journalism and 9 war journalism indicators from Lee and 
Maslog’s list. The main reason was Lee and Maslog’s specific list of indicators lent itself 
better to my quantitative analysis than Galtung’s table.  
 The following questions will guide the research: 
RQ1 – How did the coverage of the Gaza flotilla crisis by The Jerusalem Post, 
Ha’aretz, Today's Zaman and Hürriyet Daily News reflect war journalism? 
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RQ2 - How could the techniques of peace journalism help journalists avoid these 
pitfalls and become independent of government and military sources during times of 
conflict? 
RQ3 - Can war journalism articles be reconstructed using the principles of peace 
journalism and still meet recognized standards of good journalism? What differences 
would emerge from such an exercise?  
 This thesis project uses Galtung’s suggestions to shed light on the shortcomings of 
the coverage. To address the third research question, I will identify three main themes 
and representative articles in the coverage. For each theme, I will rewrite one peace 
journalism article as an experiment by using the peace journalism principles. These 
principles are as follows: to transform conflict into peaceful discussions; to reduce 
tension; to avoid ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ journalism; to give a voice to vulnerable groups and 
other stakeholders; and to give historical background information to tell stories from a 
wider perspective. During this stage, I will also use conflict analysis techniques. These 
rewritten articles will be compared to the original ones in order to show the differences in 
tone, content and vocabulary. Two important books -- Peace Journalism (Lynch and 
McGoldrick, 2005) and Reporting the World (Lynch, 2002a), which carefully define 
rewriting principles -- will be used as guides during this stage.  
Newspapers to be analyzed   
To analyse the presentation of the Gaza crisis in Israel, I selected two English-
language daily newspapers since I cannot speak Hebrew. The first chosen newspaper is 
The Jerusalem Post, founded in 1932.  Its editorial policy is considered to be right-wing. 
The circulation of The Jerusalem Post is between 30,000 and 50,000; it also publishes a 
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weekly English international edition with a circulation of 70,000 copies. The second 
newspaper chosen for analysis is Ha’aretz. Israel’s oldest daily newspaper, Ha’aretz was 
founded in 1919 and is known for its left-wing and liberal editorial policy. The 
circulation of Ha’aretz is between 65,000 and 75,000 (pressreference.com, 2011).  
To maintain the balance between Israeli and Turkish newspapers, I chose 
Turkey’s two English-language dailies. Today’s Zaman is the most widely-circulated 
English-language newspaper and its editorial policy considered to be right-wing. The 
circulation of Today’s Zaman is around 11,000; however, its sister newspaper Zaman 




, 2013, the circulation 
of Zaman newspaper was over 1 million - the highest circulation in Turkey (gazete net 
satışları, 2013). Hürriyet Daily News is the last newspaper that I will examine. It was 
launched in 1961 and it is the oldest English-language daily in Turkey. The editorial 
policy of Hürriyet Daily News is considered to be liberal. The circulation of Hürriyet 
Daily is around 5,500. However, its sister newspaper Hürriyet is very influential in 
Turkey with a circulation of over 400,000 (gazete net satışları, 2013).  
Limitations 
 I will examine only the first month of the crisis which can be seen as a limitation 
of this research. However, starting from the second week of the crisis, the newspapers 
began to lose their interest in the crisis and the number of the articles dropped 
dramatically. The first month’s coverage will provide enough evidence about the 
tendencies of the newspapers. An additional limitation of this study is that my 
examination will focus on only four newspapers, The Jerusalem Post, Ha’aretz, Today’s 
Zaman and Hürriyet Daily News. It is important to note that these four newspapers 
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cannot be completely representative of all Israeli and Turkish newspapers. However, 
different political perspectives of these newspapers represent a large proportion of Israeli 
and Turkish audiences.   
Finally, it wasn’t not possible to download Israeli and Turkish newspapers’ 
articles through academic search engines. Therefore, I used newspapers’ free website 
access to locate and copy their archives. To find the related articles, I used the key words: 
“Gaza flotilla”, “Mavi Marmara” and “Operation Sea Breeze” as it called by the Israeli 
army. The challenge is that these newspapers don’t have sophisticated archiving systems 
and they aren’t able to show how many articles were published in the first month of the 
crisis. Therefore, it is possible that some of the articles published between the dates set 
out in my parameters could not be included in this textual analysis. This could limit the 














Chapter 4: Findings 
 Quantitative Content Analysis  
Using quantitative content analysis, the research examines the coverage of the 
Gaza flotilla crisis from May 31 to June 30, 2010, looking at 405 articles (56 from The 
Jerusalem Post, 117 from Ha’aretz, 184 from Today’s Zaman, and 48 from Hürriyet 
Daily News). This section will discuss the findings of a quantitative content analysis that 
explored types of stories in the coverage, the sources of production of the articles (wire 
services, foreign or local), and the indicators of peace and war journalism. The analysis 
further examined the relationships between story types and peace/war journalism 
indicators. The analysis showed that hard-news stories 
2
 (news reports) dominate the 
coverage. Of the 405 articles, 278 (68.64%) are hard-news stories. The second largest 
group is opinion pieces/editorial/op-eds, which consist of 115 (28.39%) examples. The 
third group, feature stories
3
, contained 10 (2.46%) examples. The last group consists of 
letters and speeches, of which there were only two examples (0.49%). Hard-news stories 
informed the reader about the confrontation and its aftermath, and after the second week 
of the incident, their numbers began to decrease while opinion and op-ed pieces 
increased. Of the 278 hard-news stories, 81 (29.1%) originated from international new 
agencies such as AP, Reuters, and AFP and Turkey’s Anatolian News Agency, while 197 
(70.86%) of the articles were produced by the newspapers’ own staff. However, it can be 
argued that the use of wire stories may be slightly higher, since journalists sometimes 
adapt news agencies’ stories to create their own stories with their byline. As long as a 
                                               
2 Hard news stories report daily issues by using the inverted pyramid style and aims to respond the 5Ws 
(who, what, when, where, why) questions by providing factual information.     
3 Feature stories have an emphasis on the human element. Journalists usually describe the scene and 
provide analysis as well as give background information about the topic or people.     
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byline appeared, I coded these articles as locally-produced news, even though they were 
partly from news wires (e.g.“Lieberman: Israel has no reason to fear probe of Gaza 
flotilla raid” By Barak Ravid, Ha’aretz Service and News Agencies). 
Prior to discussing the war and peace journalism findings, it is worth mentioning 
that many of the articles in the coverage contain features of both war and peace 
journalism. While coding the articles, I tried to determine whether peace or war 
journalism indicators were predominant. By using Lee and Maslog’s (2005) 9 peace and 
9 war journalism indicators, I analyzed and coded the articles. Some articles contained 
more than one indicator of peace or war journalism. Therefore, to determine whether an 
article was predominantly peace journalism or war journalism, for each article, I 
determined the most frequently occurring indicator. The analysis of the coverage showed 
that war journalism framing dominates over peace journalism. Of the 405 articles, 279 
(68.8%) articles have dominant war journalism framing, compared to 112 (27.6%) 
dominant peace journalism framing. Also, 14 (3.4%) articles were coded as neutral (See 
Table 2). Neutral news pieces are usually short news reports which contain only some 
factual information. The highest war journalism framing was found in The Jerusalem 
Post (89.2%) followed by Today’s Zaman (69.1%), Ha’aretz (64.1%) and Hürriyet Daily 
News (56.2%).  
Table 2: Percentage of war & peace oriented and neutral articles  
Newspapers Articles War Journalism Peace Journalism Neutral 
Total:   405  68.8% 27.6% 3.4% 
     Ha’aretz 117 64.1% 32.4% 3.4% 
The Jerusalem Post 56 89.2% 8.9% 1.7% 
Today's Zaman 184 69.1% 27.1% 3.8% 





While doing textual analysis, I used Galtung’s (1998) peace / war journalism 
table. However, for the quantitative analysis I preferred to use Lee and Maslog’s (2005) 
indicators of peace and war journalism. This was done because Lee and Maslog’s work   
has more specific list of indicators lent itself better to my quantitative analysis than 
Galtung’s table, as it gave me a list of easily-identifiable factors to count. In their 
research, Lee and Maslog identified 13 indicators of war journalism and 13 indicators of 
peace journalism as coding criteria. I selected 9 war journalism and 9 peace journalism 
indicators from Lee and Maslog’s list (see Table 3). The analysis shows that the most 
frequent war journalism indicator (29.7%) is a focus on visible effects. This type of 
article, predominantly hard news, focuses mainly on the confrontation on the Mavi 
Marmara and its visible effects by giving voice to the Israeli soldiers and the activists. In 
other words, these stories fail to explain the background of the incident and its impacts. 
The second common war journalism indicator (29.4 %) is reliance on leaders, official 
sources and elite. These sources are mostly politicians, army sources and diplomats. The 
third indicator is using demonizing language; 12.5% of the coverage was found to be of 
this type. Various demonizing adjectives and labels were used to create a dangerous 









Selected indicators of war and peace journalism (from Lee & Maslog, 2005) 
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Frequency  % 
War Journalism Indicators 
-Reports on visible effects of conflict  83 29.7 
-Relies on leaders and elite as news sources  82 29.4 
-Uses demonizing/dehumanizing language  35 12.5 
-Partisan reporting  33 11.8 
-Good vs. bad tagging  15 5.37 
-Two party orientation (one party wins, one party loses)  13 4.56 
-Uses victimizing language  10 3.58 
-Zero-sum orientation  6 2.15 
-Uses emotive words  2 0.71 
Total: 279 (100%) 
   Peace Journalism Indicators  
  -Reports causes and consequences of the conflict 33 29.5 
-Nonpartisan (neutral, not taking sides)  17 15.2 
-Focuses on ordinary people and their problems 15 13.4 
-Gives voice to different parties & stakeholders  12 10.7 
-Win-win oriented  11 9.82 
-Avoids demonising language  10 8.92 
-Reports on invisible effects of conflict  7 6.25 
-Avoids labelling of good vs. bad  6 5.35 
-Avoids victimizing language  1 0.89 
Total: 112 (100%) 
 
The fourth war indicator is partisan reporting. 11.8% of the articles fell into this 
category. This type of article, mostly in editorial and opinion sections, use nationalistic 
language and defends their governments’ perspective. The fifth indicator, which 
represented 5.3% of the articles, is good vs. bad tagging. These articles don’t necessarily 
use demonizing language; however, they always blame the other side. 
The most frequent peace journalism indicator found (29.5%) was a focus on 
causes and consequences of the conflict. Instead of focusing on the visible effects of the 
                                               
4  The numbers included here represent each article’s predominant orientation. Each article appears in this 
table only once. Articles with neutral orientation were omitted from this table.    
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conflict, these articles examine the causes of the confrontation and its impacts. The 
second most common peace journalism indicator is nonpartisan reporting, at 15.2%. 
These articles show that using neutral language is an important step towards peace 
journalism. The third indicator was a focus on ordinary people and their problems. 13.4% 
of the articles were coded under this indicator. The fourth indicator, at 10.7%, is giving a 
voice to different parties & stakeholders. In other words, articles which give voice to 
other stakeholders who can contribute to easing the Israeli-Turkish tension or Israeli-
Palestinian problems. The fifth indicator is win-win orientation; 9.82% of the articles fell 
into this category. This type of article sees the conflict as an opportunity that both parties 
can benefit from.  
 The analysis of the coverage indicates that there is a strong connection between story 
type and war and peace journalism orientation. In the coverage, hard-news stories tend to 
employ mostly war journalism framing: 78.05% war journalism framing compared to 17.2% 
peace journalism framing. On the other hand, opinion pieces/editorials/op-eds show a 
higher rate of peace journalism framing: 48.9% war journalism compared to 50.4% peace 
journalism (See Table 4). Not surprisingly, in their study -- which compared the news 
coverage of the Iraq War (2003) and major Asian conflicts by eight newspapers from India, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Philippines -- Lee, Maslog and Kim (2006) achieved 
very similar results. The authors noticed that while war journalism was dominant in hard-
news stories, features and opinion pieces were dominated by peace journalism framing. 
Unlike hard-news stories, opinion pieces, op-eds and editorials generally have a wider 
perspective and don’t focus only on the visible effects of the confrontation. Moreover, the 
dependence on official sources is relatively limited. These factors increase the tendency 
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towards peace journalism.  
 Table 4: Relationship between story type and war/peace journalism 
Type of story War Journalism Peace Journalism Neutral Total: 
Hard news 217 (78.05%)  48 (17.2%)  13 (4.6%) 278 
Editorial/Opinion 56 (48.6%)  58 (50.4%)  1 (0.8%) 115 
Features 5 (50%)  5 (50%) 0 10 
Letters/Speeches  0  2 (100%) 0 2 
 
 The findings indicate that the tendency towards war journalism was caused by heavy 
use of hard-news stories. The reliance on Western wire services (especially AP, Reuters and 
AFP) is an additional factor for the high war journalism. As Lee (2010) says, Western news 
agencies tend to report conflicts and violence more saliently than other news stories forms. 
Therefore, it can be argued that Western news writing practices, especially the use of the 
inverted pyramid style, is an obstacle to peace journalism. 
 The findings from this study support this argument. The analysis of the 
production sources of the stories shows that locally produced hard news stories are 
slightly more peace journalism oriented than stories from wire services. Of the 197 local 
hard news stories, 36 (18.2%) were framed as peace journalism, 155 (78.6%) as war 
journalism, and 6 (3.04%) as neutral. On the other hand, of the 81 stories from news 
agencies, 12(14.8%) were framed as peace journalism, 62 (76.5%) as war journalism and 
7 (8.6%) as neutral. However, in opinion pieces/editorial/op-eds section foreign-produced 
news pieces tend to have more peace journalism indicators than locally-produced stories. 
Of the 98 local stories in the opinion pieces/editorial/op-eds section, 46 (46.93%) were 
framed as peace journalism, 51(52.04%) as war journalism and 1 (1.02%) story as 
neutral. On the other hand, of the 17 foreign-produced stories, 12 (70.5%) were framed as 
peace journalism, and 5 (29.4%) as war journalism. 
 Another reason for the dominant war journalism could be the news media’s 
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presumed role of supporting its government during times of conflict. It is not easy for the 
news media to remain neutral due to their dependence on official sources and the close 
relationships between the news media and governments (Bennett 2003; Reese & 
Buckalew 1995). The analysis reveals that, while reporting on the confrontation, both 
Israeli and Turkish newspapers relied on politicians, diplomats, elites and army sources 
which led to high instances of elite-oriented journalism. Therefore, as claimed by the 
peace journalism model, Israeli and Turkish journalists tended to obtain their information 
from officially recognized and ‘reliable’ sources by highlighting ‘our’ side of the story, 
all in the name of objectivity. As Ross (2009) mentions “media’s dependence on 
powerful officials as sources of news and interpretation poses a significant direct threat to 
peace journalism practices, and that inclusion of divergent voices of dissonance en 
passant serves not to advance the goals of peace journalism, but to justify existing war 
journalism as objective reporting” (p.5). 
 In addition to the official sources and elites, the newspapers used two main types 
of first-hand witness accounts to report the confrontation: Israeli commandos (usually 
quoted by the Israeli newspapers) and pro-Palestinian activists (usually quoted by the 
Turkish newspapers). This choice also led to inflammatory language, demonization and 
one-sided narratives. To reduce this dependence on the accounts of the commandos and 
activists, journalists’ accounts would also have to shed more light on this incident. The 
present analysis shows that there were no reporters from The Jerusalem Post or Ha’aretz 
on the flotilla during its journey to Gaza, nor embedded with Israeli marines during the 
operation. There were more than thirty journalists on the flotilla from different countries, 
including Turkey. Nevertheless, Today’s Zaman and Hürriyet Daily News published very 
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few news reports based on the journalists’ direct accounts of the event. In the end, 
however, these accounts don’t differ much from the activists’ inflammatory statements 
and still contain war journalism features.  
 Finally, it might be argued that the audience may factor into the use of 
nationalistic and inflammatory coverage during the Gaza flotilla crisis. As Liebes (1992) 
remarks, during times of conflict, journalists face conflicting pressures of commitment to 
their own society and its fate, and loyalty to the demands and norms of journalism. 
Therefore, war coverage puts journalism and journalists to the test of choosing between 
patriotic enthusiasm and morale-building or a distant and analytical stance. As the 
coverage from this study shows, all newspapers in some way reflected the sentiments of 
their audience after the confrontation on the Mavi Marmara ship. 
Textual Analysis   
My aim in this textual analysis is to demonstrate how the newspapers were 
implicated in the crisis. I also seek to highlight their over-reliance on official sources, 
their use of military discourse, their use of threatening and inflammatory language, the 
lack of background information provided, and the similarities and differences between 
the newspapers. To better reflect the content of the 405 articles, I chose representative 
articles from each newspaper and categorized them based on Galtung’s (1998) peace / 
war journalism table. 
 War/violence oriented vs. Peace/conflict oriented 
The analysis shows that the dominant aspect in the coverage is a focus on the 
confrontation on the Mavi Marmara ship that employs the war/violence journalism frame. 
As previously discussed, this type of war journalism focuses mainly on conflict areas and 
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the visible effects of violence. The war/violence journalism uses victimizing and emotive 
language, has a voice for ‘us’ and blames the other side as the cause of the problem. 
Ultimately, it demonizes the enemy.   
 Demonization of ‘them’ 
Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) define demonizing adjectives and labels as well as 
their functions in war journalism. The authors suggest that peace journalists should avoid 
demonizing adjectives like “vicious, cruel, brutal, and barbaric. These always describe 
one party’s view of what another party has done. To use them puts the journalists on that 
side and helps to justify an escalation of violence” (p. 30). Moreover, Lynch and 
McGoldrick talk about demonizing labels such as “terrorist, extremist, fanatic, 
fundamentalist. (...) To use such labels is always to take sides. They also generally mean 
the people labelled are unreasonable, which weakens the case for reasoning (negotiating) 
with them” (p.30).    
The use of demonizing language peaked in the coverage in the first week of the 
crisis. Israeli newspapers relied on accounts from Israeli commandos, senior army 
officers, and politicians. Inevitably, the coverage depicts horror scenes and cruel enemies 
who came to kill Israelis. The coverage provides a variety of demonizing adjectives and 
labels such as extremist supporters of terror, dangerous hatred for Jews, vicious, brutal, 
armada of hate, jihadists, terrorists, saboteurs, hired killers, and murderous mercenaries. 
These labels are powerful indicators of war journalism and helped the Israeli government 
to justify the killing of activists. Another impact of this type of demonizing is that, by 
creating an image of a dangerous enemy, future rapprochements between Israel and 
Turkey and other peaceful initiatives towards the Palestinian issue could be inhibited.   
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A good example of demonization can be seen in a feature story in the Jerusalem 
Post, which presents the accounts of Sergeant S., who single-handedly killed six activists. 
The sergeant describes an atmosphere in which two armies fought, and he has no doubt 
that the pro-Palestinian activists were, in fact, terrorists. He explains how, facing more 
than a dozen mercenaries, and convinced their lives were in danger, he and his colleagues 
opened fire: “When I hit the deck, I was immediately attacked by people with bats, metal 
pipes and axes. These were without a doubt terrorists. I could see the murderous rage in 
their eyes and that they were coming to kill us” (Katz, 2010a). The same story gives a 
voice to the sergeant’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel T., who adds: “S. did a 
remarkable job. He stabilized the situation and succeeded in hitting six of the terrorists.”  
It is worth noting that the majority of articles in the Jerusalem Post accentuate the terror 
connection of the activists. The words “terror”, “terrorism” and “terrorist” are repeated 
71 times throughout 56 Jerusalem Post articles. 
Some stories in Ha’aretz also demonize the activists and provide an enemy image 
by excluding a peaceful perspective and ignoring the real cause of the confrontation: the 
Gaza blockade and its impact on Palestinians. In an interview in the June 1, 2010 edition, 
Captain R. narrates his epic fight against “terrorists” armed with knives and batons: 
Every [activist] that approached us wanted to kill us (...) people started coming at 
me from every direction. They jumped at me and hurled me to the deck below the 
bridge. Then I felt a stabbing in my stomach -- it was a knife. I pulled it out and 
somehow managed to get to the lower level (Eyadat, 2010). 
 
Another Ha’aretz article, from June 4, 2010, demonizes pro-Palestinian activists 
by pointing out their “terror links”:  
It appears that they [activists] were well trained and experienced, especially in 
view of the arsenal found and code books used to pass on orders from group 
leaders. Among the rioters, in addition to Turks, were Yemenis, Afghans and one 
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person from Eritrea. All were apparently experienced in hand-to-hand fighting. 
Some of them did not retreat when shots were fired (Harel, 2010). 
 
Use of demonizing language is no less pronounced in the Turkish coverage. The 
only difference is that Israel, rather than the activists or Turkey. The coverage primarily 
gives voice to activists, the IHH, Turkish politicians and elites who frequently use 
demonizing adjectives and labels such as cruel, vicious, high sea piracy, banditry, 
barbaric, cold blooded murder, bloody raid, lake of blood, massacre, murderers, state 
terrorism, terrorist organization, and hyenas. In particular, the accounts of the peace 
activists became a tool for portraying Israel as a murderous state.  
A Today’s Zaman news report from June 1, 2010 explains, based on the activists’ 
accounts, how Israeli soldiers attacked the Mavi Marmara. A Turkish activist says: 
“When the Mavi Marmara continued on its course the harassment turned into an attack. 
They used smoke bombs followed by gas canisters. They started to descend onto the ship 
with helicopters”. She describes the operation as “extremely bad and brutal” and the ship 
as “a lake of blood”. Additionally, a Greek activist from another ship, Aris 
Papadokostopoulos, explains that “the Turkish ship was in front of us. There was a 
terrible raid from the air and from the sea and from everywhere, with shooting. During 
their interrogation [by the commandos], many of them were badly beaten in front of us” 
(Activists tell of beatings during Israeli raid, 2010). In the same edition, Turkish Prime 
Minister Erdoğan condemns the “bloody massacre by Israel” and accuses Israel by 
saying: “They have once again showed to the world that they know how good they are at 
killing people” (No one should test Turkey’s patience, 2010).  
 See ‘them’ as the problem/ ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ journalism 
Another indicator of war journalism is the use of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ journalism and 
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the blaming of the ‘other’ side as the real cause of the problem. Instead of seeing conflict 
and violence as a problem, revealing the deep reasons behind the conflict and 
highlighting the impacts of the blockade on 1.5 million civilians in Gaza, the newspapers 
tended to blame the other side for initiating the violence. These bilateral accusations were 
created by Israeli and Turkish politicians and officials, and were widely presented by the 
newspapers. Various news reports in the Jerusalem Post and Ha’aretz blame the activists 
for brutally attacking Israeli soldiers, using official accounts as support. For instance, the 
May 31, 2010 edition of the Jerusalem Post provides details of the “well-planned lynch” 
of Israeli soldiers and a police source comments on the operation: “The soldiers acted 
with the utmost nobility. They engaged in hand-to-hand combat, sustained injuries, but 
only opened fire after one of them was lying on the ground unconscious and two others 
had been shot. This was an unbelievable demonstration of restraint” (Katz, 2010b). 
Similarly, the Ha’aretz coverage contains parallel war journalism indicators. On 
May 31, 2010, Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu justified the killing of activists: “They 
[soldiers] were mobbed, they were clubbed, they were beaten, stabbed, there was even a 
report of gunfire. And our soldiers had to defend themselves. (...) We want to maintain a 
situation where we prevent weapons and war materials from coming into Gaza, and 
allowing humanitarian aid to go to the population of Gaza” (Ravid, 2010a). Another 
Ha’aretz news report from June 1, 2010 includes a strong voice for ‘us’ and justifies the 
killings. A senior naval officer claims: “this was not spontaneous, but premeditated 
violence. They said they came on a humanitarian mission, but they came to fight” (Harel 
& Pfeffer, 2010). Both The Jerusalem Post and Ha’aretz articles present the soldiers as 
victims, the activists as an existential threat to Israel’s security, and the killing of nine 
 51 
 
activists as an inevitable outcome. These articles send a clear message to the world: 
Israeli soldiers defended themselves against deadly attacks and their actions were 
legitimate under international laws.  
The news pieces from Today’s Zaman and Hürriyet Daily News also contain 
accusatory language, used to justify the violent resistance of the activists against the 
commandos and to emphasize Israeli aggression. For instance, a Hürriyet Daily News 
column, published on May 31, 2010, draws similarities between Israel and “the pirate 
terrorists of Somalia”, accusing the nation of murdering scores of peace activists. The 
author also blames Israel for using propaganda methods: “Even though Israeli forces 
killed and wounded scores of civilians, and contrary to there being no weapons on any of 
the six ships, Israel, as it has already started, tried to hide its rough-state attitude behind a 
‘there were weapons on the ships’ claim and try to portray itself as the real victim of the 
incident” (Kanlı, 2010).   
Focus on conflict area-visible effects  
Another war journalism feature found in the coverage is the focus on conflict 
arenas and the visible effects of violence. Certain articles tended to focus on what 
happened on the Mavi Marmara ship, examining a narrow time and space by giving voice 
to commandos and politicians. These stories placed emphasis on the details of the visible 
direct violence, such as how the activists attacked Israeli commandos, how the 
commandos defended themselves and killed the activists, as well as the descriptions of 
dead and wounded people or material damage. This approach ignores history and the 
long-term impacts of the confrontation on Israeli-Palestinian relations and Israeli-Turkish 
relations. It also ignores the effects of less visible forms of violence, such as cultural 
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violence and structural violence, on people and societies. Additionally, other main 
stakeholders are disregarded; no voice is given to Palestinians in Gaza and the West 
Bank, to people in neighboring Arab countries, to Palestinian refugees in different 
countries in the region, or to peace groups. This approach also fails to explain conflict 
and violence in a larger historical and political context. Without a doubt, ‘what happened’ 
stories are newsworthy and fill a crucial gap to inform the audience. However, as Lynch 
and McGoldrick (2005) remark, when journalists exclude everything but direct violence, 
their only explanation for violence is previous violence (revenge).The only solution, then, 
is more violence or punishment. In contrast, peace journalists strive to show how people 
have been blocked and deprived in everyday life as a way of explaining how the 
conditions for violence were produced. In the coverage examined here, zero-sum 
orientation also reinforces war journalism framing. The incident is portrayed simply as a 
power struggle between Israeli commandos and activists or between Israel and Turkey. 
Therefore, in this struggle only one side can benefit from the outcomes of the conflict.  
An example of the focus on visible effects can be seen in The Jerusalem Post 
news report from June 1, 2010. By relying on the commandos’ accounts, and without 
giving any background information about the reasons for the confrontation, the main 
concern in the article appears to narrate the conflict to show the visible effects of 
violence:  
They [commandos] immediately encountered fierce resistance as they were 
attacked by activists armed with bats, knives and metal pipes (...) the commandos 
first responded to the violence with crowd dispersion measures, and after almost 
an hour of scuffles, during which a number of soldiers were wounded -- some of 
them stabbed or shot -- the commandos were given permission to use live fire. At 
one point, activists succeeded in stealing a handgun from one of the soldiers, 




A number of Ha’aretz news pieces also emphasized the conflict areas by relying 
on the commandos’ accounts. One of the news reports, from June 4, explores the how the 
commandos were battling terrorists. Captain A. explains: “There were hundreds of people 
on the deck. In my estimation, between 50 and 100 of them were terrorists. (...) They 
would jump on us from doors and windows with batons and knives. At this stage, we all 
stood with guns and fired at anyone coming at us with means or intent [to harm]” 
(Pfeffer, 2010a). However, he emphasizes that the commandos fired “very selectively” 
and most of the passengers who were aimed at by the commandos were “only wounded” 
(Pfeffer, 2010a).   
The coverage of the event by Turkish newspapers focuses on the confrontation 
and its visible effects, mostly by relying on the accounts of the activists. Additionally, 
Today’s Zaman also provides a few news reports which are based on direct journalist 
witnessing. For instance, photographer Kürşat Bayhan writes the details of the operation, 
as well as his 30-hour detention in Israel’s Beer-Sheva Prison with other journalists:  
Soldiers opened fire from the helicopter using live bullets. We were taking photos 
the entire time up until that point. While hurrying to the press room, I saw 
someone on the floor; he had been wounded in the shoulder. Then, while passing 
by Room Two, there was a woman giving her husband a heart massage while 
yelling, ‘please don’t die, please don’t die’ (Bayhan, 2010).   
 
Bayhan also explains that once the commandos boarded the ship, the journalists 
started to hide their photographs: “I placed a small card containing some photographs 
under my tongue. As a result, I did not speak much during the 17 hours the card was in 
my mouth. Unfortunately, the doctor at the prison we were taken to confiscated the card 
during my health check”.   
 In addition to Bayhan’s own news report, Today’s Zaman used journalist accounts 
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in three different news reports. For instance, Elif Akkuş, a reporter from the state-run 
Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), describes the aftermath of the attack as 
“a lake of blood” and says that Israeli officials seized all of her belongings:  
Helicopters were above us and bullets flew everywhere. Those were very difficult 
moments. Blood was everywhere. (...) Being a journalist there meant nothing to 
them. The only thing I have now is my passport. We knew that we would 
encounter something extraordinary, but we did not expect this (Journalists aboard 
aid convoy, 2010).  
 
Hürriyet Daily News also used journalist accounts twice. A news report on June 3, 
2010, gives details about “premeditated murders” on the Mavi Marmara through 
activists’ and journalists’ accounts. After being released from Israeli detention and 
deported to Turkey, Sydney Morning Herald journalist Paul McGeough says: “Israeli 
boats had circled the flotilla like hyenas hunting animals in the night before moving in 
suddenly” (Activists' eyewitness accounts detail Israeli raid on Gaza aid ship, 2010). 
McGeough also describes the incident as “very ugly” and the atmosphere as 
“testosterone-driven”. News reports which are based on journalist eyewitnesses, in both 
Today’s Zaman and Hürriyet Daily News, indicate that these accounts are not different 
from activist accounts, as they too focus on visible effects and contain strong war 
journalism features.  
Peace-oriented journalism 
Even though war journalism is dominant, the coverage also provides examples of 
peace-oriented journalism, although not in all of the sources chosen for this study. The 
Jerusalem Post has a strong, patriotic war journalism; it is hard to find any voices critical 
of the incident and policies towards Palestinians. Ha’aretz provides a number of peace-
oriented news reports, editorials, and op-ed pieces which are highly critical of the 
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military operation and the Israeli government’s policies. In his column on May 31, 2010, 
Aluf Benn criticized the military operation and recommended a national inquiry to reveal 
the Israeli government’s failings:  
The government failed the test of results; blaming the organizers of the flotilla for 
causing the deaths by ignoring Israel's orders to turn back is inadequate. Decisions 
taken by the responsible authorities must be probed (Benn, 2010). 
 
Benn also brings up many crucial issues: the many peaceful and diplomatic ways 
to avoid a confrontation with the Gaza flotilla; Israel’s deteriorating relationship with 
Turkey; the deepening problems of Israel’s Arab minorities; and the purpose of the Gaza 
siege. Instead of drawing out the debate of who attacked who first, the column examines 
the causes and outcomes of the incident in a broader perspective. Another news report in 
Ha’aretz, from June 5, 2010, depicts peaceful protests across the world against the 
blockade and the killing of activists. The article mentions that during a big protest in 
Paris, members of the French Jewish Union for Peace walked alongside Arabs to show 
their solidarity with Palestinians. Michel Bontemps, a French Jew, indicates that the 
blockade is counter-productive for Israel, while Youssef Ben Derbal, another French 
national, adds that showing solidarity with the Palestinians does not mean one is a 
terrorist, as Israel has claimed (Thousands demonstrate across the world, 2010).   
Likewise, the Turkish coverage contains various examples of peace-oriented 
news stories. One example comes from the June 11, 2010 edition, which published a 
letter containing multiple peace journalism aspects. What makes this letter so interesting 
is that it was written by Ronen Shamir, an Israeli sociologist. Shamir writes that many 
Israelis are upset by the ongoing Gaza blockade and Israel’s unwillingness to put an end 
to its occupation; he also mentions that many Israelis lamented losing a long-time ally 
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through this conflict with Turkey:  
On the night that a few fascist brigands burned the flag of Turkey in front of its 
embassy in Tel Aviv, a thousand of us stood in front of the Ministry of Defense, 
denouncing the attack on the Mavi Marmara. Last Saturday, on June 5, 
commemorating 43 years of occupation and committed to its termination, 10,000 
Jews and Arabs marched on the streets of Tel Aviv. (...) Yet I wish to convey to 
the Turkish people that there are quite a few of us here, Israeli Jews and Arabs, 
who keep on protesting and demonstrating and fighting for peace and friendship 
in the Middle East (Shamir, 2010).  
 
Unlike many news reports in Today’s Zaman, which portray Israelis as one 
homogenous entity to be condemned, this letter gives voice to empathetic and 
understanding Israelis, serving to humanize the ‘other’. The existence of this type of 
opinion is especially crucial in times of conflict because it may help to reduce the 
tensions between conflicting sides. Instead of presenting the incident as an Israeli-Turkish 
conflict, a Today’s Zaman column mentions the other main stakeholders who could play 
a significant role in finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue:    
Provocative acts must be avoided by all parties, whether transporting aid or 
controlling borders. (...) If the aftermath is handled coolly and responsibly by all 
sides, this latest incident, even with its casualties, could provide an opportunity 
for peacemaking, coexistence and prosperity in the region rather than further 
escalation of conflict, so that people can stop killing Palestinians, Arabs, Israelis 
and Turks, or Europeans, or Americans (Çetin, 2010).  
 
Additionally, to bring peace to the region, Çetin suggests abolishing the blockade 
and establishing independent international monitoring. He feels that the international 
community needs to re-examine its tactics and policies towards this issue. This column 
reflects peace journalism’s tactic of seeing conflict as an opportunity for human progress. 
As Lynch and Galtung (2010) note, through conflict we can find new ways to act; by 
being imaginative and creative, we can transform the conflict to reach peaceful solutions.  
Hürriyet Daily News uses relatively less patriotic and more peace-oriented 
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language. Its coverage focuses on not only the confrontation but also on the broader 
problems of Palestinians struggling under the blockade and the occupation. An editorial 
from June 2, 2010, points out that the Gaza blockade is illegal according to UN 
resolutions and that international law should concentrate on the “central crime” in Gaza: 
Those responsible for the Gaza flotilla attack must be held to answer, but the 
overriding legal issue in our view is the blockade of Gaza itself. (...)  This 
blockade is illegal, pure and simple. It is a violation of repeated United Nations 
resolutions demanding its end. It is also a violation of Article 33 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention which makes collective punishment an international crime 
(We must focus on the central crime in Gaza, 2010). 
 
The editorial also quotes from Gideon Levy of Ha’aretz, who said that Israel is 
not Turkey’s enemy and that there are many voices in Israel that share Turkey’s grief. 
The editorial does not simplify the crisis into an Israeli-Turkish conflict, but rather 
highlights the blockade’s impacts on civilians; furthermore, the article looks at 
alternatives to end the blockade. Instead of dehumanizing the Israeli side, it presents a 
peaceful Israeli voice and gives a chance for readers to empathize with Israelis. 
Propaganda-Oriented vs. Truth-Oriented 
Another feature of war journalism found in the coverage is the propaganda-
orientation. This type of article focuses on the other side’s untruths and supports ‘our’ 
cover-ups and lies (Galtung, 1998). Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) notice that there are 
certain key claims which recur in propaganda, such as “we are under threat, we are left 
with no alternative, we are taking on evil-doers” (p.95). These types of propaganda 
claims obfuscate some crucial issues, such as the causes and impacts of conflict, in favour 
of the government’s proposed point of view. The main difficulty faced by journalists is 
that propaganda claims are difficult or often impossible to verify or disprove. The 
definition of propaganda from peace journalism’s framing is exemplified through the 
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statements from Israeli politicians presented in The Jerusalem Post and Ha’aretz. The 
coverage shows that Israeli politicians often used propaganda claims (such as Israel is 
threatened by terrorists, Israel is under an existential threat or the world is against Israel) 
to justify the killing of activists and harsh policies towards Palestinians. Additionally, the 
alleged links between Al-Qaeda and the IHH, as well as the existence of firearms used 
against soldiers on the deck (which were never found by Israel), are repeated in the Israeli 
newspaper coverage. These allegations usually originated with Israeli official sources and 
intelligence reports. The Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center played an 
especially important role during the crisis and released many videos and photographs to 
support Israeli claims.  
The Jerusalem Post largely presents Israeli propaganda claims without question, 
and justifies the deadly military operation. On June 4, 2010, a news feature voiced the 
Israeli army’s claims that those killed were “mercenaries and hired by the radical Turkish 
Islamic group the IHH”. An interesting feature of the story is the attempt to personally 
link the Turkish PM Erdoğan with terrorists: “Erdoğan is a known supporter of the IHH 
and there are suspicions in Israel that he, or other government officials, may have 
personally instructed the passengers on board the Mavi Marmara to violently attack the 
soldiers” (Katz, 2010d). This information, which appears to have been served to 
newspapers directly by the Israeli army, can be read as a response to Erdoğan’s criticisms 
and accusations towards Israel of state terrorism. 
 The coverage of Ha’aretz also makes use of different propaganda claims and 
propaganda videos released by the Israeli army. A news report, published on June 11, 
2010, bases a report on footage from the interrogation of the Mavi Marmara captain. A 
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montage of the footage was released by the Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Information 
Center, and the captain’s statements support Israeli arguments. Captain Mahmut Tural 
explains:  
[the activists] were cutting the steels and chains. And I said to the chief officer, he 
collected all of them and put it in the radio room. They [the activists] were 
preparing [a violent welcome] to the soldiers (Gaza flotilla captain: Activists 
prepared attack against IDF raid, 2010).  
 
Another Ha’aretz news report matches the classic we are under threat claim of 
war propaganda. During his visit to the commandos who conducted the operation, 
Defence Minister Barak argues that “we live in the Middle East, in a place where there is 
no mercy for the weak and there aren’t second chances for those who don’t defend 
themselves. You are fighting for your lives” (Barak: In the Middle East, there is no mercy 
for the weak, 2010). This perspective inevitably ignores any peaceful solution and 
justifies all violence in the name of survival.   
 In response to the allegations from Israeli newspapers, Turkish newspapers used 
statements originating with Turkish politicians, official forensic reports (which detail the 
close and multiple shootings suffered by activists), and customs reports (to show that 
there were no weapons on board), as well as statements from the IHH officials. A 
Today’s Zaman news report from June 1, 2010, gives voice to Erdoğan, who defines 
Israel’s military operation as a “war crime” and the killing of nine activists as “state 
terrorism”, stating: “Israeli government, in lying, using deception, engaging in bloodshed 
and massacring the innocent, was damaging the people of Israel most. (...) We are sick of 
your lies. Be honest”. (No one should test Turkey’s patience, 2010).  Another Today’s 
Zaman news report from May 31, 2010, presents the IHH’s counter-claims. An IHH 
official, Ahmet Mercan, defines the military operation as a unilateral war against 
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unarmed civilians. Moreover, he claims that “the assault has shown that Israel is not a 
state or a society. It is a terrorist organization” (Israeli assault on Gaza flotilla draws 
sharp reaction, 2010). 
Propaganda-oriented journalism is also visible in the Hürriyet Daily News 
coverage. The June 3 edition points out the alleged connection between Israel and the 
separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is fighting against Turkey:  
There are increasing speculations, ambiguously supported even by the [Turkish] 
interior minister, that Israel’s notorious Mossad intelligence agency might have 
increased its collaboration with the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, 
terrorist gang and particularly the PKK attack on the Iskenderun naval base in 
which seven [Turkish] soldiers lost their lives the very same night Israel staged 
the bloody attack on the “Freedom Flotilla” might have been contracted by the 
Mossad (Kanlı, 2010b). 
 
In opposition to war journalism’s cover-ups and propaganda, peace journalism 
suggests a truth-oriented journalism which exposes not only untruths and cover-ups on 
‘their’ side but on all sides. Therefore, it rejects a reliance on official sources and military 
officials during conflict reporting and emphasizes using a critical perspective with 
background information to analyze the conflict and reveal constant propaganda messages. 
While the Jerusalem Post coverage does not provide any examples, the Ha’aretz 
coverage provides some pieces with truth-oriented framing. These news pieces don’t 
blame activists and Turkey; instead, they examine the Israeli government’s propaganda 
efforts to cover up their failure during the military operation. 
In his column from June 3, 2010, famous Israeli journalist Gideon Levy criticizes 
the government’s propaganda efforts and Netanyahu’s “the whole world is against us” 
argument. As the peace journalism model requires, Levy rejects the propaganda efforts 
and tries to show how the government’s claims are baseless:  
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After the saws and knives seized on the Marmara have been publicly exhibited, 
we will be able to convince ourselves once and for all that there is indeed a danger 
lurking in every alley, an Al-Qaida operative on every ship, weapons on every 
deck -- and even that the Marmara was an existential threat. (...) Of course, no one 
will demand to see the guns that the activists are alleged to have fired, or the 
video footage in which Israeli soldiers are seen firing, or the confiscated 
photographs taken by journalists. For us, the pictures of the severe beatings that 
the IDF Spokesman's Office has released are enough (Levy, 2010).  
 
The Turkish news coverage also displays truth-oriented journalism frames. For 
instance, an op-ed in the June 4, 2010, edition of the Today’s Zaman says that “even the 
fact that some of the ‘humanitarian aid workers’ turned on the soldiers with a rather un-
peaceful array of knives and clubs is no justification for shooting to kill” (Oz-Salzberger, 
2010). This remark is important because, generally in the coverage, the resistance of 
activists is presented as self-defence, with no critical analysis. The column also touches 
on the blockade and suggests that “moderate Israeli citizens, who were not involved in 
the flotilla incident, should lower their heads in shame for their government’s act and 
then proudly meet the gaze of those Palestinians who are willing to talk peace”. As 
suggested by peace journalism, the article attempts to expose untruths on all sides and 
calls for a peaceful solution (Oz-Salzberger, 2010).  
Finally, in Hürriyet Daily News, columnist Murat Onur explains the major 
mistakes of the Israeli and Turkish sides that led to the crisis. Onur notices that Turkey 
completely ignored the fact that some passengers actually engaged in active resistance by 
using knives, iron sticks and slingshots. Also, he points out that the Turkish government 
dismissed the responsibility of the IHH its motives (Onur, 2010). These remarks expose 
the Turkish government and the IHH’s victimizing discourse and highlight certain 




Elite-Oriented vs. People-Oriented 
As Galtung (1998) indicates, war journalism is also elite-oriented; it represents 
‘our’ points of view and ‘our’ suffering by relying on information from elite and official 
sources. Therefore, by presenting the ‘truth’ solely through the lens of official sources, 
journalists become little more than a mouthpiece. Not surprisingly, the coverage from the 
first week of the crisis was dominated by articles focused on what happened on the Mavi 
Marmara ship. Later on, the main discussion shifted to Israel’s own investigation into the 
incident and to the international pressure on Israel to allow a UN inquiry. The primary 
voice was given to politicians, senior army officers, diplomats, UN representatives, and 
international law experts, all of whom are seen as elite in the peace journalism model. In 
these types of articles, Israeli and Turkish official sources repeat the views of their 
officials and blame each other in order to strengthen their position on the international 
stage. 
On June 18, 2010, a feature story from the Jerusalem Post contained an interview 
with the deputy commander of the Israel Navy, Rani Ben-Yehuda, who commanded the 
military operation. He repeats the official Israeli view, blaming the activists and 
explaining how the commandos walked into a well-planned trap: “There was a clever 
group of terrorists on the ship who took advantage of the humanitarian platform and 
planned to kidnap, injure and kill Israeli soldiers. No innocent people were killed, only 
the terrorists” (Katz, 2010e). This elite-oriented and patriotic story displays many 
features of war journalism. First of all, it serves as a mouthpiece for the army commander 
to blame activists and justify the killing of nine people. It also ignores the other side and 
paints them as terrorists.   
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The Ha’aretz coverage likewise provides considerable elite-oriented journalism. 
Many of its articles place an emphasis on the UN’s demands for an international 
investigation and detail Israel’s arguments for rejecting such an investigation. A news 
report in the diplomacy section from June 6, 2010 talks about the UN’s international 
inquiry calls; the only voices heard in that article are those of politicians and diplomats. 
Michael Oren, Israel’s ambassador to the U.S., says: “We are rejecting an international 
commission. We are discussing with the Obama administration a way in which our 
inquiry will take place”. Additionally, the article shifts the focus from the killing of the 
activists to the activists’ “terror connections”, stating: 
The prime minister said, he told Ban that some of the passengers (…) were 
members of an extremist terror-backing Turkish organization. He stressed that 
any investigation into the event should determine who organized these extremists, 
who funded them and supplied them with equipment, and how they ended up on 
the ship (Ravid, 2010b).  
 
Today’s Zaman news report from June 1, 2010, prominent Turkish jurists, think 
tanks and politicians condemn Israel and support Turkey’s official points of view.  
Professor Hasan Köni uses Erdoğan’s arguments to comment on the incident:   
The Israeli military, however, opened fire on unarmed activists. This is a war 
crime. This is also a crime against humanity. All Israeli state officials are now 
‘responsible’ for what has happened in terms of international criminal law 
(Jurists: Israeli flotilla assault violation of international law, 2010).  
 
Similarly, on May 31, 2010, a news report from Hürriyet Daily News only gave a 
voice to leaders from Turkey’s ruling and opposition parties, as well as some political 
analysts. Due to this choice of sources, the article became another platform for the 
condemnation of Israel. While Hüseyin Çelik, the spokesman of the AKP (the Turkish 
ruling party) said “our relations with Israel will never be the same”, Deputy Prime 
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Minister Bülent Arınç described the attack as “piracy”. Devlet Bahçeli, the head of the 
Nationalist Movement Party, called Israel’s attacks “barbaric” and said they should not 
be left unreciprocated (Raid on flotilla puts final nail in coffin of Turkish ties with Israel, 
2010). Again, this article only mentions the suffering of the Turkish side and continues to 
vilify Israel.  
In contrast to elite-oriented journalism, peace journalism places an emphasis on 
women, children, the aged, minorities, and the vulnerable. Peace journalists are also 
required to name all evil-doers and to find alternatives to official sources such as peace 
groups, peaceful political parties, and so on. A Ha’aretz op-ed from June 11, 2010, 
written by Henry Siegman (the former director of the American Jewish Congress), 
indicates that the main question is not who was the first to attack the Mavi Marmara, but 
rather Israel’s occupation policies and their impact on Palestinians. Siegman rejects the 
claim that the world’s condemnation of Israel is reminiscent of the widespread distrust of 
Jewish people during Hitler’s regime, an opinion voiced by some Israelis. Siegman shifts 
the focus from who was the first to attack to the real issue: Israel’s occupation policies 
and its impacts on Palestinians:  
A million and a half civilians have been forced to live in an open-air prison in 
inhuman conditions for over three years now, but unlike the Hitler years, they are 
not Jews but Palestinians (...) Fully 80% of Gaza’s population lives on the edge of 
malnutrition, depending on international charities for their daily nourishment (...) 
Particularly appalling is that this policy has been the source of amusement for 
some Israeli leaders, who according to Israeli press reports have jokingly 
described it as ‘putting Palestinians on a diet’. That, too, is reminiscent of the 
Hitler years, when Jewish suffering amused the Nazis (Siegman, 2010). 
 
Today’s Zaman and Hürriyet Daily News include numerous stories about the 
activists and their families which contain victimizing and emotive language. However, 
there are also people-oriented examples.  A Today’s Zaman news report published on 
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June 13, 2010, turns the reader’s attention to forgotten people of Gaza. This is the only 
article in the Turkish coverage which gives a voice to ordinary Gaza people:   
Zaher is 28 years old (...) He explains that Gaza is connected to the outside world 
only through the Rafah border crossing, which has been open only three days in a 
month since 2006 and which is not sufficient for the passage of thousands of 
people. He adds that aid to Gaza is checked by Israel before being sent to them 
and that there is difficulty in finding even the most basic foodstuffs and that what 
they can find is very expensive. Noting that the power is gone for eight hours a 
day in Gaza, he offers two words to describe their feelings: despair and isolation 
(Kılıç, 2010). 
 
This news report is an important one because, although the international flotilla 
was organized to help the people of Gaza, only one of the above Today’s Zaman news 
reports actually provided a platform for their voices. It is a noteworthy example of peace 
journalism ideals.  
Victory-Oriented vs. Solution-Oriented 
According to the last category of Galtung’s (1998) table, victory-oriented 
journalism conceals peace initiatives and focuses on treaties, institutions, and controlling 
society. In contrast to victory-oriented journalism, solution-oriented journalism highlights 
initiatives with the aim of building a peaceful culture and society. After a conflict ends, 
victory-oriented journalism leaves for another conflict area and returns only if the old 
conflict flares up again. Solution-oriented journalism, in contrast, attempts to contribute to 
peace-building after the conflict ends. The flotilla incident wasn’t a conflict between two 
armies or groups, and it didn’t result in any ceasefire or treaty. Therefore, by its nature, it is 
unlikely to lead to victory-oriented coverage. The coverage examined in this analysis 
provides some partially solution-oriented articles which discuss ways to ease the tension 
between Israel and Turkey and to find a peaceful solution to Israeli-Palestinian problems.  
 While The Jerusalem Post didn’t publish any solution-oriented examples, the 
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Ha’aretz coverage offers some news pieces which propose and defend peaceful solutions 
to the conflict. An editorial from June 4, 2010, remarks on the increasing tension between 
the two countries and maintains that Turkey isn’t Israel’s enemy. The editorial highlights 
peaceful ways to prevent possible confrontations in the future, provides a historical 
background of the bilateral relationship, and suggests that the Israeli government should 
immediately rehabilitate its relations with Turkey. Additionally, it calls for lifting the 
blockade and suggests bringing Turkey closer to the region’s political processes (Turkey 
is not an enemy, 2010). These recommendations are important steps towards reducing the 
tension between the two countries and towards bringing peace to the region; therefore, 
the editorial can be defined as solution-oriented.  
 In Today’s Zaman, the solution-oriented articles tend to focus on the Israeli-
Palestinian problem. A column from June 2, 2010, argues that the incident could be an 
opportunity for Israel to break the blockade and start working towards a solution:  
There is a consensus of opinion in the international community that the 
Palestinian issue can be solved only through a two-state solution (...) The two-
state solution is the only insurance against a three-state outcome. So why does 
Israel insist on maintaining the blockade of the Gaza Strip? Why doesn’t Israel try 
to ‘win’ this region instead of allowing its opponents to use the unacceptable 
humanitarian situation there as a weapon against Israel? (Dedeoğlu, 2010).   
  
 Finally, the June 11 edition of Hürriyet Daily News proposes some peaceful 
solutions in the wake of the flotilla incident. Dalila Mahdawi, an expert journalist on 
human rights issues, recommends that instead of using the flotilla incident as an excuse 
for exchanging fiery political rhetoric and accusations, the incident should be used as an 
opportunity to persuade both Palestinians and Israelis to return to the negotiating table 
once and for all:  
Violence and finger-pointing is unsustainable -- only a decisive agreement will 
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protect the rights of the Palestinians and provide assurances to the Israelis. The 
two sides must accept the inevitability of peace and coexistence, and the 

























Chapter 5: Transforming War Journalism into Peace Journalism 
In this chapter, I will try to demonstrate that Israeli and Turkish newspapers’ 
inflammatory reporting practices -- or their war journalism tendencies -- are not the only 
option for reporting the Gaza flotilla incident. Ideally, journalists would also adopt peace 
journalism principles from the outset in all aspects: research, reporting, interviewing and 
production of stories at the time of the incident. To examine the feasibility of using peace 
journalism principles, I will rewrite a selection of the articles from my study using peace 
journalism techniques and conflict analysis. I identified three main themes in the 
coverage used for this study: (1) what happened on the Mavi Marmara ship?; (2) 
accusations between Israel and Turkey; (3) calls and debates on the UN investigation into 
Israel’s takeover operation. For each theme, I selected representative war journalism 
articles from the coverage (i.e., four articles per theme). These articles can be found in 
the appendices. Articles relating to theme 1 are in Appendix A, theme 2 in Appendix B, 
and theme 3 in Appendix C. Subsequently, for each theme, I wrote one peace journalism 
article as an experiment. The aim of this section is to show that Israeli and Turkish 
newspapers’ war journalism tendencies are not the only option to report the incident. In 
writing these articles, I drew upon two important guidebooks which also attempted to 
rewrite peace journalism stories: Peace Journalism (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2005) and 
Reporting the World (Lynch, 2002a). As it isn’t possible to re-report on an incident that 
occurred almost three years ago, in rewriting the articles I drew on materials in the 
original newspaper coverage as well as information from sources such as TRANSCEND 
International, the UN, and various NGOs, peace groups and government websites. These 
alternative sources are identified in the accompanying references. 
 69 
 
 Alternative Peace Journalism Story 1  
Peace activists across the world demand the removal of the Gaza blockade after 
Israeli takeover of the Gaza flotilla 
 In the aftermath of the Israeli takeover operation of six international ships 
carrying humanitarian aid and 680 pro-Palestinian activists who intended to break the 
Gaza blockade, the confrontation is being described quite differently by the Israeli 
government and activist groups. The operation -- which resulted in the deaths of nine 
Turkish activists, and wounded dozens of others, including ten Israeli commandos -- took 
place in international waters, about 130 km from the Gaza coast. Since eyewitness 
accounts from both sides are subjective, what happened on the ship is subject to dispute 
and interpretation. 
 Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak expressed his regrets for the victims, but also 
blamed the organizers of the flotilla for the fatalities and described them as “extremist 
supporters of terror”. Similarly, Israeli army sources claim that once the commandos 
came on board the Mavi Marmara, they were met with the resistance of activists armed 
with bats, knives and metal pipes. In response, the commandos first used crowd 
dispersion measures, and then, only after approximately one hour of confrontation in 
which some soldiers were wounded, did the commandos start to use live ammunition 
(Katz, 2010c). The army sources also claim that two commandos were wounded by 
gunshots fired from activists and that three commandos were taken captive for a short 
period of time. In addition to some pistols and rifles taken from commandos by activists, 
the army sources allege that activists had also brought their own weapons on board and 
used them against soldiers (Harel, 2010). On the other hand, officials from the Turkish 
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Customs Undersecretariat rejected these claims from the Israeli army, stating that: “all 
passengers that boarded the Mavi Marmara ship were screened and that not a single 
passenger was in possession of any weapon” (Baş, 2010). Moreover, Turkish PM 
Erdoğan pointed out that since the flotilla was carrying volunteers and bringing aid 
supplies in accordance with international shipping rules, it was unacceptable to equate 
unarmed civilians with terrorists. Erdoğan noted that Turkey has always stood against 
anti-Semitism and offered protection to the Jewish people when they were victims of 
violence and persecution and “it was now the Israelis’ turn to do the same” (No one 
should test Turkey’s patience, 2010). Bülent Yıldırım, the leader of the Turkish IHH, also 
disputed the Israeli government’s claims that the activists had links to terror groups. 
Yıldırım argued that the passengers on the ship engaged only in civil resistance and that 
the IHH called on the passengers not to allow Israeli soldiers aboard (IHH chief tells of 
violence, chaos on international aid ship, 2010). Nilüfer Çetin -- one of the Turkish 
activists aboard the Mavi Marmara, along with her one-year-old baby -- told reporters in 
Istanbul that she was aware of the possible danger in joining the trip; however, she said 
that “there are thousands of babies in Gaza. If we had reached Gaza we would have 
played with them and taken them food” Greeks from Gaza aid flotilla return to Athens, 
2010). 
 The Gaza flotilla crisis is not a simple confrontation between Israeli soldiers and 
activists. To understand the crisis, it is important to look at the roots of the Israeli-Arab 
struggle and historical claims which date back centuries. Especially after the First World 
War, Jewish people started to return to their ‘promised land’ after centuries of 
discrimination and persecution. This mass migration brought colonization, expulsion and 
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military occupation to the Palestinians. However, the Israeli people faced many wars and 
conflicts started by their Arab neighbours. After Israel gained independence in 1948, the 
armies of Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq tried to wipe out Israel; however, they 
were defeated and Israel expanded its territories. The tension between Israel and these 
countries its neighbours caused another war in 1967. Israel once more defeated them and 
invaded Gaza, the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt and the Golan Heights in Syria. Moreover, 
Israel took the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel to 
take back their territories. As a result, Israel gained more lands beyond the 1967 ceasefire 
lines. In 1979, Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty, returning Sinai to Egypt (A history 
of conflict, n.d). After a long occupation, Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza in 2005, 
but it continued to control Gaza’s borders. Tensions rose when Hamas won the 2006 
Palestinian legislative elections and took control of the territory in 2007. Israel 
immediately imposed a naval, air and land blockade on Gaza. Additionally, from 
December 2008 to January 2009, the Israeli army carried out Operation Cast Lead against 
Hamas, which resulted in more than 1,000 Palestinian deaths and led to the destruction of 
Gaza’s economic infrastructure (Migdalovitz, 2010).  
 Israel is not alone in imposing blockades on Gaza. Egypt has imposed a similar 
blockade since Hamas won the Palestinian legislative election in 2006 (Shokr, 2010). In 
addition to the U.S. and several Western countries, many Sunni-Muslim Arab countries, 
including Egypt, mistrust the Hamas regime --which is supported by Iran -- even though 
Hamas won the Palestinian legislative election in Gaza. By imposing the blockade on 
Gaza, Egypt has put additional pressure on Hamas to sustain the legitimacy of the 
Palestinian National Authority, headed by the Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas.  
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 The Gaza flotilla incident caused the world’s attention to shift to the blockade and 
its impact on 1.5 million Palestinians. An Al Jazeera feature story remarked that Gaza 
depends on outside humanitarian aid and on tunnels running between Gaza and Egypt. 
The blockade’s impact is felt in every corner; power cuts last up to eight hours a day, the 
poverty rate is 70 per cent, and the majority of people cannot afford the basic foodstuffs, 
including clean water. Due to this level of poverty, many children survive on a simple 
diet of bread, yogurt and water. Additionally, Gaza’s infrastructure has, for the most part, 
been destroyed by various Israeli operations. Due to sewage-contaminated water, many 
children suffer from skin and respiratory diseases. Moreover, when people get sick, they 
are usually unable to seek help because they are not allowed to leave for treatment 
(Joudeh, 2010). Zaher, 28, is one of the Palestinians who struggles under the blockade. 
He thinks that the attention drawn to their plight by the flotilla is more valuable than the 
aid it carried. In his opinion, the outside world is not really aware of what happens in 
Gaza and Zaher uses “despair” and “isolation” to describe their situation under the 
blockade (Kılıç, 2010).  
 An unforeseen consequence of the incident is that the reaction to the military 
operation has united eleven Israeli and Palestinian peace groups, including Ta’ayush, the 
Arab-Jewish Partnership, Rabbis for Human Rights, and the Israeli Committee against 
House Demolitions. In a joint statement, these groups declared their support for the Gaza 
flotilla. The statement described the flotilla as “a courageous act of political protest, an 
expression of worldwide solidarity with the Palestinian people and rejection of Israeli 
practices of oppressive occupation, as manifested in the continuing siege and blockade of 
Gaza and the imposition of collective punishment upon a mass of civilians”. The peace 
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groups described Gaza as “a giant open air prison where a million and half residents 
deprived of their fundamental rights” (Peace groups express support for Gaza Freedom 
Flotilla, 2011). 
 The operation also sparked protests in Israel. One of the protesters in Jerusalem, 
Yosefa Raz said “something terrible has happened and I feel provoked. After what has 
happened, I think people felt that something more public needed to be done. We wanted 
to be seen and heard” (Selig, 2010). Similarly, protests occurred across the world -- in the 
U.S., France, Sweden, Italy, the U.K., Egypt, Indonesia, Australia and many other 
countries, including Turkey -- to protest the operation and the ongoing blockade. In 
almost every city in Turkey, people took to the streets in protest. In Istanbul, around 
10,000 Turks carrying Palestinian flags gathered in front of the Israeli consulate to protest 
the incident (Israel widely condemned in street demonstrations across the world, 2010).  
 Dr. Dov Shinar, an expert on peace journalism at Israel’s Netanya Academic 
College, stated that not only should the flotilla have been allowed passage, but also that 
Israel will not emerge from this unharmed. Shinar points out that the Israeli government 
created public doubt by stressing “We do not know what the flotilla contains and who is 
on the ships”. This implied a move towards right wing and security-oriented politics, 
Shinar added, remarking that the operation and its aftermath demonstrated the importance 
of discussing the problem itself: that Israel and Hamas have to find ways to communicate 
(Korkut, 2010).  
 As a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, linguist, philosopher and political 
critic Noam Chomsky suggests a two-state settlement along the internationally 
recognized (pre-June 1967) borders. He indicates that the basic principles of this solution 
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have been accepted by virtually the entire world: the Arab states (which call for the full 
normalization of relations), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (including Iran) 
and relevant non-state actors (including Hamas). Chomsky says that this line was first 
proposed at the UN Security Council in January 1976 and backed by the major Arab 
states. However, it was rejected by Israel and the U.S. (Chomsky, 2010).  
 Johan Galtung, founder and director of the TRANSCEND international peace 
network, also suggested a solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one that is neither a 
one-state nor a two-state solution. Instead, he proposes a six-state solution in which 
Israel’s right to exist and the Palestinians’ right to be represented by their own 
independent state are both respected. Based on the 1958 European Economic 
Community, Galtung suggests a union of Israel and its five Arab neighbors (Syria, 
Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Palestine) which would be recognized by the international 
community (Galtung, 2012).  
 The killing of civilians during the takeover operation was condemned by the 
United Nations (UN) Security Council after ten hours of closed-door negotiations in New 
York. The Council called for a “prompt, impartial, credible and transparent investigation 
conforming to international standards” (UN Council condemns deaths on Gaza flotilla, 
2010). Additionally, the UN’s Human Rights Council voted to create an independent 
fact-finding mission to investigate the violations of international law during the 
operation. However, Israel has rejected any investigation that would be conducted by the 
UN. Instead, it favours the U.S. proposal of launching an Israeli investigation with the 
participation of outside observers (Israel defiant as UN rights body sets up probe into 
raid, 2010).  
 75 
 
 Commentary 1 
  The first theme I identified in the coverage was ‘What happened on the Mavi 
Marmara?’ Articles that fall into this category were mainly published during the first 
week of the crisis and tend to narrate the details of the conflict. As examined in the 
previous chapter, this type of article reports the confrontation in a very limited space and 
time perspective. In other words, the reader isn’t fully informed about the background to 
the conflict and its impacts on the Israeli-Palestinian issue or Israeli-Turkish relations. 
Additionally, these articles tend to rely on accounts from either the commandos or the 
activists to explain the confrontation. The incident is presented as a battle ground and 
Israeli and Turkish voices accuse each other of being murderers and terrorists. 
Demonizing and emotive words dominate the articles, another indicator of war 
journalism. Also, while the main goal of the flotilla was to help the people of the Gaza 
strip, the articles ignore this crucial point and shift the attention to the confrontation itself. 
Drawing on Lynch and McGoldrick (2005), it can be said that the coverage tends to 
disregard certain key issues: (1) the impacts of the Israeli blockade and military 
occupation on the daily life of Palestinians; (2) the background of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict; (3)  Israeli and Palestinian public opinion regarding the abolition of the blockade 
and a peaceful solution; (4) ways to break the cycle of violence; (5) ideas on how to 
resolve the conflict or any image of a solution; (6) images of peace and co-operation 
between Israelis and Palestinians.  
 In the first alternative peace journalism article, I tried to touch on these missing 
points as well as to explain the confrontation without using war journalism practices. My 
first step was to write an inclusive title, without focusing only on the conflict, and 
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without using any demonizing, accusatory or emotional words. An example of a war-
journalism title can be seen in the Jerusalem Post: “Nine dead in vicious conflict aboard 
Mavi Marmara”.  
 In the first and second paragraphs of the revised article, I provided the agreed-
upon facts, explained the incident without glorifying the violence by presenting both 
Israeli and Turkish perspectives. To reflect the reality of conflict coverage, I included in 
my article certain allegations made towards activists, such as the use of firearms against 
commandos. Moreover, I included statements from Israeli and Turkish politicians, even 
though these statements contain certain war journalism elements, along with the activists’ 
accounts. Although these statements included certain demonizing labels, I preferred to 
use rather moderate statements in my own writing. In the third paragraph, I briefly 
overviewed the historical Israeli-Palestinian problem and the roots of the Gaza blockade. 
In the fourth paragraph, I showed that in addition to Israel, Egypt has also imposed a 
blockade and some Sunni-Muslim countries mistrust Hamas and support the Palestinian 
National Authority. In the fifth paragraph, I focused on the rather invisible structural 
violence caused by the blockade and by Israeli operations. I explained the humanitarian 
crisis in Gaza by giving voice to Palestinians struggling under the blockade. This 
paragraph contains certain key features of people-oriented journalism. In the sixth 
paragraph, I intended to break down war journalism’s common Israeli vs. Palestinian 
approach by mentioning unified Israeli and Palestinian peace groups and their calls for 
peace and the abolition of the blockade. In the seventh paragraph, I discussed the 
peaceful anti-blockade and anti-occupation protests in Israel, Turkey and across the 
world, an indicator of the peace journalism approach because it sees conflict as a 
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problem. In the eighth paragraph, I cited the Israeli professor, Dov Shinar, in order to 
help explain how the operation is harmful for Israel and to show propaganda methods that 
were used by Israel to influence public opinion. In the ninth and tenth paragraphs, I 
mentioned some alternative solutions. For decades statesmen and elites have been 
suggested various solutions; however, I preferred to present Chomsky and Galtung’s 
suggestions for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both suggestions have solid grounds; 
however, it remains to be seen if they will be accepted by Israel and its neighbors. 
Finally, in the eleventh paragraph I briefly explained the reactions to the deadly takeover 
operation by the United States and the investigation calls to Israel. 
 Alternative peace journalism article 2 
Turkish and Israeli civil societies raise their voices and demand the immediate 
abolition of the blockade as details of military operation emerge 
 In the wake of Israel’s military operation of the Gaza flotilla, thousands of people 
took to the streets in cities across the world, including in Israel and Turkey, to protest the 
operation and to demand the abolition of the Gaza blockade. The flotilla had intended to 
break the naval blockade and was bringing humanitarian aid to the Palestinians who have 
for the past three years been living under a strict blockade from Israel and Egypt. 
Thousands of people, many carrying Turkish and Palestinian flags, gathered in Istanbul’s 
Taksim Square to protest the operation, showing solidarity with the Palestinians. 
Members of Turkey’s Jewish community also condemned the attack, saying they share 
Turkey’s feelings about the killings of activists on the aid ships. Their statement read: 
“We are saddened to learn that a military operation was launched against the Mavi 
Marmara.We share the reactions the operation sparked in our country” (Israeli assault on 
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Gaza flotilla draws sharp reaction from Turkish civil society, 2010). 
 Pro-Palestinian protests also took place in Israel, where members of peace groups, 
including the Hadash Party, gathered in Jerusalem’s Paris Square the day after the 
military operation. The activists protested the naval raid on the flotilla as well as the 
ongoing Israeli blockade. Tzachi, a student at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, said 
“we are here to protest the violent takeover of the Gaza flotilla ships and we wanted to 
voice our strong opposition to the illegal blockade of Gaza” (Selig, 2010).  
 According to Louise Arbour, president of the International Crisis Group, it is easy 
to condemn Israel's attack on a flotilla of aid bound for Gaza as unnecessary, ill-
conceived and disproportionate. The hard thing to do, she says, is to “understand how this 
incident is an indictment of a much broader policy toward Gaza for which the wider 
international community bears responsibility.” Arbour pointed out that for years many 
countries have supported the blockade in the hope of overthrowing Hamas; as a result, 
today Gaza “suffers from sky-rocketing unemployment and poverty, and lacks medicine, 
fuel, electricity, food, and other essential commodities” (Arbour, 2010). Similarly, Dalila 
Mahdawi, a British journalist who focuses on human rights issues, said that lifting the 
blockade and an independent investigation into what occurred on the flotilla are essential 
actions, but these are only part of the broader actions needed to end the 62-year-old 
conflict. Mahdawi says violence and finger-pointing are unsustainable and Israelis and 
Palestinians should immediately return to peace talks: “only a decisive agreement will 
protect the rights of the Palestinians and provide assurances to the Israelis. The two sides 
must accept the inevitability of peace and coexistence, and the international community 
must help them achieve that” (Mahdawi, 2010).  
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 Even before the flotilla sailed towards Gaza, the Israeli government had started to 
claim that some activists as well as the IHH had connections to terrorist organizations. 
According to a report from Israel’s Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, the 
activists who resisted the commandos’ actions were well-trained and backed by the 
Turkish government. The report also claims that the Turkish PM Erdoğan was personally 
involved in the flotilla’s preparations, and that 40 hard-core IHH activists, who had 
boarded the ship earlier in Istanbul, had skipped the security checks (Pfeffer, 2010). In 
addition to these claims, Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon argued that the 
flotilla’s organizers had ties to global jihad, Al-Qaida and Hamas (Lazaroff  & Lappin, 
2010).  
 The Turkish Customs Directorate has rejected Israel’s claims and stated that all 
passengers (42 of them boarded from Istanbul port and 504 from Antalya) were screened 
and that not a single passenger was in possession of any weapon. During the search of the 
Mavi Marmara, advanced metal detectors, X-ray scanners and trained sniffer dogs were 
used (Soncan et al., 2010). On the other hand, the activists admitted that during the 
confrontation, they incapacitated 10 soldiers, took their guns and threw these weapons 
into the sea. An IHH official argued: “we would have been right if we used them against 
them. You are legally innocent if you take the weapon of the person who is attacking 
you” (IHH chief tells of violence, chaos on international aid ship, 2010). The flotilla was 
organized by the Turkish IHH and the Free Gaza Movement and Israel’s claims of the 
involvement of Turkish PM Erdoğan or his government cannot be verified. However, it 
can be said that the Turkish government didn’t prevent the flotilla from sailing to Gaza, 
despite the known risk of confrontation after the Israeli army’s warnings of using force to 
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stop the flotilla. After the Turkish officials ensured that there were no firearms on the 
ships, the aid flotilla was allowed to leave. To clarify the Turkish government’s stand, 
Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç described the flotilla as a “pure civil society 
initiative” and stated that the government wasn’t involved in the organization of the 
flotilla. The Turkish government’s strategy against Israel is based on political, legal and 
humanitarian dimensions. Turkey plans to mobilize the international community to create 
pressure to lift the blockade on Gaza and the West Bank. Additionally, Turkey will try to 
bring the operation to the international courts. Finally, it will use the operation as a tool to 
highlight the problems of Palestinians (Raid on flotilla puts final nail in coffin of Turkish 
ties with Israel, 2010).  
 According to an investigative Der Spiegel article by Yassin Musharbash, Israeli 
officials couldn’t provide strong evidence to back up their claims. The author reported 
that these accusations are often difficult to verify because they are based on classified 
intelligence information. For instance, the Israeli army released a list of passengers who 
were “known to be involved in terrorist activity”. One of them, Fatimah Mahmadi, was 
accused of having smuggled “forbidden electrical components” to Gaza. Another 
passenger, Ken O'Keefe, an internationally well-known peace activist, was accused of 
being a “radical anti-Israel activist and operative of Hamas”. In the article, Musharbash 
says that the accusations towards the IHH are based on a limited number of sources and 
are not well-grounded. The first source is a CIA report from 1996 on the links of Islamic 
welfare organizations. This report mentioned the IHH but its conclusions were vague. 
The second source was a study from the Danish Institute for International Studies, which 
claimed in 2006 that IHH members had trained for armed combat in Afghanistan, Bosnia 
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and Chechnya, and that firearms had been found in its headquarters in Istanbul in 1997 by 
Turkish security forces. This same study mentions phone calls between alleged Al-Qaida 
contacts and weapons shipments to militants. Additionally, it cites a summary of 
testimony given by Jean-Louis Bruguière (a French judge) at a U.S. trial in April 2001. 
Bruguière mentioned a link between the IHH and the defendant in the trial; the defendant 
was later convicted of having plotted to attack Los Angeles International Airport for al-
Qaida in 1999 (Musharbash, 2010).  
 The IHH completely rejects these allegations of terror links. Osman Atalay, a 
member of the acting board of the IHH, argued that passengers on the vessels were 100-
per- cent peaceful activists. Yavuz Dede, deputy head of the IHH, claimed that these 
alleged ties to terror groups were part of a “smear campaign by Israel” and the IHH was 
found to be not guilty by a Turkish court. Referring to the 1997 police raid on the IHH 
headquarters, Dede claimed that the group was framed because of the political situation 
in Turkey at the time; in the end, nothing came out of the trial after the raid. The IHH 
President Bülent Yıldırım was acquitted and released from prison after three months 
(Öğret & Songün, 2010).  
 The U.S. doesn’t recognize the IHH as a terrorist organization and has declared 
that it cannot validate any connection between the IHH and Al-Qaeda (US says cannot 
validate claims of IHH ties to al-Qaeda, 2010). An American terrorism analyst, Evan 
Kohlmann, succinctly summarized the situation in the previously mentioned Spiegel 
article: “On one side, you have the Israelis insisting that everyone on board is a terrorist. 
On the other side, you have the Turks insisting that everyone on board is an innocent 




 Due to the Gaza flotilla incident, the international community has stepped up 
criticism of the Gaza blockade, which has focused the tension between the governments 
of Israel and Turkey. However, Israel is not the only state imposing an embargo on Gaza. 
Palestine’s fellow Arab neighbour Egypt has imposed a blockade since 2006, when 
Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections. The Egyptian blockade has further 
deteriorated Gaza’s humanitarian and economic situation. Several human rights groups 
have described the current situation as the worst humanitarian crisis in Gaza since its 
military occupation by Israel in 1967 (Shokr, 2010).   
 In addition to the blockade, the current water shortage is a vital issue for 
Palestinians who often complain about their denied water rights. Many analysts believe 
that water is a key issue in the Israel-Palestine conflict, and that this shared problem 
could lead to cooperation between the two nations in the long term. One such example is 
the group Friends of the Earth Middle East (FoEME), which brought together Israeli, 
Palestinian and Jordanian environmentalists to build sewage-treatment plants and to 
replace old water pipes in the occupied Palestinian territories. “We should be using water 
as a tool for peace and to bridge the gap of confidence in the region -- not to create a 
water crisis,” says FoEME’s Palestinian director Nader Al-Khateeb. He says that thanks 
to the project, 29 cross-border communities have worked together to solve their water 
problems over the past ten years (Aburawa, 2011). Further complicating the issue, Syria 
supports anti-Israeli militant groups, including Hezbollah, in the hopes of taking back the 
Golan Heights. During the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel occupied the Golan Heights, which 
today supplies a third of Israel’s water. In terms of water supply, Syria is in a critical 
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position because, after losing Golan, Syria depends on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers 
where Turkey has various dam construction projects known as GAP (Southeastern 
Anatolia Project) (Lynch, 2002a). By the end of this project, Turkey will gain near total 
control over the two main rivers of the Middle East. This once more shows that the path 
to peace in the Middle East is very complex and there are various conflicting parties. 
Therefore, peace could be reached through regional cooperation, respect for each nation’s 
security concerns and a fair solution to the water problem, with Turkey’s involvement. 
 Commentary 2 
  The second group of articles tends to focus on the accusations between Israel and 
Turkey after the incident. Although there were activists from 38 countries in the flotilla, 
the incident and its aftermath were predominantly presented as a power struggle between 
Israel and Turkey. Moreover, the coverage relied on official sources and politicians’ 
accusatory statements, with little to no background information. Israeli newspapers 
repeatedly highlighted the terror connections of the IHH and the activists, including their 
supposed connections with Al-Qaeda. For instance, in the selected Ha'aretz article in 
Appendix B, the main source is the Israeli army and the Intelligence and Terrorism 
Information Center. The article paints the picture not of the flotilla activists but of an 
organized group which came for war. Also, Erdoğan was presented as an enemy that 
personally helped this violent group to attack Israeli soldiers. Similarly, the selected 
Jerusalem Post article mentions that the well-trained activists were not carrying identity 
cards or passports, but did have $10,000 in cash. The article puts forth establishment 
propaganda claims (made without proof) that this money came from the Turkish 
government. As part of their demonization, the activists were presented as part of a 
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suicide mission. On the other hand, Turkish newspapers also demonized Israel and 
statements from politicians dominated the coverage. As can be seen in the chosen 
Today’s Zaman article, the use of inflammatory language and the condemnation of Israel 
is prevalent in Turkish coverage. Anti-Israel slogans such as down with Israel and 
Turkish soldiers to Israel were used, and Israel was classed as a terrorist organization. 
Likewise, the selected Hürriyet Daily News article presents the incident as the final nail 
in coffin of Turkish ties with Israel. By relying on official sources and statements from 
politicians, the article promotes Turkey’s official policy. 
 Overall, the second group of selected articles don’t contain certain key aspects 
that could have made these articles examples of peace journalism: (1) a discussion of 
Israeli and Turkish public opinion; voicing not angry protesters, but moderate voices 
from both sides which demand better relationships between two countries, the abolition 
of the blockade and a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue; (2) ideas on how 
to ease the tension between Israel and Turkey and how to see the incident as an 
opportunity to contribute to the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian problem;(3) an 
alternative, critical look towards the alleged terror connections of peace activists; (4) an 
examination of Egypt’s overlooked blockade on Gaza; (5) water inequality in the Middle 
East, including Turkey’s ongoing dam-building projects on Tigris and Euphrates rivers.  
 The first paragraph of my article provides factual information about the blockade, 
the flotilla incident as well as global anti-blockade protests. Moreover, the voice of 
Turkey’s Jewish community is presented; this point of view is very important. Since 
certain articles in the Turkish coverage present the Israeli government and Jewish people 
as one entity, this coverage could provoke anti-Semitic feelings towards the Turkish-
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Jewish community. The statement from Turkey’s Jewish community could have helped 
to make a distinction between the Israeli government’s policies and peaceful Jewish 
people. Likewise, in the second paragraph, the anti-blockade protest in Jerusalem 
presents moderate-peaceful voices in Israel who demand a peaceful solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the blockade. By giving voice to Turkey’s Jewish 
community and the peaceful protesters, the first two paragraphs display certain peace-
oriented and people-oriented journalism features. The third paragraph points out that that, 
after the killing of activists, it is easy to condemn Israel and debate about international 
investigations; however, the key point is the ignored role of the international community 
in the humanitarian crisis in Gaza as well as the immediate need for peace talks between 
Israel and Palestine. The paragraph presents the incident as an opportunity to contribute 
to the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian problem; therefore, it demonstrates peace-
oriented and solution-oriented journalism characteristics. The fourth paragraph mentions 
Israel’s main accusations and the terrorism claims made towards the activists. These 
claims, based on Israel’s Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, link the Turkish 
PM Erdoğan personally with the IHH. The fifth paragraph gives a voice to Turkish 
officials as a response to the Israeli government’s accusations, and also clarifies the 
position of the Turkish government in the organization of the flotilla. Turkish officials 
have rejected any connection between the Turkish government and the IHH as well as 
existence of any firearms on board. The paragraph also briefly mentions the future 
strategy of Turkish government towards Israel. The sixth paragraph tries to demonstrate 
how certain claims made by the Israeli government are not well-grounded and were used 
as a propaganda tool. By quoting Der Spiegel’s investigative story, I explained the origin 
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of the Israeli claims. I also provided the IHH’s perspective in the seventh paragraph. The 
IHH rejects the allegations and describes them as a “smear campaign by Israel”. The 
eighth paragraph firstly shows the position of the U.S. government about the IHH, as well 
as showing that neither the Israeli and nor the IHH claims are straightforward. In the 
ninth paragraph, I pointed out an overlooked but important fact in the coverage: Egypt’s 
blockade on Gaza. The paragraph shows that while the international community criticizes 
Israel over its blockade, Egypt has imposed the same type of blockade on Palestinians. 
The tenth paragraph highlights a key factor in the Israeli-Palestinian and Israel’s 
disagreements with its Arab neighbours: water inequality in the Middle East. The 
paragraph explains how increasing water scarcity which can be exploited as an 
opportunity for cooperation between Israel and its neighbouring countries.  
Alternative peace journalism article 3: 
Pressure on Israeli government increases after it rejects UN proposal for 
international Gaza flotilla probe; Jews and Arabs increase their calls for a peaceful 
solution   
The Israeli government has rejected calls from the United Nations Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon to allow an investigation by an international commission into its 
military operation on the Gaza flotilla. During the takeover operation, which created a  
confrontation between the Israeli marines and pro-Palestinian activists, nine activists 
were killed and dozens others wounded, including Israeli commandos. After the 
operation, Israel has faced pressure from the international community and peace groups 
to abolish its blockade on Gaza. However, Israel has repeatedly claimed that its 
commandos used lethal force only in self-defence after facing resistance from activists. 
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Instead of an international commission, Israel wants to conduct its own internal 
investigation, which would include international observers. After speaking with the UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (who had suggested a panel headed by former News 
Zealand Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer, as well as officials from Israel, Turkey and the 
U.S.), Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu said “we need to consider the issue carefully and 
level-headedly, while maintaining Israel’s national interests as well as those of the Israel 
Defense Forces”. Regarding the easing of the Gaza blockade, Netanyahu said that “our 
desire is to facilitate the transfer of civilian and humanitarian goods to the civilian 
population, while preventing the transfer of weapons and warfare materials” (Ravid, 
2010).  
During his address to the UN Security Council, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu demanded that the council condemn Israel’s actions, and called for an 
international investigation to find out who was responsible for the deaths (Solomont, 
2010). According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, which has already accepted the UN 
proposal, an internal Israeli investigation “cannot be impartial, fair, transparent and 
credible” because, “Israel doesn’t have the authority to assign a national commission to 
investigate a crime perpetrated in international water” (Ankara: Israel’s own inquiry far 
from global expectations, 2010). While the Arab League condemned the attack and 
claimed that it negatively impacted regional security and stability, the U.S. special envoy 
for Middle East Peace George Mitchell said “the tragedy of last week cannot be allowed 
to spiral out of control and undermine the limited but real progress that has been made” 
(Israel rejects international investigation, 2010). 
Israel’s rejection of an international investigation can be connected back to a 
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critical UN report, known as the Goldstone Report, on Israel’s Operation Cast Lead on 
Gaza in December 2008. The UN fact-finding mission in 2009 found evidence that both 
Israel and Hamas had committed serious war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
Additionally, the report condemned Israel’s policy towards Gaza and rejected Israel’s 
argument of self-defence to stop Palestinian rocket attacks from Gaza (UN mission finds 
evidence of war crimes, 2009). Richard Falk, the UN special rapporteur on Palestine 
issues, is skeptical about the Israeli government’s internal investigation into the Gaza 
flotilla operation, pointing out that Israel’s previous investigation in 2009 had ignored 
both their own use of lethal weapons and the serious allegations of human right abuses 
levied against Israel. Instead, the probe found that the most serious violation was a credit 
card stolen from a Palestinian by an Israeli soldier (Ankara: Israel’s own inquiry far from 
global expectations, 2010).  
While a new UN investigation on the Gaza flotilla operation is being debated on 
the international stage, 37 Palestinian NGOs from Gaza have issued a joint open letter to 
express their situations under the blockade. The statement declares: “We Palestinians of 
Gaza want to live at liberty, to have the right to travel and move freely. We want to live 
without fear of another bombing campaign that leaves hundreds of our children dead and 
many more injured or with cancers from the contamination of Israel’s white phosphorous 
and chemical warfare. We want to live without the humiliations at Israeli checkpoints or 
the indignity of not providing for our families because of the unemployment brought 
about by the economic control and the illegal siege”. The joint letter also called on the 
international community to stop the blockade on Gaza and the West Bank, and to end the 
Israeli occupation and other war crimes (Open Letter from Gaza, 2010). 
 89 
 
In the meantime, Israeli peace groups have increased their efforts to contribute to 
a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue after the Gaza flotilla incident. Jerusalem 
Peacemakers is a group which gathers grassroots activists and Jewish, Christian, Muslim 
and Druze religious leaders to work towards the Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation. As part 
of their efforts, Rabbi Menachem Froman and Sheikh Ghassan Manasra visited the 
Turkish PM Erdoğan to present to him a peace plan suggestion. The same peace plan will 
be also presented to Israeli and Palestinian governments as well as to the governments of 
Arab countries, European countries, Russia and the U.S. (Jerusalem peacemakers visit 
Turkish PM over peace plan, 2010). Rabbi Froman’s plan proposes the establishment of 
two countries: Israel and Palestine. According to Froman, the Israeli-Palestinian issue is 
political as well as religious and efforts for peaceful solution “won’t succeed without a 
religious, spiritual basis”. He says “the key to peace is peace in Jerusalem”, therefore his 
plan proposes a shared Jerusalem by Muslims, Christians and Jews (Kershner, 2008).  
While the bilateral relations between Israel and Turkey only began in the 1940s, 
the two nations’ common history dates back to the 15th century. When Jewish people 
were expelled from Spain, the Ottoman Empire welcomed them in 1492. For centuries, 
under Turkish rule, they enjoyed relative prosperity and tolerance compared to many 
parts of the Christian world. Jews also played key roles especially in bureaucracy, 
diplomacy and the empire’s socio-economic life (Guleryuz, n.d). These relationships 
continued after the independence of Israel in 1948. Turkey was the first Muslim country 
to officially recognize Israel in 1949 and bilateral relations increased from 1949 to 1990 
due to common foreign policy interests. From the 1990s to 2002, major problems with its 
neighbors, including Iran, Iraq, and Syria, motivated Turkey to approach Israel; the two 
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countries became strategic allies and business partners. In 2002, Tayyip Erdoğan came to 
power with a parliamentary majority and Israeli-Turkish relations became more focused 
on the Israeli-Palestinian issue (Tiryaki & Yirik, 2010). Turkey’s recognition of Hamas 
as a political party cooled relations. More specifically, Israel’s renewed blockade of Gaza 
and Operation Cast Lead on Gaza in 2008 displeased the Erdoğan government. Prior to 
the offensive, Turkey had been mediating peace talks between Israel and Syria; however, 
Turkey had not been informed by Israel of this operation (Inbar, E. 2011). Shortly 
thereafter, Erdoğan participated in a conference with Israeli President Shimon Peres at 
the Davos Economic Summit, where Erdoğan harshly accused Peres because of the 
Operation Cast Lead. In return, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Ayalon insulted the 
Turkish ambassador by deliberately seating him on a lower chair during a meeting, 
further damaging the relationship (Kosebalaban, 2010).  
This historical overview shows that Israel and Turkey, two of the most mature 
democracies in the region, share common values, interests and have various reasons to 
cooperate to bring peace to the Middle East. In addition to its role of negotiator between 
Israel and its Arab neighbours, Turkey could also contribute to peace by using its 
plentiful water resources as a tool to promote stability and peace. The Israel/Palestine 
Center for Research and Information indicates that water scarcity is a major concern for 
Israel, Palestine, and Jordan. Recent studies have shown that Israel needs 30 percent more 
water than it currently has in order to meet the needs of its population in 2020. Today, 
many Palestinians have very limited access to water and two hundred villages in the West 
Bank are without a connection to a water grid. In Jordan, water is generally available 
only 12 hours per day. According to the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and 
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Information, Turkey, with its rich fresh water sources, is the only practical candidate to 
solve the regional water scarcity problem. In 1986, Turkish President Turgut Özal first 
proposed the “Peace Water Pipeline” project which aimed to bring Turkish water through 
pipelines to Syria, Jordan, Palestine and the Gulf States. In addition to this unrealized 
project, in 2004 Turkey agreed with Israel to sell its water through the Manavgat River 
Project which aimed to provide Israel with 50 million cubic litres of water annually for 
twenty years. However, the project was later cancelled due to high transportation costs 
and cooling diplomatic relations (Water Imports, 2010). The Israel/Palestine Center for 
Research and Information report once more underlines how water scarcity can be used as 
an encouraging force for the Middle Eastern countries to cooperate and reach a peaceful 
solution to their problems.   
Commentary 3 
The third group of articles focused on the aftermath of the Gaza flotilla incident, 
the reactions from the international community, and the debates regarding the United 
Nations’ investigation proposal. This type of article predominantly gave voice to 
government members, politicians and elite sources. Inevitably, Israel and Turkey’s 
official views were over-represented. After the killing of nine peace activists in 
international waters, an impartial investigation under the UN umbrella was seen as a 
necessity and was debated on the international stage. However, the newspapers chose to 
cover this debate by focusing on the confrontation on the Mavi Marmara, without 
providing any context. In the Ha’aretz news report (an example of elite-oriented 
journalism), Israeli PM Netanyahu and Israel’s ambassador to the US were the main 
voices. They explained why Israel rejected the UN proposal for a Gaza probe. As 
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expected, Netanyahu accused the activists of being members of an extremist, terror-
backing Turkish organization and explained the use of lethal force as self-defense. In 
addition to official Israeli sources, Turkish FM Davutoğlu and Irish FM Micheal Martin 
were also cited. However, this doesn’t change the elite-oriented nature of the article. The 
Jerusalem Post article, heavily dependent on elite males, can be also described as elite-
oriented. The reactions and discussions after the Gaza incident were presented in the 
article from the perspectives of various politicians and diplomats. While Turkey and Arab 
countries accused Israel of being a terrorist state and condemned their actions, Israel tried 
to present itself as a victim and to convince the international community that the killing 
of activists was legitimate, and the operation was part of its fight against a terrorist 
regime (Hamas) which controls Gaza.  
In the Today’s Zaman article, the main voices were mostly Turkish politicians 
who condemned Israel’s actions and sought an international investigation into the 
incident. The article also contains statements from U.S. and European diplomats on the 
international investigation debate. This elite-oriented article is missing a look at the 
suffering of ordinary people in Gaza or an exploration of public opinion in Israel or 
Turkey. Finally, the Hürriyet Daily News article reported Israel’s rejection of 
international investigation by relying elite sources, such as the Arab League. In contrast 
to the Israeli perspective towards the activists and the calls for investigation from the 
diplomatic world, the Arab League described the incident as state piracy and terrorism. 
Again, this article does not contain any references to the difficulties faced by the ordinary 
people affected by the blockade. Also, it is missing a discussion of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict or any background information about the Israeli-Turkish relationships. 
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 Overall, these elite-oriented news reports, along with other elite-oriented 
examples in the coverage, are missing various important factors which could help them 
become examples of peace journalism: (1) a critical look at the Israeli rejection of the 
international investigation; (2) focus on vulnerable groups affected by the blockade and 
by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which actually created the Gaza flotilla incident; (3) 
statements from grassroots peacemakers, instead of elite politicians and diplomats who 
have different political priorities;(5) a discussion of the historically close relationships 
between Jewish people and Turks; and (6) an exploration of Turkey’s rich water 
resources and how this could contribute to the peace in the Middle East.  
The first paragraph of my article summarizes the position of the Israeli 
government which was at the time under heavy international pressure to accept the UN 
probe and lift the Gaza blockade. The paragraph also contains statements from Israeli PM 
Netanyahu, without becoming a mouthpiece for the Israeli official sources. The second 
paragraph introduces the important stakeholders in the issue such as Turkey, the UN, the 
Arab League, and the U.S. Without making them the dominant voices in the article, their 
stances are presented as they are important in easing the tension or finding possible 
solutions. Additionally, the paragraph examines both Turkey’s position towards the UN’s 
international investigation commission proposal and Israel’s rejection of the 
investigation. The third paragraph looks critically at the situation and explores the 
reasons behind the Israeli rejection of an international inquiry. The UN website and the 
Today’s Zaman article provide me with some essential background information about the 
Israeli rejection. A previous UN report had accused Israel of committing war crimes in 
2008; consequently, Israel is unwilling to face another critical report. This part of the 
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article can be described as truth-oriented, as it sheds light on cover-ups and discusses the 
real reasons behind the rejection of the probe. Unlike the first three paragraphs, the fourth 
reflects the voices of vulnerable groups affected by the blockade and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. In other words, it focuses on structural violence. The joint open letter 
-- which presents 37different NGOs or civic associations from Gaza -- shifts attention to 
the problems of ordinary Palestinians. The letter examines the struggles that ordinary 
Palestinians face in their everyday lives as well as their calls for justice. The fifth 
paragraph gives voice to grassroots peacemakers from Israel and Palestine who work 
together to contribute to a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The Jerusalem 
Peacemakers initiative gathers religious leaders from different groups and sees religion 
as a force for peace. This paragraph demonstrates that differing religious beliefs don’t 
need be an obstacle to reaching a peaceful solution. Additionally, this section helps to 
humanize opposing groups instead of demonizing them. Therefore, it shows certain 
features of solution-oriented journalism. The sixth paragraph demonstrates that Jewish 
and Turkish people have, historically, had a close relationship and share a common 
history which dates back to the 15
th
 century. This section explains the rising tensions 
between the two countries in a historical context. The paragraph also indicates that the 
Gaza flotilla incident isn’t the only reason behind the deteriorating relationships. The last 
paragraph, based on a report from the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and 
Information, highlights, like in the second article, how water scarcity is a key factor for 
Israel’s policies towards Palestinians and other neighbours; Turkey’s possible role in 
solving this problem is also explored. The paragraph shows that Turkey is a relatively 
water rich country and its water resources may be a tool for regional cooperation and 
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peace.   
Overall Commentary 
 This chapter aimed to answer my third research question: Can war journalism 
articles be rewritten using the principles of peace journalism and still meet the recognized 
standards of good journalism? What differences would emerge from such an exercise? In 
order to find an answer to this question, as well as to test the viability of the peace 
journalism model in the present case study, I identified three main themes: (1) what 
happened on the Mavi Marmara ship?; (2)  accusations between Israel and Turkey; (3) 
calls for and debates on a UN investigation into Israel’s takeover operation. For each 
theme, I wrote one example article, transforming the original war journalism articles 
using peace journalism principles; I also aimed to write publishable and realistic peace 
journalism pieces. An important limitation while rewriting these stories was that the 
incident happened almost three years ago; therefore it was not possible to do any original 
reporting. I was required to work with the published sources available. Thus, I relied 
predominantly on information and quotes from the selected stories and the rest of the 
coverage. Additionally, I drew material from various online sources: news websites (such 
as BBC, Al Jazeera, the Independent, Der Spiegel); TRANSCEND International; the UN, 
Israeli and Palestinian NGOs; peace groups; and government websites. To rewrite these 
three peace journalism articles, I relied on more than 40 news sources. 
 Transforming war journalism into peace journalism is increasingly practiced in 
certain universities or peace institutions by journalist instructors such as McGoldrick or 
Lynch. While completing this chapter, I drew upon their guidebooks Peace Journalism 
(Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005) and Reporting the World (Lynch, 2002a). Similarly, this 
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experiment showed that war journalism articles can be rewritten through the use of peace 
journalism principles and conflict analysis. I noticed that some themes leant themselves 
more easily to peace journalism framing than the others. For example, the first theme 
(what happened on the Mavi Marmara ship?) forced me to focus on certain visible effects 
of the conflict and to give more voice to the official sources. However, the second theme 
(accusations between Israel and Turkey) more easily lent itself to peace journalism 
framing. I was able to focus on the populations affected by the conflict and demonstrate 
the roots of the relationships and the conflict. I tried to avoid a two-sided war journalism 
narrative and did not have to rely on elite sources. 
Finally, this experiment also showed that writing peace-oriented stories requires 
enough time, enough space and journalistic expertise. As a graduate student, I had the 
liberty to spend weeks on this chapter; to do research, find the sources and write the three 
peace journalism articles without any space limitation. Moreover, my experience as a 
reporter and my personal interest in the Gaza flotilla incident were facilitating factors 
while writing these stories. On the other hand, journalists -- like those who wrote the 
original stories -- work under the pressure of deadlines. Also, they have additional 
responsibilities and work on different stories from completely different topics. The print 
media’s space constraint is also an important issue. It can be argued that at least 1,000 







Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This thesis has argued that the peace journalism model can offer alternative means 
for reporting conflicts and wars, although it faces theoretical and practical challenges. 
Peace journalism stems from the work of Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung, 
working with Mari Ruge, who published the pioneering work The Structure of Foreign 
News in 1965. The model emerged as a remedy to the shortcomings of the news media’s 
war and conflict reporting practices. Galtung (1998) explains that peace journalism tries 
to depolarize issues by pursuing truths on all sides, and to de-escalate conflicts by 
highlighting peace and conflict resolution in equal proportion to violence. During this 
research project, I examined the coverage of the Gaza flotilla crisis in two English-
language daily newspapers from Israel (The Jerusalem Post and Ha’aretz) and two from 
Turkey (Today’s Zaman and Hürriyet Daily News) between May 31st and June 30th 2010, 
the first month of the crisis. The first research question was: How did the coverage of the 
Gaza flotilla crisis by The Jerusalem Post, Ha’aretz, Today's Zaman and Hürriyet Daily 
News reflect war journalism? To answer the question, I applied both textual analysis and 
quantitative content analysis to the coverage (405 articles in total). The analysis focused 
on the newspapers’ provocative role in the crisis as well as story types, the production 
source of stories (wire stories or produced by newspapers’ staff), the indicators of peace 
and war journalism and their relationships with each other. 
The quantitative content analysis showed that in all four newspapers, war 
journalism framing predominates. In all of the coverage, 68.8 per cent of the articles 
could be classified as dominant war journalism framing, compared to 27.6 per cent peace 
journalism and 3.4 per cent neutral. The highest incidence of war journalism framing was 
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found in The Jerusalem Post (89.2%), followed by Today’s Zaman (69.1%), Ha’aretz 
(64.1%) and Hürriyet Daily News (56.2%). Due to their editorial policies, which are 
usually consistent with the national policies of their governments, it was expected that 
there would be a high rate of war journalism in The Jerusalem Post and Today’s Zaman. 
However, the dominance of war journalism framing in Ha’aretz was surprising, since 
Ha’aretz is known for its left-wing and oppositional editorial policy. Finally, Hürriyet 
Daily News provided the least amount of war journalism framing, due to its relatively 
neutral and oppositional editorial policy, as well as its high number of opinion and 
editorial pieces.   
The analysis revealed that the most common war journalism indicator in the 
coverage was reporting on visible effects of conflict (29.7%). This type of story focused 
mainly on the confrontation on Mavi Marmara and its visible effects. The second most 
common indicator was the reliance on leaders, official sources and elite as news sources 
(29.4%). This reliance excluded ordinary people affected by the conflict, as well as  
alternative voices from the other side and created one-sided reporting, emphasizing a 
propaganda voice for ‘us’. The third most common indicator was the use of demonizing 
language (12.5%). Demonizing adjectives and labels were used to help justify the killing 
of activists by Israeli commandos and created an enemy image. 
In contrast, the most common peace journalism indicator was reporting causes 
and consequences of the conflict (29.5%). Instead of focusing on the visible effects of the 
conflict, these articles examined the causes of the confrontation and its impacts on 
ordinary people. Non-partisan reporting was the second most common indicator of peace 
journalism (15.2%). These articles show that avoiding partisan reporting is an important 
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step towards peace journalism. The third most common indicator was the focus on 
ordinary people and their problems (13.4%). As the peace journalism model suggests, 
this group of articles placed emphasis on the ordinary people: people affected by the 
Gaza flotilla confrontation, those affected by Israel’s occupation and blockade on 
Palestinian lands, and peaceful groups from Israel, Palestine, Turkey and other countries.   
Overall, the domination of war journalism framing can be explained by several 
factors. The first is a reliance on war/violence-oriented hard-news stories to report the 
confrontation. In the coverage, there is a strong connection between story type and war 
journalism framing. Hard-news stories tend to employ mostly war journalism framing 
(78.05 % war journalism, 17.2 % peace journalism, and 4.6 % neutral). Compared to hard-
news stories, opinion pieces, op-eds and editorials show a relatively higher rate of peace 
journalism framing (50.4% peace journalism, 48.9% war journalism, and 0.8% neutral). 
Hard-news stories in the coverage reinforce a two-sided war/violence journalism narrative. 
However, opinion pieces, op-eds and editorials don’t necessarily depend on official sources, 
don’t need to report ‘hot news’ and the visible effects of the conflict. Therefore, this type of 
article can get away with not discussing the visible effects of the conflict and the two-sided 
narrative by drawing on a wider perspective. The analysis also reveals that, while reporting 
on the confrontation, both Israeli and Turkish newspapers relied on politicians, diplomats, 
elites and army officers which led to high instances of elite-oriented framing. Therefore, as 
claimed by the peace journalism model, Israeli and Turkish journalists tended to obtain their 
information from officially recognized and ‘reliable’ sources by highlighting ‘our’ side of 
the story, all in the name of objectivity. 
Another point worth mentioning is the use of direct witnessing. In the coverage, 
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there are two main types of first-hand witness accounts: Israeli commandos (largely quoted 
by the Israeli newspapers) and pro-Palestinian activists (largely quoted by the Turkish 
newspapers). As mentioned earlier, this reliance created inflammatory language, 
demonization and one-sided narratives. To reduce this dependence and maybe to increase 
the instances of relatively neutral perspectives, first-hand accounts from Israeli and 
Turkish journalists could have been used to shed more light on this incident. The analysis 
shows that there weren’t any reporters from The Jerusalem Post or Ha’aretz on the flotilla 
during its journey to Gaza or embedded with Israeli marines during the operation. On the 
other hand, there were more than thirty journalists -- who could be called ‘embedded 
journalists’-- on the flotilla from different countries, including Turkey. For instance Today’s 
Zaman published the accounts of its own photographer, Kürşat Bayhan, on the operation 
and his detention in Israeli prison with other journalists. In addition to Bayhan’s own 
story, Today’s Zaman and Hürriyet Daily News published a handful of other news 
reports, including the first-hand accounts of Turkish and foreign journalists. However, 
these accounts don’t differ much from the activists’ inflammatory statements and still 
contain some war journalism features. While it doesn’t excuse inflammatory accounts, 
during the takeover operation, the journalists were handcuffed, detained and their 
equipment was confiscated. Therefore, the stories they told became similar to the 
accounts from the activists.  
An additional factor which reinforces the domination of war journalism in the 
coverage is the reliance on Western wire services such as AP, Reuters and AFP. Of the 278 
hard-news stories, 81(29.1%)  originated with international new agencies such as AP, 
Reuters, and AFP as well as very few examples from Turkey’s Anatolian News Agency 
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(wire stories: 76.5% dominant war journalism framing, 14.8% peace journalism, 8.6% 
neutral). As Lee (2010) points out, Western news agencies tend to report conflicts and 
violence more saliently than other news stories forms; therefore, journalists need to rethink 
the notions of hard news values and the inverted pyramid formula for reporting conflict. In 
addition to professional journalists, journalism schools and scholars should also rethink the 
issue. Every year, thousands of journalism students learn the inverted pyramid formula at 
universities as a standard news writing form. Peace journalism and conflict analysis 
techniques should be added to university curricula to equip future journalists with a variety 
of perspectives.  
 The domination of war journalism in the coverage can be also explained by the news 
media’s presumed role of supporting national interests and government policies. Liebes 
(1992) explains that during conflicts, journalists face conflicting pressures of 
commitment to their own society and its fate, and loyalty to the demands and norms of 
journalism. Therefore, war coverage puts journalism and journalists to the test of 
choosing between patriotic enthusiasm and a distant stance. Similarly, the fourth filter of 
the propaganda model (Herman and Chomsky, 1988), flak (negative reaction to media 
coverage by public audience, power groups, institutions or governments) defines the 
pressure on news media to cover issues in certain ways. As the coverage from this study 
shows, all newspapers in some way reflected the expectations or sentiments of their 
audience after the confrontation.  
In the present study, I also looked for the answer to the second research question 
which was: How could the techniques of peace journalism help journalists avoid these 
pitfalls and become independent of government and military sources during times of 
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conflict? As Aslam (2011) notes, although the peace journalism model has been gaining 
acceptance among scholars and journalists, the model is unable to provide a realistic 
solution for the problems of modern journalism. That is why, forty years after its 
emergence, the model hasn’t been adopted by the majority of the news media.  
If we consider the peace journalism model and its principles as a whole, it is clear 
that the model hasn't become the dominant approach in the news media over the past 
forty years. However, as explained in the literature review, the model consists of various 
principles, some of which could be incorporated bit by bit. Similarly, the analysis of the 
coverage showed that consciously or unconsciously, to some extent, newspapers already 
have adopted some peace journalism principles in their coverage, and this is a promising 
sign for the future of journalism. Peace journalism may help journalists avoid certain 
characteristics of war journalism practices in their daily routine. Journalists who have had 
peace journalism training could better avoid accusatory, demonizing, victimizing and 
emotive language by choosing alternative words and frames. They could also expand 
their range of sources and learn how to avoid ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ journalism and partisan 
reporting by giving voice to other stakeholders and ordinary people from a wider 
perspective. In other words, peace journalism could provide journalists with the tools 
needed to adopt a more peaceful tone and highlight peaceful solutions in their reporting. 
The use of conflict analysis is also an important tool for journalists. As Lynch and 
McGoldrick (2005) explain, conflict analysis skills make journalists capable of reporting 
conflict more accurately, identifying and restoring parts of stories about conflict generally 
ignored or marginalized, and taking responsibility for their inescapable involvement in 
the events and process on which they report. However, the challenges that peace 
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journalism faces can’t be solved simply through better training, raising the awareness of 
journalists or using conflict analysis to understand the roots of the conflicts.  
However, other aspects of peace journalism might be more difficult to 
incorporate. In their daily routine, journalists struggle with various complicated structural 
problems strongly related to the political economy of the corporate news media, the close 
relationship and mutual benefits between the news media and government officials, and 
the news media’s relationship with other power groups. Therefore, as Shoemaker and 
Reese (1996) explain, today’s media system gives little autonomy to journalists to free 
themselves from institutional and corporate interests. For instance, journalists rarely have 
enough freedom to pursue investigative stories which could be harmful to corporate 
interests or to the media outlet’s relations with other power groups. This pressure creates 
an auto-control mechanism on journalists to cover issues in a certain way. Moreover, due 
to shrinking newsrooms, the responsibilities of journalists, especially print journalists, 
has gradually increased and journalists are now required to produce more content and 
updates for different media outlets which belong to the same media corporation.  
One of the main structural problems that peace journalism faces is the dependence 
on official sources, as well as the pressure from the governments and militaries on news 
flow. These main issues have been examined by various scholars and journalists 
including Reese and Buckalew (1995), Shoemaker and Reese (1996), Wolfsfeld (1997), 
Bennett (2003), Naujaim (2004), Reese (2004), and Patrick and Thrall (2007). The peace 
journalism model warns against heavy reliance on official sources and suggests 
broadening news sources to give a voice to vulnerable groups. However, these 
suggestions would remain wishful thinking in today’s corporate media system. As 
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Shoemaker and Reese (1996) explain, official sources provide a convenient and regular 
flow of information, which is efficient for journalists who work under the pressure of 
deadlines. For the mass media, this cooperation reduces the need for expensive specialists 
and extensive research. In other words, ‘reliable’ official sources provide irrefutable, 
ready-to-serve information to the news media. This is a mutually beneficial relationship 
and there is little chance for peace journalism to be adopted. 
Also, it is worth mentioning that many reporters do not directly witness conflicts 
that they cover. Therefore, they require sources to provide that information. While using 
this information from different sides and sources, journalists consider the way that they 
understand the objectivity norm and the peace journalism model labels this type of 
journalism as war journalism. As Ross (2009) points out, “media’s dependence on 
powerful officials as sources of news and interpretation poses a significant direct threat to 
peace journalism practices, and that inclusion of divergent voices of dissonance en 
passant serves not to advance the goals of peace journalism, but to justify existing war 
journalism as objective reporting” (p.5). 
The third research question was addressed in this study was: Can war journalism 
articles be reconstructed using the principles of peace journalism and still meet 
recognized standards of good journalism? What differences would emerge from such an 
exercise?  
 To answer this question, and to examine the viability of the peace journalism 
model, I selected a sample of war journalism articles under three main themes from each 
newspaper: (1) what happened on the Mavi Marmara ship? (2) accusations between Israel 
and Turkey, and (3) calls and debates on the UN investigation on Israel’s takeover 
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operation. Using the coverage as well as various other sources, I wrote three peace 
journalism articles. This experiment showed that war journalism articles can be rewritten 
through the use of peace journalism principles and conflict analysis.  
 An important challenge that I faced while rewriting these peace journalism stories 
was that the incident happened almost three years ago; therefore, it was impossible to do 
an original report. So, I had to use the published sources about the incident. At first, I 
tried to use information and quotes from the coverage. I then drew additional material 
from various online sources such as news websites, Galtung’s TRANSCEND 
International, the UN, Israeli and Palestinian NGOs, peace groups and government 
websites. While rewriting these stories, I noticed that some themes leant themselves more 
easily to peace journalism framing than the others. For instance, the first theme (what 
happened on the Mavi Marmara ship?) forced me to discuss certain visible effects of the 
conflict and to give a voice to the official sources which have the detailed information 
about the confrontation. These factors inevitably reinforced the two-sided reporting.  
Similarly, the third theme (calls and debates on the UN investigation) reinforced again a 
two-sided, elite-oriented journalism, because the UN probe was, by its nature, debated 
among diplomats and politicians. However, the second theme (accusation between Israel 
and Turkey) was an easier topic with which to create a peace journalism article. I was 
able to focus on the populations affected by the conflict and demonstrate the roots of the 
relationships and the conflict. I could easily avoid a two-sided war journalism narrative 
and did not have to rely on elite sources. Additionally, by discussing water scarcity, I was 
able to broaden the scope of responsibility to include other regional actors such as 
Turkey, Syria, and Egypt.  
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As mentioned earlier, peace journalism requires, first of all, enough time, enough 
space and expertise. Free from the type of time pressure journalists face daily, I spent 
days on my research, finding the sources and writing the three peace journalism articles. 
However, journalists -- like those who wrote the original stories -- work under the 
pressure of deadlines. In times of crisis, they have to reach sources, get enough 
information, do research and write their story. It is highly probable that these journalists 
have also other responsibilities and work on different stories from completely different 
areas. Additionally, the print media struggle with space constraints. For instance, the 
hard-news stories examined in this study usually ranged from 300 to 700 words. This 
space limitation is an obstacle to writing a peace journalism article. Under this limitation, 
after providing the factual information and giving some official voices, it is very hard to 
focus on alternative voices, explore the roots of the conflict and examine its impacts, as 
peace journalism requires. It can be argued that least 1,000 words are needed to fulfill the 
requirements of peace journalism in an article. Another important point is that journalism 
is generally event-oriented; therefore, coverage tends to focus on the immediate events 
(incidents, conflicts, wars etc.) to explain its details. This event-orientation, generally 
reliant on official sources and elites, could easily leave aside crucial contextual details or 
background information about the incident. It can be argued that this approach is also 
related to the simplistic notion of objectivity that journalists employ during reporting 
conflicts.   
 The peace journalism model should reconsider the realities of news production 
and the mechanism of newsrooms as well as the relationships between commercial media 
outlets and powerful institutions. In other words, the peace journalism model should be 
 107 
 
practical for journalists and marketable for the news media. Today, war journalism 
practices are dominant in the news media and will remain dominant unless a significant 
reform movement begins as Hackett (2006) suggests. By focusing on the core of the 
conflict, war journalism is profitable because it provides a rich content which includes 
clashes, tears, blood, emotion, victims, and dead bodies. This kind of content is believed 
to be attractive to audiences, and larger audiences attract more advertisers. This is a 
challenge which prevents peace journalism from being accepted by the mainstream 
media. It can be assumed that journalism has conditioned its audience to expect conflict 
and event-oriented coverage rather than avoiding focusing on the violence itself through 
highlighting peaceful solutions, drawing a broader picture with background, and 
presenting ordinary people. Therefore, reconditioning audiences according to the peace 
journalism principles will likely require large amounts of time and effort.  
Examination of the peace journalism literature shows that there are few studies 
which examine the challenges and broader strategies for peace journalism to face 
dominant war journalism practices. One of the most important and inclusive studies was 
conducted by Hackett (2006). As a theorist, Hackett is able to connect peace journalism 
with other conceptual frameworks. He suggests that peace journalism “must translate its 
normative concerns, rooted in the discipline of peace research, into a strategy based on a 
theoretically-informed analysis of the governing logics of news production”. The author 
highlights three frameworks to examine the relationship between journalism and other 
relations and institution of power: (1) Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model; (2) 
Shoemaker and Reese’s “hierarchy of influences” model; and (3) Bourdieu’s notion of 
journalism as a field. The first framework explains corporate and government influence 
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on the news media; however, it has been criticized as reductionist and functionalist. The 
second identifies five levels which have influence on news content and which help to 
assess pressures for and against peace journalism. Like the propaganda model, the 
hierarchy of influences model tends to be reductionist and obscures the coherence of 
journalism as cultural practice and form of knowledge production, Finally the third 
model, according to Hackett, “has the advantage of allowing conceptual space for both 
the structural influences of and on news media, as well as the potential agency and 
creativity of journalists”.  
Hackett also proposes three important strategies needed in order for peace 
journalism to be successful from Bourdieu’s analysis of fields: The first is to reform the 
journalism field from within. Dedicated journalists should take the lead as educators in 
journalist training, as Lynch and McGoldrick do. Hackett also points out that journalists 
who work in the Western corporate media don’t have enough incentives and autonomy, a 
major obstacle to the realization of this reform. Alternatively, the author suggests that 
peace journalism can be adopted by societies, giving the examples of Rwanda or the 
former Yugoslavia where the news media provoked the enmities between ethnic groups. 
The second strategy is to build a new field; in other words, to create alternative media 
organizations supported by civil society, relatively insulated from corporate or state 
power. The third strategy’s aim is to change the environment of journalism through social 
justice movements which also demand a better media system in number of countries. 
 The emergence of new communication technologies and alternative online news 
sources certainly has the potential for the development and expansion of peace 
journalism. More and more alternative news sources are challenging the domination of 
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corporate media outlets and providing a platform for different groups to express 
themselves to millions of people. Moreover, these alternative news sources provide rich 
content for journalists wishing to write peace journalism articles. During this project, I 
found dozens of valuable alternative sources which could have been used by the Israeli 
and Turkish journalists during the crisis. Nearly every peace organization or group with 
little chance to be heard in the mainstream media uses its website to promote its 
perspective and reaction to events. Therefore, in seconds, journalists can access this 
information and use it to transform war journalism articles into peace journalism. The 
internet also provides a great opportunity for the print media to overcome the space 
limitation that hinders peace journalism. It has become increasingly common for 
newspapers to insert hyperlinks at the end of articles. This is a very practical way to 
overcome the space limitations and allow the reader to get further information about the 
topic, including background of the incident, additional interviews, maps, statistics, 
photos, videos, audio clips and more.  
The peace journalism model emphasizes the potential role of journalists in 
conflicts and places a measure of responsibility on them to moderate or prevent violence. 
To do so, journalists are required to use conflict analysis to understand, analyse and 
transform the conflict by peaceful means. In other words, it is an alternative way for 
journalists to do “broader, fairer and more accurate ways of reporting” (Lynch, 2002). 
This new role adds to the responsibilities of journalists, requiring them to not only report 
on the conflict but also temporarily take on the roles of political analyst, historian, or 
sociologist.  
As Lynch (2008) points out, in a conflict situation such as Afghanistan, the news 
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media usually fails to answer an important question (why) and argues that peace 
journalism could bridge this gap:  
Why are the Taliban still a factor? Why do people in Afghanistan support them? 
Such questions are very rarely posed or answered in the media. Instead, their 
portrayal generally bears out what the novelist Gore Vidal said about Americans' 
stock view of their enemies - that they are driven to oppose the US simply out of 
‘motiveless malignity’ (Lynch, 2008).  
Advocates of peace journalism believe that the model could make a difference in 
conflict situations. If, through peace journalism practices, societies are given better access 
to balanced and accurate information, they might raise their voices to put pressure on 
their governments regarding policies. Moreover, peace journalism practices in the news 
media might lead to more peaceful arena where conflicting parties or countries could 
gather to find peaceful solutions to conflicts. 
However, the crucial question is: Do the news media actually have enough 
influence on policy makers, powerful institutions, corporate interests or audience to 
mobilize them for peaceful solutions or policies? Or do the news media tend to determine 
their positions depend on its government’s policies or other geopolitical forces? The 
coverage from the recent wars or military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, 
as well as the uprising in Syria, show that the editorial policies of the mass media are 
very close to their governments’. This is a significant obstacle for the application of 
peace journalism in the news media.  
Similarly, as Hanitzsch argues, the potential of journalism to contribute to the 
peaceful settlement of conflicts is limited. “The extent to which news media can 
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influence readers, listeners, viewers and users is highly dependent on the audience itself 
as well as on various social and cultural factors” (Hanitzsch, 2004.p. 491). Additionally, 
the author points out that freeing the world from crises, conflicts and other evils cannot 
be the primary task of journalism; it is the task of other social systems such as the 
government and the military. Considering the obstacles to peace journalism, such as the 
power of the institutions, governments, and interest groups, it seems as though the peace 
journalism model, in reality, does not have enough power to change conflict situations 
fundamentally. 
 Finally, this research project was limited to the first month of the Gaza flotilla 
incident and four English-language daily newspapers from Israel and Turkey. Therefore, 
further research is required to examine the domination of war journalism in Israeli and 
Turkish media outlets in the long term. I am especially interested in weekly and monthly 
news magazines. During my research, I noticed that in the peace journalism field, 
scholars tended to examine newspaper coverage (Fawcett, 2002; Lee and Maslog, 2005; 
Lee, Maslog and Kim, 2006; Perez, 2008; Shinar, 2009; Lee, 2010; Khan, 2011). I 
believe that an analysis of magazines, in which journalists enjoy a relative freedom of 
time and space compared to their colleagues working at newspapers as well as using 
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First theme: What happened on the Mavi Marmara ship? 
Original Stories 
 
Ha’aretz – Israel Navy: 3 commandos nearly taken hostage in Gaza flotilla raid By 
Amos Harel, June 04, 2010   
During Israel's takeover of a Turkish ship in the Gaza-bound aid flotilla this week, 
some passengers tried to take captive three commandos who lost consciousness as a 
result of the activists' blows, according to early findings of a navy investigation. The 
three were dragged into one of the passenger halls below deck and were held there for 
several minutes. After dozens of other commandos began searching the ship, the Mavi 
Marmara, the three soldiers regained consciousness and managed to join their comrades. 
Conversations with senior navy officers in the chain of command during the operation 
present a different view of the events on Monday. In Israel, the raid has been perceived as 
a failure, while abroad it has been derided as piracy or worse. 
The navy rejects the claims that it was poorly prepared. Officials have been 
commending the commandos' performance in a situation in which they were confronted 
by dozens of activists who attacked them as they rappelled from helicopters. "They were 
terrorists - hired killers who came to murder soldiers, not to assist the residents of the 
Gaza Strip," said a navy officer. The operation on the Mavi Marmara began at about 4:30 
A.M. on Monday. Because of the presence of hard-core activists including members of 
the IHH, the Turkish group organizing the aid convoy, most attention went to that ship. 
Navy chief Eliezer Merom and the head of the naval commandos, Lt. Col. A., were on 
vessels next to the ship. Lt. Col. A. climbed on the Mavi Marmara during the takeover. 
As seen on a video documenting the takeover, the first four commandos to rappel onto 
the deck were attacked by activists with bars, axes and knives. The fourth commando, K., 
saw his team leader on the deck, with a Turkish activist holding the pistol he had grabbed 
from him and pointing it to his head. K. jumped from the rope and managed to shoot the 
activist holding the gun. This happened 20 seconds after the first soldier landed on the 
deck. 
The commanders of the first unit were hit by the mob as they landed. One of the 
soldiers managed to fix another rope, after there were problems with the original one, for 
10 more soldiers to land. The commandos cared for the wounded and took over part of 
the upper deck of the ship. At this stage, six minutes into the operation, another force 
landed from a second helicopter, led by a major. At that point they realized that three 
commandos were missing and they began looking for them. A short while later the naval 
commando chief landed along with dozens more soldiers, some of whom climbed from 
boats. Others landed from a third helicopter. The search involved limited shooting, in the 
bridge and on the lower deck, until the three men were recovered. The head of the naval 
commandos gave orders by radio to use live fire, two minutes after the incident had 
begun. 
Shots had been fired earlier, but Lt. Col. A. later explained that in his orders he 
wanted to make sure that the troops realized that "the mood of the incident had changed." 
The soldiers reported that the activists had fired on them during the confrontation and that 
at least two commandos suffered gunshot wounds. After the incident, 9mm bullet casings 
were found - a kind not used by the naval commandos. The Israel Defense Forces says 
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that during the operation a number of pistols and an M-4 rifle were taken from soldiers, 
but they believe that the Turkish activists had other weapons. The captain of the ship told 
the naval commando chief that the guns were thrown overboard before the ship was 
completely taken over. 
The wounded activists were airlifted to Israel for treatment, some seriously hurt 
whose lives were saved by the evacuation. The IDF did not question the activists 
extensively because of the decision to release them. In conversations after the takeover, 
activists said they were surprised by the use of helicopters, even though the navy had 
used this method before. However, nothing else appears to have surprised them because 
international law requires sufficient warnings before ships are boarded. 
Post-operation assessments have the number of hard-core activists involved in the 
fighting at between 60 and 100. It appears that they were well trained and experienced, 
especially in view of the arsenal found and code books used to pass on orders from group 
leaders. Among the rioters, in addition to Turks, were Yemenis, Afghans and one person 
from Eritrea. All were apparently experienced in hand-to-hand fighting. Some of them 
did not retreat when shots were fired. The operation involved a month of training, with 
dummy takeovers of a ship at sea with 50 soldiers performing the role of activists. The 
navy admits that it trained mostly for "a Bil'in type of opposition, but there was no feeling 
that this was going to be a walk in the park." He was referring to a village at the 
separation fence where demonstrations take place. 
The navy says it needs to look into whether the psychological preparations of the 
force were sufficient, and whether it had emphasized an easier scenario that did not take 
place.The navy says it went over "incidents and responses" in preparation; these included 
opening fire at charging activists with melee weapons. In case of a threat to their lives, 
the commandos were ordered to shoot to kill even as they were on their way onto the 
deck. "The main gap between preparations and intelligence was that we did not know we 
would face dozens of rioters," a senior officer involved in the operation said. "This was 
not a disturbance that went awry. It was a planned ambush." Another officer added that "I 
still wake up at 3 A.M. and wonder how the hell we did not know more." Another officer 
said said that "we became a little spoiled, as a society, expecting perfect performances." 
According to a senior officer, "Under the circumstances, and I do not like the 
result, I think we did the best we could. We took care of five ships without injuries. On 
the sixth ship, we faced a harsh attack and killed nine saboteurs. "No real peace activist 
was injured. No soldier was killed, even though it came pretty close. In the end the ships 
are docked at Ashdod. It was very complicated and the result is near perfect. 
 
The Jerusalem Post- Nine dead in vicious conflict aboard ‘Mavi Marmara’. By 
Yaakov Katz, June 1, 2010  
Dozens wounded, including 10 soldiers, in pre-dawn battle at sea; Israel says its 
commandos were brutally attacked before opening fire. The Israeli Navy’s takeover of a 
flotilla of international aid ships headed to the Gaza Strip came to a dramatic end before 
dawn Monday, with nine activists dead and dozens wounded. Defense officials said that 
despite the outcome, Israel would continue to enforce the blockade on Gaza and use force 
if necessary to prevent activists’ ships from reaching the Strip. 
IDF naval commandos slid down ropes onto the Mavi Marmara Turkish 
passenger ship from helicopters. They immediately encountered fierce resistance as they 
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were attacked by activists armed with bats, knives and metal pipes. The boarding of the 
five other ships was completed without incident. Aboard the Mavi Marmara, the 
commandos first responded to the violence with crowd dispersion measures, and after 
almost an hour of scuffles, during which a number of soldiers were wounded – some of 
them stabbed or shot – the commandos were given permission to use live fire. At one 
point, activists succeeded in stealing a handgun from one of the soldiers, leading to an 
escalation in violence. The navy made initial contact with the flotilla at 11 p.m. on 
Sunday night and ordered the ships to follow them to Ashdod Port or be boarded. The 
boarding started at 2 a.m. on Monday and was completed by 8. The IDF released a grainy 
black-and-white video that supported its version of events and showed activists swarming 
around commandos after they descended from a helicopter by rope. Activists scuffled 
with the commandos and were seen throwing an object the military identified as a 
firebomb. 
IDF sources said that despite the unfortunate outcome, the navy will continue to 
use the same type of operations to stop vessels that try to break the blockade. Another 
ship, named Rachel Corrie – for the American International Solidarity Movement activist 
who was killed in Gaza in 2003 – was still making its way to Gaza and the IDF said that 
it would intercept the ship and prevent it from reaching the Strip. “If more ships come, 
we will use the same tactic in the future,” a top IDF source told The Jerusalem Post, 
adding that it was possible that Israel had succeeded in creating a deterrent for future 
ships trying to reach Gaza.  OC Israel Navy V.-Adm. Eliezer Marom said the IDF 
soldiers who raided the  Mavi Marmara acted with “perseverance and bravery.” The 
soldiers’ lives were in danger and they fired their weapons in self-defense, Marom said. 
Many more people could have been killed if the soldiers had not acted with the proper 
sensitivity, he added. Defense Minister Ehud Barak said in a press conference that while 
he regretted the loss of lives, the organizers of the Gaza-bound protest flotilla were solely 
responsible for the outcome. The soldiers tried to disperse the activists aboard the ship 
peacefully but were forced to open fire to protect themselves, Barak said. 
He called the flotilla a provocation and called the Turkish organization IHH, 
which organized the initiative, “extremist supporters of terror.” The defense minister 
called on Arab and Palestinian leaders not to let this “provocation by irresponsible 
people” ruin the progress made in proximity peace talks. IDF Chief of General Staff Lt.-
Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi said Monday that the violence aboard the Mavi Marmara was 
instigated by those aboard the ships and that soldiers who opened fire were defending 
themselves. 
Ashkenazi noted that the Mavi Marmara, the only ship on which violence took 
place, was different than the other five ships of the flotilla. He said that five ships carried 
humanitarians and peace activists, but the Mavi Marmara was sponsored by the extremist 
organization the IHH and those aboard acted with “extreme violence.”  Helicopters 
evacuated the wounded to Israeli hospitals, officials said. Five ships had reached port by 
early evening and 136 activists had been removed without serious incident, the military 
said. 
Sixteen were jailed for refusing to identify themselves, police spokesman Micky 
Rosenfeld said.According to police procedures, activists who agreed to be deported were 
immediately taken to Ben-Gurion Airport and flown home at Israel’s expense. Those who 
did not agree were transferred to a prison facility for questioning. By press time, 150 
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people from five ships were examined, only 40 of whom came from the Mavi Marmara. 
Forty people agreed to be deported immediately, mostly Greeks and Turks. Turkey’s 
NTV network showed activists beating one commando with sticks as he landed on one of 
the boats. Of the 10 soldiers wounded in the raid, Dr. Arnon Afek, deputy director of 
Sheba Medical Center at Tel Hashomer, said two commandos were brought in with 
gunshot wounds. Another had serious head wounds from an unspecified blow, Afek 
added. 
 
Today’s Zaman-Activists tell of beatings during Israeli raid  
By AP- Athens, Greece, June 1, 2010   
Activists returning to Europe after Israeli forces raided their aid flotilla said 
Tuesday that the commandos had beaten passengers and used electric shocks during the 
assault. Six Greeks and several others, including a Turkish woman and her 1-year-old 
baby, were released Tuesday, but Israel has barred access to hundreds of others seized 
during the raid that killed at least nine people and wounded dozens early Monday. Most 
of those killed were aboard the Turkish-flagged Mavi Marmara, and there have been 
conflicting accounts of what happened during the assault. Turkish activist Nilüfer Çetin, 
who had hidden with her baby in her cabin's bathroom aboard the Mavi Marmara, told 
reporters she believed there were 11 dead. "The ship turned into a lake of blood," Çetin 
told reporters in İstanbul, having returned after Israeli officials warned that jail would be 
too harsh for her child. "We were aware of the possible danger" in joining the trip, she 
said. "But there are thousands of babies in Gaza. If we had reached Gaza we would have 
played with them and taken them food." She said Israeli vessels "harassed" the flotilla for 
two hours starting around 10 p.m. Sunday, and returned at around 4 a.m. Monday, fired 
warning shots and told the ships to turn back. 
"When the Mavi Marmara continued on its course the harassment turned into an 
attack. They used smoke bombs followed by gas canisters. They started to descend onto 
the ship with helicopters," she said, calling the clashes that then erupted "extremely bad 
and brutal." "I was one of the first victims to be released because I had a child," she told 
reporters, but "they confiscated everything, our telephones, laptops are all gone." Her 
husband -- the ship's engineer -- was still being held by Israeli authorities. Some 400 
Turkish activists were on the six-ship flotilla, along with more than 30 Greeks and people 
of some 20 other nations including Germany, the U.S. and Russia. 
The ships had been trying to break the three-year blockade of Gaza to deliver 
humanitarian aid, the activists said. "Suddenly from everywhere we saw inflatables 
coming at us, and within seconds fully equipped commandos came up on the boat," said 
Greek activist Dimitris Gielalis, who had been aboard the Sfendoni. He was among six 
Greeks returned home Tuesday. "They came up and used plastic bullets, we had beatings, 
we had electric shocks, any method we can think of, they used," he said. He said the 
boat's captain was beaten for refusing to leave the wheel, and had sustained non-life-
threatening injuries, while a cameraman filming the raid was hit with a rifle butt in the 
eye, he said. "Of course we weren't prepared for a situation of war." The returning Greeks 
said those still in custody were refusing to sign papers demanded by Israeli authorities.  
"During their interrogation, many of them were badly beaten in front of us," said Aris 
Papadokostopoulos, who was aboard the Free Mediterranean traveling behind the Turkish 
ship and carrying mainly Greek and Swedish activists. Papadokostopoulos said the 
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flotilla was about 80 miles (130 kilometers) off Gaza when the raid occurred around 4 
a.m. Monday. 
"The Turkish ship was in front of us ... on which there was a terrible raid from the 
air and from the sea and from everywhere, with shooting," he said. Aboard the other 
boats, he said, commandos beat activists, but nobody was gravely injured. He said no one 
put up resistance on the Free Mediterranean, which was carrying a cargo of wheelchairs, 
building material and medical and pharmaceutical aid. 
"Some people were hit by clubs and electric shocks," he said. Crew member 
Mihalis Grigoropoulos said he was on the bridge of the Free Mediterranean and heard 
shooting coming from the Turkish ship. Several people who tried to stop the Israeli forces 
from getting to the bridge were hit by electric shocks and plastic bullets, he said. "We 
didn't' resist at all. Even if we had wanted to, what could we do?" 
Civil engineer Thanassis Petrogiannis said he had joined the flotilla to provide 
help in rebuilding destroyed Palestinian homes. He said that, while in Israeli custody, 
authorities had demanded he sign a paper written in Hebrew. He refused, and was 
eventually given another document that he signed. "Everyone who didn't accept to sign is 
in jail," he said. Grigoropoulos, the crew member, and Gielalis said they were not asked 
to sign anything, though their cell phones, cameras and clothes were confiscated before 
they were expelled. While the six Greeks "are in good health," Foreign Ministry 
Spokesman Grigoris Delavekouras said Greece was demanding the others still in custody 
be repatriated as soon as possible. "Israel bears responsibility for their safety. So it must 
contribute so they can return quickly to Greece," he said. Turkey said it was sending three 
ambulance planes to Israel to pick up 20 more Turkish activists injured in the operation. 
Three Turkish Airlines planes were on standby waiting to fly back other activists, the 
prime minister's office said. 
  
Hürriyet Daily News-Activists' eyewitness accounts detail Israeli raid on Gaza aid 
ship By Daily News with wires, June 3, 2010 
Activists detained after their Gaza aid ship was attacked by Israeli commandos 
earlier this week began detailing their accounts on Thursday of what some activists called 
"premeditated murder." Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has denounced the 
activists as "violent supporters of terrorism," charging that Israeli forces were "stabbed, 
they were clubbed, they were fired upon" as they stormed the boat. Eyewitness accounts 
differ from what Israeli security forces have said. An Australian journalist on board the 
Gaza-bound aid ship said Israeli commando boats had circled their flotilla like "hyenas 
hunting animals in the night" before his colleague was shot with a stun gun. Two Swedes 
aboard the Gaza-bound aid flotilla intercepted by Israeli forces this week said in a radio 
broadcast Thursday they had witnessed "premeditated murder" aboard the Turkish ship 
that came under the heaviest attack. And the leader of the Turkish Humanitarian Relief 
Foundation or, İHH, Bülent Yıldırım, said he saw Israeli soldiers shoot a photographer 
and an activist who had already surrendered.  
A 'very ugly' incident 
Sydney Morning Herald journalist Paul McGeough and photographer Kate 
Geraghty were released from Israeli detention and deported to Turkey on Thursday, and 
said they were slowly recovering from their ordeal. "We're fine, we're both fine," 
McGeough told the Herald's website from Turkey. "We are leaving Israel on legal advice 
 133 
 
that we will be able to appeal our deportation in absentia," he added. McGeough said 
Israeli boats had circled the flotilla like "hyenas hunting animals in the night" before 
moving in suddenly, describing it as a "very ugly" incident. "Kate and I got pushed 
around," he said, adding that the atmosphere was "testosterone-driven." 
'We could have died' 
"We were witnesses to premeditated murders," said Swedish historian Mattias 
Gardell who was on the Mavi Marmara along with his wife, fellow historian Edda 
Manga. Manga and Gardell, who were among 11 Swedes taking part in the flotilla but the 
only ones on the Mavi Marmara, were on deck when the shooting began. "I saw the ship's 
security personnel trying to prevent divers from climbing onto the boats," Manga said. 
"Then one of our comrades said [the soldiers] were shooting and had killed three people 
... [and] that we had to throw ourselves to the floor. We were on deck. We could have 
died," she said. 
Shot after surrendering  
Yıldırım, the leader of the Turkish İHH, said many people were wounded by gas 
bombs and that a journalist was taking photographs when he was shot by an Israeli 
soldier, adding that one of their friends was shot after he surrendered. Yıldırım said 
passengers on the ship showed civil resistance, the press was there, and that the İHH 
called on the passengers not to allow Israeli soldiers in. "We rendered ten of the soldiers 
who got on the ship ineffective, we took their weapons, but it would have been self-






Second theme: Accusations between Israel and Turkey     
Original Stories 
 
Ha’aretz- Probe: Erdoğan knew Gaza flotilla would be violent By Anshel Pfeffer, 
June 9, 2010  
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan knew in advance that activists 
aboard a Gaza-bound aid flotilla planned to attack Israeli troops, Israeli intelligence 
officials have said. In a report published this week, a group of independent investigators 
from Israel's intelligence community found that activists aboard the 'Mavi Marmara' were 
part of an organized group that was prepared for a violent conflict. Last week Israeli 
commandos killed nine pro-Palestinian activists when they boarded the Turkish-owned 
boat, part of a six-ship convoy trying to break Israel's maritime blockade on the Gaza 
Strip. The report, published by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (known 
in Israel by its Hebrew acronym Malam), said activists who attacked commandos with 
clubs and knives were supported by the Turkish government. Malam is a privately run 
but is widely seen as an unofficial branch of Israel's intelligence community and has in 
the past been a medium for passing Israel's intelligence findings to the public. The report 
said while most of the Mavi Marmara's 500 passengers were humanitarian volunteers 
who underwent security checks before boarding the ship at Antalya in Turkey, a group of 
40 IHH activists had boarded the ship in an Istanbul port beforehand, keeping apart from 
the rest of the passengers throughout the journey. 
This hard core of activists boarded the ship without checks and was equipped with 
communications equipment, flak jackets embroidered with Turkish flags, and gas masks, 
Malam said. 
According to the report, the group turned the upper deck into its headquarters, 
blocking it off to other passengers. It had a clear internal hierarchy, with specific activists 
nominated as commanders. Bülent Yıldırım, the leader of the IHH, an Islamic 
organization that planned the voyage, was on the Mavi Marmara and briefed group 
members about two hours before the Israeli Navy intercepted the ship. Their main 
objective was to hold back soldiers by any means, and to push them back into the sea. As 
they had been banned from bringing weapons aboard, IHH members improvised weapons 
including metal rods and knives cut from the ship's metal rails, which they used to attack 
the soldiers. According to a witness aboard the ship, a confrontation broke out when the 
ship's crew heard IHH members sawing the railing into metal rods, but they were unable 
to confiscate them from them. 
IHH activists also gathered all the knives from six cafeterias on the ship, as well 
as axes from fire extinguishers on the deck, all of which served as weapons against Israeli 
commandos. Before the takeover, IHH ordered all other passengers into the hold of the 
ship and told them to remain there. Only journalists and security personnel were allowed 
access to the deck. Video footage matched testimonies from passengers who claimed they 
witnessed any violence, as they were denied access to the deck, where the clash occurred. 
The testimonies are also similar to the version given by the Navy commandos who said 
that they fought with a group of approximately 50 people who used every weapon 
available to attack them. Eight of the nine dead were identified as IHH members. Files 
found on laptops owned by the IHH members pointed at strong ties between the 
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movement and Turkey's prime minister. Some of the activists even said that Erdoğan was 
personally involved in the flotilla's preparations. They also said that they knew in 
advance that their chances of making it into Gaza were slim, but their initial goal was to 
"to expose Israel's true face to the world." An IHH journalist said during his investigation 
with Israeli security forces that "the Turks set a trap for you and you fell straight into it." 
He also said that the recent flotilla was the first in many. 
 
The Jerusalem Post-  IDF: Mercenaries to blame for violence - Army says some 50 
well-trained passengers were recruited in Turkey. By Yaakov Katzlast, June 4, 2010     
The IDF has identified one of the passengers aboard the Mavi Marmara, which 
navy commandos commandeered earlier this week, as the ringleader of a group of 
mercenaries who were recruited from a city in northwest Turkey, according to new 
details from the military’s ongoing investigation of the Gaza flotilla. The IDF identified a 
group of about 50 men – of the 700 on board – who were well-trained and were stationed 
throughout the ship, mostly on the upper deck, where they laid an ambush for the IDF 
soldiers who rappelled onto the deck from helicopters. The members of this violent group 
were not carrying identity cards or passports. Instead, each of them had an envelope in 
his pocket with about $10,000 in cash. The defense establishment suspects the funding 
for the mercenaries may have come from elements within the Turkish government. 
According to sources within the defense establishment, one member of the group, who 
appears to have been the ringleader, traveled to the city of Bursa in northwest Turkey and 
allegedly recruited mercenaries for the flotilla there. 
In videos from the Marmara released this week by the IDF, this group of men can 
be seen preparing to confront IDF commandos. The videos, taken by the ship’s security 
cameras, show the group of activists brandishing metal bars, slingshots, and other 
assorted weaponry. The group was split up into smaller squads that were distributed 
throughout the deck and communicated with one another with handheld communication 
devices. The men wore bulletproof vests and gas masks. One video clearly shows a 
member of the group throwing a stun grenade onto the IDF commando vessel that pulled 
up alongside the Marmara. Another video shows how groups of at least four or five men 
swarmed each commando that landed on the top deck, beating them with metal bars, and 
in one case throwing a soldier off the third deck. Soldiers testified that in at least two 
instances their side arms were taken from them, as were their helmets and vests. Two 
soldiers jumped off the ship into the water to save themselves from being lynched. On 
Wednesday, Deputy Defense Minister Matan Vilna’i told a Knesset hearing that all nine 
men killed on the Marmara were “involved in the fighting.” “There were no innocents 
among the dead,” Vilna’i said. Meanwhile, Palestinian Media Watch reported Thursday 
that three of the four Turks killed on ship sought a martyr’s death. PMW quoted from the 
official Palestinian Authority daily Al-Hayat al-Jadida:  
“Three of the four Turks killed in the Israeli attack on the ‘Freedom Flotilla’ 
bound for the Gaza Strip wanted to die as martyrs, said their relatives and friends. The 
wife of one of them, Ali Haydar Bengi, told the Vatan daily: “He used to help the poor 
and the oppressed. For years, he wanted to go to Palestine. And he constantly prayed to 
Allah to grant him shahada (martyrdom). “Ali worked at telephone repair shop in 
Diyarbakir, the largest city in southeastern Turkey. Sabir Ceylan, a friend of Ali, told the 
Milliyet newspaper: ‘Before embarking on this journey [to Gaza], he said he desired to 
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become a martyr. He had a strong desire to die as a martyr.’  “Another Turkish victim 
was Ali Ekber Yaratilmis, a 55-year old pensioner. He was a father of five who lived in 
Ankara. Ali volunteered for the Turkish Aid and Human Rights Organization [IHH], 
which transfers aid to Gaza. A friend, Mehmet Faruk Cevher, told the Sabah daily that 
[Ali] ‘devoted his life to charity work, that’s why he went to Gaza. He always wanted to 
become a martyr.’ “The third victim was Ibrahim Bilgen, a 61-year old pensioner and 
father of six sons. He was a supporter of the Felicity Party, an Islamic movement in the 
southeastern city of Siirt, Anatolia news agency reported. His brother-in-law, Nuri 
Mergen, told the agency: He was an exemplary man and a truly good man. That’s why he 
was truly worthy of shahada(martyrdom). Allah granted him the death that he wished 
for.’”Palestinian Media Watch reported in the last two days that participants on board 
were chanting Islamic battle cries and talking about their coming martyrdom during the 
days before the confrontation. 
 
Today’s Zaman - Israeli assault on Gaza flotilla draws sharp reaction from Turkish 
civil society May 31, 2010 
Thousands of Turks took to the streets on Monday in protest of a pre-dawn Israeli 
assault on a flotilla of aid ships bound for the Gaza Strip which left up to 19 people dead 
and dozens wounded.The aid ships, dubbed the Freedom Flotilla, were taking badly 
needed humanitarian supplies to the people of the Gaza Strip, who have for the past three 
years been living under a harsh economic blockade. The Israeli assault came as the ships 
were sailing in international waters. 
The assault drew strong condemnation by Turkish civil society, which denounced 
the Israeli violence with massive rallies throughout the day yesterday.A group of around 
2,000 people had convened in İstanbul's Taksim Square before noon. Carrying Turkish 
and Palestinian flags, the group chanted anti-Israeli slogans and called on the Turkish 
government to take action against the disproportionate use of force by Israeli soldiers 
against civilians. “Down with Israel!” “Greetings to Palestine and aid ships; go ahead 
with resistance!” and “Turkish soldiers to Israel!” chanted the protestors. 
Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay) President Tekin Küçükali said his organization 
was ready to provide medical assistance to civilians injured during the Israeli attack. “The 
armed raid on civilians carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza has opened a deep wound in 
people's consciences. We are ready to undertake any responsibility to take the injured to 
secure places and take care of their wounds there,” he stated. In the meantime, officials at 
the Antalya Customs Office announced that passengers on the Turkish ships in the aid 
convoy did not have any weapons or even a knife on them. “All passengers boarded the 
ships after being screened. Our records show that no weapons were detected on them,” 
they said. The announcement refutes Israeli claims that the activists were carrying 
weapons and munitions to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. 
The Humanitarian Aid Foundation (İHH) expressed concern that Israeli security 
forces may plant weapons on the aid ships after seizing control. “Let alone a weapon, 
there wasn't even a jackknife onboard the ships. But the ships are currently under Israeli 
control, and the Israelis may place weapons or munitions on the ships to back up their 
assertions,” İHH Vice President Yavuz Dede said. İHH is one of the main coordinators of 
the Freedom Flotilla. 
Ahmet Mercan, another İHH official, said Israel's bloody raid on aid activists was 
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a “unilateral war” waged against unarmed civilians. “The assault has shown that Israel is 
not a state or a society. It is a terrorist organization. The world is now faced with a test. 
Will it side with human rights or not? How will the world react in the face of such an 
assault? Israel initiated a war. This is a unilateral war being waged on civilians. This is a 
war waged on 50 countries. This is a war waged on the collective conscience of 
humanity,” he said. 
Members of Turkey's Jewish community also condemned the attack, saying they 
share Turkey's feelings about the killings of activists on the aid ships. “We are saddened 
to learn that a military operation was launched against the Mavi Marmara [one of the 
Turkish ships in the flotilla]. We share the reactions the operation sparked in our country 
[Turkey],” read a statement issued by the community. 
Thousands of people living in İstanbul and Ankara have been in front of the 
Israeli Embassy and Consulate since the early hours of Monday to protest the killings of 
the unarmed civilians. Police tightened security measures around the buildings, 
preventing protestors from entering the embassy or consulate. 
‘Attack damaged Turkish-Israeli ties' 
A statement issued by the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's 
Association (MÜSİAD) said the Israeli assault had damaged ties of fraternity between 
Turkey and Israel.“With the most recent assault in international waters of unarmed ships 
which were carrying only humanitarian aid to Gaza, Israel has shown the entire world 
that it will not allow any peaceful attempt in the region and will not respect human rights. 
The attack cannot be approved or backed by any nation in the world. World leaders do 
not have the luxury to hide themselves behind mere statements. It is high time the world 
said ‘stop' to the perpetrators of the bloody assault,” the MÜSİAD statement read and 
called on the United Nations and the international community to review their approach to 
Israel. 
A similar statement came from Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions 
(Hak-İş) President Salim Uslu, who said Israel committed a crime against humanity by 
attacking civilians on a ship carrying humanitarian aid to people in need. He also called 
on the international community to take action against Israeli violence. 
“Israel insists on not ending its terror and attacks in the Middle East. It has turned 
into a traumatic actor in the region. It attacks civilians, children or women included. 
Israel has caused the shame of the century to humanity and continues to do so. … The 
United Nations, NATO, the European Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference 
[OIC] and the Arab League should take action and say ‘stop' to [Israel's] dirty game,” the 
statement went on to say. 
A doctors' organization known as Yeryüzü Doktorları (Doctors on Earth) also 
condemned the killings of the activists on the aid flotilla, saying humanitarian aid flowing 
to people in need should not be blocked, regardless of their religion, language or 
ethnicity. “The attack on the Freedom Flotilla came in violation of international law and 
universal humanitarian values. Yeryüzü Doktorları strongly condemns the Israeli assault 







Hürriyet Daily News- Raid on flotilla puts final nail in coffin of Turkish ties with 
Israel. May 31, 2010 
As details slowly emerge in the wake of Israel’s deadly attack on a flotilla of aid 
ships bound for the Gaza Strip, leaders from Turkey’s ruling and opposition parties raise 
their voices to condemn the action. It is the latest and worst incident in a long line of 
troublesome encounters over the last year and a half between the two allies and some say 
this could be the final act. ‘Our relations will never be the same,’ says a member of the 
ruling AKP 
Israel’s deadly attack on a Palestinian aid convoy is likely to be the last straw in 
already fraught Turkish-Israeli relations, according to senior officials in Turkey’s ruling 
party.Though the identities of the killed civilians were still unknown late Monday when 
the Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review went to print, it is believed that many of 
the dead are Turkish citizens. “Our relations with Israel will never be the same,” Hüseyin 
Çelik, spokesman of the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, told reporters Monday. 
The Israeli attack dealt a devastating blow to relations already strained by tensions 
over Israeli actions in Gaza in late 2008. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s 
escalating rhetoric that targeted the Israeli government and his remarks that Israel’s 
alleged nuclear weapons capacity was comparable to Iran’s quest to develop such 
weapons was responsible for putting a strain on bilateral ties over the past year. 
On Monday, Turkey appeared to be taking the lead in gathering international 
support against the Israeli attack, with the government already pressing international 
organizations such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference, or OIC, the European 
Union and the Arab League to take action. “The worst possible scenario has happened,” 
said the head of the Turkish Center for International Relations and Strategic Analysis, or 
TÜRKSAM, Sinan Oğan. 
“Israel has made a suicide commando move, and has committed suicide 
internationally, he said. “The Turkish-Israeli relationship is now open to every different 
scenario.” He said, “The relationship between Turkey and Israel will face its biggest test 
in history, with the possibility of Turkey taking this issue to the European Union.” 
Hasan Köni, an international relations professor, said the incident would further 
strain Turkish-Israeli ties in comments to the private Habertürk channel on Monday. 
“Israel lost a lot. It’s a major mistake in the eyes of the West. This will strengthen 
Turkey’s hands,” Köni said, adding that it will be hard to repair Turkish-Israeli ties in the 
near future following Turkey’s decision to recall its ambassador for a second time in only 
a few months. In addition to the diplomatic recall, Turkey also canceled three joint 
military drills and sporting activities on Monday. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu also 
called on the United Nations Security Council to convene an urgent meeting on the 
attack, which was declared “piracy” by Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç. Erdoğan, 
meanwhile, cut short his Latin America tour and was expected to return home Tuesday. 
Three pillars of the strategy  
Turkey’s strategy against Israel will likely be based on three main dimensions, 
including political, legal and humanitarian aspects. Politically, Turkey plans to mobilize 
all international organizations to exert pressure on Tel Aviv to change its aggressive 
policies toward the Palestinians and remove the blockade on West Bank. Turkey is also 




On the legal front, Turkish diplomats have begun to explore avenues to determine 
whether it is possible to bring the attack before international courts. Lastly, Turkey will 
also use the attack to draw attention to the humanitarian situation of the Palestinian 
people. The visit of Mahmoud Abbas, president of Palestine, is seen within this context. 
Attack not to remain unanswered 
Crisis desks were established at the Turkish Prime Ministry and the Foreign 
Ministry on Monday morning. Speaking to reporters after an emergency meeting, Arınç 
said 400 of the Mavi Marmara’s 581 passengers were Turks. 
“I strongly condemn the use of force by Israeli military forces on an aid convoy 
composed of 32 countries, including Turkey,” he said. “This attack must not remain 
unanswered.” Arınç said the government was not involved in the organization of the 
flotilla, saying it was a pure civil society initiative. Early in the day, Israel’s ambassador 
to Ankara, Gabby Levy, was summoned to the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Deputy 
Undersecretary Ünal Çeviköz demanded Levy provide a detailed report about the 
outcome of the passengers of the boats, the Hürriyet Daily News has learned. 
Çeviköz said it was against international law to forcibly interfere with ships 
carrying humanitarian aid in international waters. “We want the return of the injured, and 
the cooperation needed to have them treated in Turkey. We expect the other passengers to 
be returned to their countries immediately,” he said. “We demand an end to this unlawful 
situation, and the release of the detained ships in international waters.” Meanwhile, while 
en route to the United States, Davutoğlu said, “Under all conditions, even if no one had 
been injured, this is still an act of piracy.” 
Opposition slams Israel 
Turkey’s two main opposition parties strongly criticized Israel over a deadly 
attack on ships carrying aid to Gaza, announcing their support for a government decision 
to take the issue to international organizations.“Nothing can justify this inhumane 
attack,” Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, head of the Republican People’s Party, or CHP, told 
reporters at a press conference Monday. Criticizing the Israeli government for not 
sufficiently warning members of civilian organizations before their departure that soldiers 
could use deadly force, Kılıçdaroğlu said recalling the Turkish ambassador was the 
correct decision. Devlet Bahçeli, head of the Nationalist Movement Party, or MHP, called 
Israel’s attacks barbaric and said attacking a ship flying a Turkish flag was a hostile 
move. “These attacks should not be left unreciprocated. The reaction of the government 
should not be temporary and left on paper.” 
He also asked the government to cut all economic and defense relations with 
Israel, adding that the country must pay compensation for the attacks. “It should also 





Third theme: Calls and debates on the UN investigation. 
Original Stories 
 
Ha’aretz- Israel rejects UN proposal for joint Gaza flotilla probe with U.S. and 
Turkey. BY Barak Ravid, June 6, 2010 
Israel rejected on Sunday a proposal by United Nations Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon for an international investigation into its deadly raid on a Gaza-bound aid ship 
and said it had the right to launch its own inquiry."We are rejecting an international 
commission. We are discussing with the Obama administration a way in which our 
inquiry will take place," Michael Oren, Israel's ambassador to Washington, said on the 
U.S. TV program "Fox News Sunday". The UN chief had suggested establishing a panel 
that would be headed by former New Zealand prime minister Geoffrey Palmer and 
include representatives from Turkey, Israel and the United States, an Israeli official said 
earlier in Jerusalem. 
Netanyahu discussed the proposal for a multinational panel with Ban in a 
telephone call on Saturday but told cabinet ministers from his right-wing Likud party on 
Sunday that Israel was exploring other options, political sources said."I told [Ban] that 
the investigation of the facts must be carried out responsibly and objectively," Netanyahu 
told ministers. "We need to consider the issue carefully and level-headedly, while 
maintaining Israel's national interests as well as those of the Israel Defense Forces." 
The prime minister said he told Ban that some of the passengers aboard the 
stormed the Mavi Marmara were members of an extremist terror-backing Turkish 
organization. He stressed that any investigation into the event should determine who 
organized these extremists, who funded them and supplied them with equipment, and 
how they ended up on the ship. 
Netanyahu also discussed the Israeli blockade on Gaza, saying that discussions 
surrounding the easing of the blockade had begun before the flotilla ever set sail. "Our 
desire is to facilitate the transfer of civilian and humanitarian goods to the civilian 
population, while preventing the transfer of weapons and warfare materials." He added 
that "the provocative flotilla will not stop us from discussing this, and we are considering 
proposals on the topic made by friendly nations." The prime minister further told the 
cabinet that he spoke with U.S. Vice President Joe Biden over the weekend as well as the 
prime ministers of Greece and Bulgaria.  
Nine Turks were killed on Monday in the Israeli commando raid on the Mavi 
Marmara, part of a six-vessel convoy that set out to challenge an Israeli-led blockade. 
Israel has said its troops used lethal force in self-defense after they were set upon by pro-
Palestinian activists wielding clubs and knives. Israeli leaders have spoken publicly about 
setting up an internal investigation with foreign observers into the interception of the 
Turkish-flagged ship off the coast of Gaza, an enclave run by Hamas Islamists who 
oppose Western-backed Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas's peace efforts with 
Israel. "Israel is a democratic nation. Israel has the ability and the right to investigate 
itself, not to be investigated by any international board," Oren said. Turkish Foreign 
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, speaking on CNN, said Ankara would insist on an 
independent commission and suggested that Israel's rejection of an international inquiry 
showed it wanted to cover up the facts of the raid. "We want to know the facts. If Israel 
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rejects this, it means it is also another proof of their guilt. They are not self-confident to 
face the facts," he said. 
Turkey's relations with Israel, once a close ally, have soured badly since the 
deadly raid. Israel's navy boarded another ship carrying aid and pro-Palestinian activists 
to Gaza on Saturday. Its interception of the Irish-owned MV Rachel Corrie ended without 
violence following diplomatic efforts to avoid bloodshed. "I want to pay tribute to the 
crew of the Rachel Corrie for demonstrating in no uncertain terms their peaceful 
intentions," Irish Foreign Minister Micheal Martin told Irish public radio RTE. "We of 
course communicated that relentlessly to the Israeli authorities."An Israeli official said 
Israel wanted to establish whether the Turkish government had sponsored the Mavi 
Marmara, where the strength of the resistance to the boarding party appeared to have 
caught the Israeli military off guard. Israel has said seven of its troops were wounded. 
 
The Jerusalem Post- Turkey demands int’l inquiry c’tee By E. Solomont, June 1, 
2010   
NEW YORK - The United Nations Security Council convened an emergency 
meeting on Monday afternoon to discuss Israel’s raid of a Gaza-bound flotilla that left at 
least 10 dead and dozens more wounded.  Amid a sharp international outcry across 
Europe and the Middle East, diplomats gathered in New York for an urgent meeting, with 
Arab states pushing for a full investigation that would hold Israel accountable for its role 
in the fatal naval operation. Several states blamed Monday’s bloodshed on Israel’s 
blockade of Gaza, and called for an immediate end to Israeli restrictions. 
Set for 1 p.m. New York time, the meeting was called at the behest of several 
countries, including Turkey, a non-permanent member of the council, and Lebanon, 
which holds the council presidency until midnight Tuesday. Addressing the Security 
Council, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu called Israel’s use of force both 
“inappropriate and disproportionate.” Israel must be prepared to face the consequences 
and be held responsible for its crimes, he said. 
“This is a black day in the history of humanity when the distance between 
terrorists and states has been blurred,” he said. “It is murder conducted by a state,” with 
“no excuse, no justification whatsoever.” He urged the council to adopt a statement 
condemning Israel’s actions; calling for a full investigation; and punishing those 
responsible. 
During a visit to Uganda, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon condemned the 
violence and called for a “full investigation to determine exactly how this bloodshed took 
place.” Speaking to reporters in Kampala following the opening of a conference on the 
International Criminal Court, the top UN official condemned the violence that occurred.  
“I am shocked by reports of killings and injuries of people on boats carrying 
supplies for Gaza,” he said. “I believe Israel must urgently provide a full explanation,” he 
added. “Right now, what is absolutely vital is that we first have a full account of the 
incident, what had happened, and Israel must provide the full explanation on this.” 
Amid calls for Israel to be held accountable, several states criticized the blockade 
of Gaza.“It is a matter of grave concern that Israeli action should end in such heavy loss 
of life,” the British ambassador to the UN said. “There is an unambiguous need for Israel 
to act with restraint.” He said it was “clearer than ever” that Israel’s restrictions must be 
limited, and that “the current closure is unacceptable and counterproductive.” 
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'Israel regrets loss of innocent lives, it was not a peaceful protest' 
Daniel Carmon, Israel’s deputy permanent representative to the UN, strongly 
defended Israel’s response, while characterizing the results of the operation as “tragic and 
unfortunate.” “Let me be very clear,” he said. “This was not a peaceful protest.” 
Those on board the ships “were not humanitarian aid activists,” he said. “What 
kind of peace activists use knives, clubs and other weapons to attack soldiers who board a 
ship in accordance with international law?” Carmon said the naval operation had begun 
as a preventive measure to counter illegal breakage of the Gaza blockade. Israel acted to 
protect its own civilians and ensure the country’s security. “Let me remind the council 
that a state of armed conflict exists between Israel and the Hamas terrorist regime 
controlling Gaza,” with mortars regularly launched toward Israel, he said. “Let me 
remind the council that Gaza is occupied by terrorists that ousted the [Palestinian 
Authority] in a violent coup, and that arms are continuously being smuggled, including 
by sea.” A maritime blockade is a legitimate and recognized measure under international 
law, he said.  
“Israel provided, in due time, not only information about the existence of the 
blockade, but also appropriate notification to the relevant governments and to the 
organizers of the Gaza Flotilla,” Carmon asserted. 
The organizers had other plans, he charged. The soldiers boarding one of the ships 
were “violently attacked” with live ammunition, knives, clubs, deck furniture and other 
weapons in what amounted to “no less than a lynch,” he said. “The soldiers undoubtedly 
acted in self-defense, prompted by the uncontrolled violent attempts on their lives.” 
Earlier on Monday, the White House said it “deeply regrets” the loss of life and 
injuries incurred during the raid.“The US deeply regrets the loss of life and injuries 
sustained and is currently working to understand the circumstances surrounding this 
tragedy,” a White House spokesman said. 
Meanwhile, a group of Arab ambassadors met at the Egyptian mission to the UN 
in New York on Monday morning to coordinate their effort. “We condemn this action by 
Israel and we call, collectively as Arabs, for an independent international investigation to 
know who gave the orders on the Israeli side to open fire on civilians,” said Riyad 
Mansour, the Palestinian observer to the UN. Speaking to reporters in New York ahead of 
the Security Council meeting, he said, “The Security Council will have an open session at 
1 p.m., and we are exerting all efforts so that the Security Council will shoulder its 
responsibility, that will rise to the level of crimes of Israel”. This kind of “provocation 
and aggression” on the part of the Israelis, he said, was not conducive to peace 
negotiations, including proximity talks. And he ridiculed Prime Minister Binyamin 
Netanyahu’s decision to cancel a visit to the White House on Tuesday.  “I guess he is so 
embarrassed to face a new chapter of criminal action against the Palestinian people,” he 
said. As the unofficial sponsor of the flotilla, Turkey was among the countries to call 
immediately for a meeting of the Security Council. “This attack is another sign of the 
reckless levels that the Israeli government’s violent policies have reached,” said Deputy 
Prime Minister Bulent Arinc. “We condemn Israel’s attack at the highest level.” 
Dozens of stone-throwing protesters tried to storm the Israeli Consulate in 
Istanbul after the IDF flotilla raid was reported. Protesters scuffled with Turkish police 
guarding the consulate; later, peaceful demonstrators held Palestinian flags and listened 
to readings from the Koran. 
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Robert Serry and Filippo Grandi, UN officials involved in the Middle East peace 
process, condemned the raid and said it had taken place “apparently in international 
waters.” In a joint statement, they said, “We wish to make clear that such tragedies are 
entirely avoidable if Israel heeds the repeated calls of the international community to end 
its counterproductive and unacceptable blockade of Gaza.” France, Germany and Britain 
expressed shock at the early morning raid. In a statement, Tony Blair, the representative 
of the quartet – which includes the US, UN, EU and Russia – expressed “deep regret and 
shock at the tragic loss of life.”  The statement continued, “We need a different and better 
way of helping the people of Gaza and avoiding the hardship and tragedy that is inherent 
in the current situation.” The European Union also criticized Israel for excessive use of 
force. The EU called for an investigation by Israel and the lifting of the Gaza blockade, 
which it deemed “politically unacceptable.” In a statement, EU foreign policy chief 
Catherine Ashton expressed “deep regret” at the loss of life and violence and extended 
her sympathies to the families of the dead and wounded. 
 
Today’s Zaman - Ankara: Israel’s own inquiry far from global expectations 
June 16, 2010 
ANKARA - Ankara has strongly condemned Israel's apparently intentional snub 
of a UN proposal for a full international investigation into its own forces' lethal raid on a 
Gaza aid flotilla, while urging the international community, particularly Washington, to 
up pressure on Israel to agree to this proposal. Furthermore, the Turkish capital clearly 
reiterated that it would take “certain measures” in the eventual absence of Israel's 
affirmation of the UN proposal. On May 31, Israeli commandos killed one US national 
and eight Turkish peace activists when they boarded the Mavi Marmara, part of a six-
vessel convoy that set out to challenge the blockade of the Gaza Strip. The bloodshed 
triggered an international outcry and damaged Israel's ties with Turkey. Israel's cabinet 
convened on Monday to form a commission to carry out an Israeli inquiry into a deadly 
raid on the Gaza aid flotilla, while responding to international demands for impartiality 
by putting two foreign observers on the panel. 
“Israel's declaration that it will establish a commission composed of Israeli 
citizens and two foreign observers in order to investigate the Israeli raid against the 
Freedom Flotilla does not in any way meet Turkey's clear demand or the international 
community's expectations, which were expressed in the Presidential Statement of the 
United Nations Security Council,” the Turkish Foreign Ministry said in a written 
statement released late on Monday. 
“An inquiry to be conducted by such a commission cannot be impartial, fair, 
transparent and credible,” the ministry said, because, “Israel does not have the authority 
to assign a national commission to investigate a crime perpetrated in international 
waters.” 
Recalling that Turkey has indeed already agreed to the proposal by UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon, which was conveyed to the Turkish and Israeli prime ministers 
only five days after the raid, to establish an international commission comprising one 
Turkish, one Israeli and three international experts, the statement added: “We strongly 
condemn Israel's disregard of this proposal to date. We expect that the international 
community, and above all the US, which lost a citizen of its own, will support this 




Speaking to reporters late on Monday following a Cabinet meeting during which 
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu informed Cabinet members of the latest 
developments regarding the issue, Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Çiçek echoed the 
message within the Foreign Ministry statement. Turkey has already accepted Ban's 
proposal, Çiçek noted. “Israel has yet to respond to this. If Israel accepts this proposal, 
then the matter will be examined thoroughly by this commission in all its aspects and 
where each party can provide any materials or documents they may have or any defense 
they may make for this violence,” Çiçek continued. 
“Today, we discussed measures which will be taken if Israel rejects the UN 
secretary-general's proposal because those people who lost their lives are our citizens. A 
considerable number of people who were injured are our citizens. A commission set up 
unilaterally by Israel will not satisfy us,” he said, while noting that the currently 
unspecified measures against Israel would be announced according to upcoming 
developments within days, and in particular according to Israel's stance on the UN 
proposal. 
EU in ‘wait and see’ mood While the White House has backed Israel's inquiry, 
calling it “an important step forward,” the European Union is reportedly planning to 
“wait and see” how Israel's inquiry is conducted before taking a firm stance on its 
legitimacy. 
“I think this is an important step forward in what is called for in the UN Security 
Council presidential statement. That said, we're not going to prejudge the process or the 
outcome,” US State Department spokesman Philip J. Crowley told reporters at a daily 
press briefing on Monday. “Turkey, as any sovereign country, has a right to conduct its 
own investigation. I'm not aware that Turkey has reached its own judgment on how to 
proceed,” he also said in response to a question. 
In Brussels, an EU diplomat was quoted as saying that the 27-nation bloc plans to 
wait and see how Israel's inquiry is conducted before taking a firm stance on its 
legitimacy. “There was no willingness to approve it or to explicitly disapprove it,” the EU 
diplomat told news portal EUobserver following a meeting of EU foreign ministers in 
Luxembourg on Monday. 
“Since it was not possible to agree on a judgment, we can always reserve our 
position and see how it functions in practice. It's a similar situation to the Goldstone 
inquiry. In the beginning we had our reservations. But in the end it did a good job,” the 
diplomat added, referring to a recent UN report which accused Israel of war crimes in 
Gaza in 2009. 
UN rapporteur skeptical 
 In Geneva, Richard Falk, UN special rapporteur on Palestinian issues, has 
expressed doubt over the internal probe of the Israeli government, saying that he is 
“rather skeptical” of the probe “given the kind of statements that the political leadership 
of Israel has made about not subjecting the Israeli military participants in the naval 
operation to any kind of questioning.” Falk, speaking to reporters on Monday, said 
Israel's own probes into its 2008-2009 assault on Gaza did not inspire confidence as the 
biggest violation found was “that an Israeli soldier had stolen a credit card” from a 
Palestinian. “None of the serious allegations involving tactics and weapons and the attack 




Hürriyet Daily News - Israel rejects international investigation of raid  
By The Associated Press, June 3, 2010  
JERUSALEM - Israel has rejected international calls for an investigation of its 
deadly raid on a Gaza-bound aid flotilla. Israel on Thursday rejected calls from the 
United Nations and others for an international investigation of its deadly raid on a Gaza-
bound aid flotilla but left the door open to foreign involvement. Israel says the 
commandos used force, killing nine people, only after activists attacked them with 
knives, crowbars and clubs, as well as two pistols grabbed from raiders. Activists who 
had set sail for Gaza with tons of aid, hoping to break Israel's 3-year-old blockade of 
Gaza, say Israeli commandos fired first. 
Officials have insisted Israel's military already is investigating the raid and the 
country is capable of conducting a credible review. "It is our standard practice after 
military operations, especially operations in which there have been fatalities, to conduct a 
prompt, professional, transparent and objective investigation in accordance with the 
highest international standards," government spokesman Mark Regev said. 
Another official in the prime minister's office said there would be no separate 
international investigation. He spoke on condition of anonymity pending an official 
decision. Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, however, proposed attaching 
international observers to an internal Israeli probe. He told the Ynet news website that he 
has proposed setting up a commission of inquiry, headed by a respected former Israeli 
Supreme Court judge. "If they'll ask to include foreign observers, we'll include them," 
Lieberman said. A junior Cabinet member, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, went even further, 
saying, "an international commission of inquiry must be established because we have 
nothing to hide. "We must quell world criticism," Ynet quoted Ben-Eliezer as telling 
fellow Labor Party ministers. An inner Cabinet of ministers with security responsibilities 
must convene to discuss the matter. Israel has refused to cooperate with previous 
international probes, most recently the U.N. investigation into Israel's 2009 war in the 
Gaza Strip that concluded that both the Israelis and Hamas militants, who control Gaza, 
committed war crimes. 
Israel says the commission that ordered the probe has a record of anti-Israel 
conduct, and has rejected the investigation as fundamentally flawed. The international 
outrage over the deaths on board the flotilla's lead ship, the Mavi Marmara, has sparked a 
wave of protests across the diplomatic world and condemnations by a sheaf of countries. 
South Africa became the latest country to recall its ambassador to Israel, although it 
stressed it has no intention of expelling the Israeli ambassador or cutting diplomatic ties 
with the Jewish state. 
The raid has also provoked multiple demands for an international probe, and on 
Wednesday, U.N. chief Ban Ki-moon indicated he was headed in that direction. In a 
strongly worded statement, the Arab League called the raid "state piracy and terrorism" 
and said it threatened regional stability and security. Arab foreign ministers also urged 
the U.N. Security Council to force Israel to lift the blockade. Earlier this week, the 15-
nation U.N Security Council called for a "prompt, impartial, credible and transparent 
investigation conforming to international standards" but stopped short of calling for an 
independent international investigation. The U.S., as a member of the council, supported 
that statement. Washington's special Mideast envoy, who is in the region to mediate 
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another round of indirect talks between Israelis and Palestinians, said the raid 
"underscores the need to make progress in negotiations to lead to a two-state solution." 
"The tragedy of last week cannot be allowed to spiral out of control and undermine the 
limited but real progress that has been made," envoy George Mitchell said Thursday at an 
investment conference in the West Bank city of Bethlehem. 
